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WHITE, LAURIE LAKE, Ph.D. Modern Traditions of the Essay. 
(1987) Directed by Dr. Walter H. Beale. 220 pp. 
Critical interest in the essay as a genre has increased 
in recent years with the rise of non-fiction studies 
focusing on the essay as literary art. The argument of this 
dissertation is that the essay is best seen as a form of 
rhetoric, and Walter Beale°s theory of discourse provides a 
theoretical model for this view. Categorizing the essay as 
rhetorical accounts for the sermonic aim of the form and its 
protean nature. 
The essay's rhetorical aim is connected with the 
spirit of skepticism which has informed it from its incep­
tion. Both Montaigne and Bacon were skeptics, although 
their anti-dogmatism took different forms. Too, skepticism 
has been associated with rhetorical practice since Cicero. 
The weighing of probabilities, the willing suspension of 
judgment, and the examination of different sides of a 
question are the characteristics of rhetoricians and 
skeptics. They are the characteristics, too, of the essay 
which is, by name and reputation, only a "try," not a 
system. 
In our own day, the popularity of the essay form 
attests to a new age of skepticism, and a revived interest 
in rhetorical discourse. The major portion of this work is 
a study of five modern writers whose essays vary from op-eds 
to book reviews to autobiographical narratives. 
By studying modern practitioners of the two streams of 
the essay tradition—the followers of Bacon and Montaigne 
—we can see the various forms that the persuasive aim of 
the essay can assume. The rhetorical analyses of three 
Baconian essayists whose work is characteristically 
suasory—George Will, Paul Fussell, and Paul Theroux—reveal 
the voice of the aphorist and sophisticated teacher. On the 
other hand, analyses of two followers of Montaigne—Lewis 
Thomas and Joan Didion—reveal their reliance on self-depre­
cation and lyricism in making their points. 
All five of these essayists write reflective-
exploratory essays, the oldest category of the essay, the 
closest to poetic discourse, the most difficult to categor­
ize, and the most volatile. By studying their essays we can 
see the subtlety of their rhetoric and the connections of 
their work with deliberative argument as well as fiction and 
poetry. 
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THE TRUE ESSAY 
"The simplest and safest definition of the essay is that it 
is the kind of composition produced by an essayist." 
—J.Be Priestley 
Debates about the essay seem curiously old-fashioned in 
comparison with other literary discussions. Critics still 
engage in heated arguments over the constitution of the 
"true essay" long after they have relaxed generic require­
ments for other kinds of literature. Even the language they 
use is reminiscent of an earlier, more dogmatic criticism. 
In a recent article, for example, Richard Chadbourne asserts 
that American studies of the essay "confirm the belief, 
hardly new, since many an essayist and student of the essay 
have held it intuitively without arguing for it, that the 
essay is indeed a branch of what the Greeks called poetry 
. . . and what we would call creative or imaginative 
literature." On the other hand, Quebecois studies of the 
genre reveal a "deplorable [underlining mine] tendency to 
equate the essay with non-fiction" (Chadbourne 138, 146). 
Mary E. Rucker in a 1975 article, "The Literary Essay and 
the Modern Temper," wonders "just how far may the tradition­
al essay as it was shaped by Montaigne adapt to a dynamic 
social order without becoming the polemic article?" (323). 
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This sort of scolding of a "deplorably" wayward genre 
was common among critics in the twenties discussing the 
experiments of Faulkner, Eliot, and Woolf. But critics and 
readers as well grew accustomed to the anarchies of poets 
and novelists, and gave up attempting to hold authors to 
strict generic requirements. Not so with the essay. The 
sort of narrow definition insisted upon by Charles Whitmore 
in a 1921 article, "The Field of the Essay," is echoed in 
the most recent articles and dissertations on the essay 
genre. According to Whitmore, the only "true" essay is the 
literary or "familiar" essay. He despairs of being able to 
restrict the term—"the free and easy use has gone on too 
long to be easily discarded"—but hopes to distinguish "the 
true essay from the study, the portrait, and the sketch" 
(564). 
In our day, the emotional defense of a genre is 
uncommon, but in this case it is understandable. Literary 
critics wish to "save" the essay from the reviled categories 
of the temporal, the unimaginative, the polemical—in other 
words, from the netherworld of "non-fiction prose." Their 
efforts, however have resulted in a reductive narrowing of 
critical comment on the essay. Even the most liberal 
critics, such as the deconstructionists who have enlarged 
the essay category to include literary criticism, resort in 
most cases to precious argument and hair-splitting when 
discussing the essay. 
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Critical confusion about the nature of the essay is a 
reflection of the larger confusion about the nature of 
"non-fiction" prose. Recently, the term "literary non-fic­
tion" has come into vogue, both as a refinement of the old 
category and as an attempt by critics to envision a higher 
status for some "rhetorical" writing. Nevertheless, 
"non-fiction" as a term continues to connote the negative. 
As Norman Podhoretz wrote in 1958: 
[We have all become] so accustomed ... to thinking in 
terms of two radically different categories of mind 
the imaginative, which is the mind that creates, and 
the . . . well, there is not even an adequate word for 
the other kind of mind. 'Critical* won't do because it 
has too restricted a reference; nor will Nphilosophi-
cal1 quite serve. The fact is that our attitude 
reveals itself beautifully in this terminological 
difficulty: we call everything that is not fiction or 
poetry 'non-fiction,' as though whole ranges of human 
thought had only a negative existence.(77) 
In this dissertation, I propose to examine the essay 
with a more refined instrument than the blunt "non-fiction" 
specification. I believe that the genre is inherently more 
rhetorical than poetic, although I agree with other critics 
that many essays have lasting literary merit, even when 
conceived in a context of immediacy and the rhetorical 
imperative. There is nothing remarkable about such a 
judgment, for this has been the case with other works of 
rhetoric—from The Republic to Lincoln's Second Inaugural 
Address. Such a view of the essay is easier to articulate 
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in a climate of renewed respect for rhetorical discourse. 
Modern rhetoricians, such as Walter Ongf Douglas Ehninger, 
James Kinneavy and Walter Beale, have alerted us to the 
variety, complexity, and interdependence of different kinds 
of discourse, so that the old rough and ready distinctions 
between "imaginative and factual" or "literary and non-lit­
erary" no longer serve. 
In this first chapter I want to examine some of the 
characteristics of the essay traditionally associated with 
the genre. I believe that these characteristics are sympto­
matic of the inherently rhetorical nature of the essay, 
particularly as indicated in Walter Beale's theory of 
discourse. At the end of the chapter I shall summarize 
Beale's theory as it concerns the essay genre in its several 
varieties or sub-genres. 
The Essay and Fiction 
What distinguishes some essays, particularly personal, 
reflective pieces from fiction? Did Orwell actually shoot 
an elephant or E.B. White see two ganders fighting for 
dominance in the barnyard? How do we distinguish between an 
obvious bit of fancy (such as Addison's dissertation on a 
"beau's brain") and a satirical short story? Such questions 
are best answered by adhering to a contractual idea of 
discourse, which presupposes a relationship between writer 
and reader in which the writer supplies certain clues about 
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the nature of the work. In the case of some essays, there 
is external evidence that events took place as the author 
describes. More often, however, readers expect certain 
things to happen in an essay or other genres because of 
their reading experiences. This "internal evidence," as 
critic Robert Davis terms it, is the ground for the author's 
"implied contract with the reader about the kind of truth 
that is being offered him" (12). 
Davis is not the first critic who has commented on the 
importance of "internal evidence" for an accurate reading of 
a piece of discourse. It was Kenneth Burke who defined form 
as "the arousal and fulfillment of desires" fCounterstate-
ment) , and Wayne Booth in 2M Rhetoric of Fiction writes 
that "imaginative works . . . make us desire a 
quality" (126) . This desire is not only intellectual—a 
desire for truth—-but formal as well. According to Booth, a 
genre evokes and satisfies certain expectations of "cause 
and effect," "convention," "abstract forms," and "promised 
qualities"—distinctive qualities exhibited in the beginning 
of a work are "promised" to be repeated (Booth 126-128). 
This is true of non-fiction works as well. The voice 
of Montaigne in his Essais is the primary "quality," 
promised in the first pages, which holds the work together. 
And, according to Booth, the voice in the Essais is as much 
an invention as the narrator's voice in a work of fiction. 
6 
If we look closely at the ''Montaigne' who emerges from 
these completed pages, we cannot help rejecting any 
simple distinction between fiction and biography or 
essay. The Montaigne of the book is by no stretch of 
the imagination the real Montaigne, pouring himself 
onto the page without regard for ""aesthetic distance.' 
(Booth 228) 
Booth in his Rhetoric of Fiction brilliantly demons­
trates the slipperiness of "simple distinctions" between 
fiction and rhetorical genres, and the importance of a 
case-by-case approach to generic criticism based on con­
tracts or "promises" between authors and readers. Neverthe­
less, since I want to define the genre more precisely than 
just "fictional non-fiction" I must examine other aspects or 
"promised qualities" traditionally associated with the 
genre. 
The Essayist's Personal Voice 
The oldest form of the essay is the "personal" or 
"familiar" essay developed by Montaigne. Indeed, as I 
already mentioned, some critics such as Whitmore hold that 
it is the only "true" essay. H.V. Routh in his 1920 
article, "The Origins of the Essay Compared in English and 
French Literatures," expresses the traditional notion of the 
literary essayist as a personal voice speaking directly to a 
reader: 
Lyric poetry creates a passion; drama creates emotional 
or mental crisis; epic creates action .... None 
attain their end until they're recited. The essay 
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. . . creates . . . its author's point of view. But 
the essay needs an idiomatic, sinuous and desultory 
style which can guide us through the labyrinth of a 
fellow creature's mind, and it does not attain its full 
effect unless it is read leisurely and in seclusion. 
(Routh 31) 
Routh's comment also suggests the importance of print as the 
medium for the essay. Only a reader in "seclusion" can 
follow such a "sinuous" style. The essay's flexibility is 
connected with its history as a print-based genre, "of all 
genres the most spontaneous and the least subject to the 
tyranny of schools," (32), which traditionally are associat­
ed with formality and orality. In fact, Routh believes that 
the salons of seventeenth-century France, with the attendant 
growth of formalism and schools of literature, contributed 
to the decline of the familiar essay in that country 
(34-35) . 
One of the more interesting quirks of the personal or 
"familiar" essay, then, is that it seeks to mimic a "person­
al voice" by relying on the artifice of print. -The essay, 
which is associated with naturalness and conversation, could 
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not have developed fully in an oral culture. Nevertheless, 
the essay's connections with good conversation are many. As 
Robert Davis reminds us, many of history's most famous 
essayists—Shaw, Wilde, Johnson, Auden, Coleridge, 
Emerson—were also renowned conversationalists. "Much 
conversation ... is a testing out of one's opinions, 
tastes, and characteristic experiences by seeing how others 
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respond to them or how they might look to other eyes. . . . 
The essayist can draw upon his best moments in conversation 
but add and develop in a way that is possible only in a 
thoughtfully composed piece of writing" (11). 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the emphasis on "good conversation" was reflected in 
essays. This emphasis was connected with the growth of the 
middle-class. The newly affluent and upwardly mobile were 
insecure in their positions and dutifully looked to 
experts — Cast iglione , Bacon, Addison and Steele—for 
guidance and instruction in the social arts, including the 
art of conversation. Furthermore, especially in the 
eighteenth century, "good conversation" usually meant "moral 
conversation." As George Marr has noted in his book on the 
periodical essayists, the establishment of middle class 
morals in reaction to the excesses of the Restoration was a 
positive work of reform, in the shape of supplying 
subjects for conversation, rules for good manners, and 
for the observance of the lesser morals which both 
Addison and Steele could and did present in an attrac­
tive manner. (32) 
The Essay and the Sermon 
Moral instruction is another "promised" quality that 
an experienced reader expects of an essay. Many years ago, 
Leslie Stephen located the heart of the essay in rhetorical 
discourse. He believed that the essayist's moralistic 
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stance is the most important element of the genre so that 
the English love of essays can be directly traced to their 
"love of sermons of all varieties, from sermons in stone to 
sermons in rhyme" (45). 
Literary historians trace the sermonic element in 
essays throughout the complicated geneology of the genre. 
Not only does the rhetorical nature of the essay have 
classical roots—Plutarch's Moralia. Cicero's Distiches—but 
medieval ones as well in the ecclesiastical oral instruction 
of the Middle Ages. "Essays were 'spoken essays.8 Utter­
ances of teacher/preachers were sermonic" (Dawson and Dawson 
5) . Both Bacon and Montaigne were moralists, and William 
Bryan and Ronald Crane believe that they "treated problems 
of morality in light of classical precept and example 
. . . [although their view was] morality from the indivi­
dual's point of view" (xxiii). The tone is very different 
in Addison and Steele's essays of the Eighteenth Century; 
the examination of moral problems is as connected with 
author and audience's preoccupation with respectability as 
with their yearning for high moral principles. 
One of the most nakedly "sermonic" elements in modern 
essays — the coining and quoting of wise sayings—is a 
bequest of the Renaissance. Elbert Thompson in his study of 
The Seventeenth Century: English Essay., notes that the 
composition of aphorisms and maxims "became a common 
preoccupation in sixteenth-century Italy" as an adjunct to 
the study of "statecraft" (Thompson 23). In England, 
encyclopedic commonplace books provided "sentences, apo­
thegms, and examples from classical literature," all in 
English, for the writer or speaker who wished a fashionable 
classical patina to his work (Thompson 11). Robert Davis 
records Montaigne's debt to Erasmus's Adag ia and 
Colloauia; "Some of Montaigne's essays were like belles 
pensees . . . dealing rather loosely with a single thought" 
( 1 ) .  
The ambition of the middle class was, as is widely 
noticed, a powerful influence on literature in the Renaissa­
nce as well as the eighteenth century. Social insecurity 
lies behind the popularity of Renaissance emblem books and 
dialogues on right living. These antedate and contribute to 
later essays on isolated traits and characteristics of "the 
gentleman." Descriptions of beaux, gentlemen, and other 
"types" were part of the tradition of the "character" essay, 
a category which achieved wide popularity in the seventeenth 
century, and continued as a staple in the eighteenth in 
periodical essays. The Theophrastean character sketch, 
Thompson notes, "had reached England indirectly through the 
medium of rhetorical text-books, and directly through 
Casaubon's edition in 1592 and John Healey's English 
translation that soon followed" (86). By the time Sir Roger 
de Coverley and Isaac Bickerstaff appeared in Addison's and 
Steele's papers, the "character" was more than a stick-man 
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on which to hang a virtue or vice. Thus, the periodical 
essayist's characters were ancestors of the novelist's. 
Addison, writes George Marr, 
seems to have had a real genius for tale-telling, and 
if he had lived in our own day, or even a generation 
after our own, he might have been a successful novelist 
(34). 
In fact, Marr makes a direct connection between 
periodical essays and the development of the novel, especi­
ally the intrusions of an omniscient, didactic narrator. Af­
ter all, most novelists even to the present day have also 
been essayists. Fielding, for example, worked on The 
Champion before writing Joseph Andrews. Marr mentions the 
essay-quality of the "asides" and inter-chapters—little 
sermons—in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones. He believes 
these interchapters [of Tom Jones1 show Fielding at his 
best, and indicate that the novel was not yet entirely 
severed from the periodical. The bridge which bridged 
the gap between the Sir Roger &£ Coverlev series and a 
novel like Tom Jones had not yet been destroyed. (114) 
Essayists of the Nineteenth Century, according to 
G. Robert Stange (in an article on George Eliot's critical 
essays) made two great contributions to the essay genre: the 
nature essay and the literary or critical article. We can 
still see the rhetorical stance of the essayist behind these 
two sub-genres, although the "sermonic" quality is more 
muted. Nevertheless, the nature essay and critical article 
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did promote certain values. According to Stange, the nature 
essay was developed "as a reaction to . . . growing urban-
ism, a response to the newly possible bourgeois luxury." 
Its intended audience were "city dwellers . . » sheltered 
from the harsher aspects of outdoor life . . . [and] the 
values it promoted were distinctly antiurban" (315). 
The values promoted by critical articles are often more 
aesthetic than moral, although, of course, the two are 
inseparable at some point. The pronouncements of nineteenth 
century critical essayists were sermonic, and, according to 
Stange, reflected a growing specialization of knowledge. The 
"Victorian Sage," as Kathleen Tillotson has called him or 
her, provided the kind of expert opinion increasingly valued 
by a population intent on self-improvement and aware that no 
one person could master and analyze the flood of new 
information. 
In his remarks on Eliot's critical essays, Stange 
writes that: 
the literary or critical essay, usually in the form of 
an article in a journal, had become during her life­
time—and has since remained—the dominant form of 
essay writing. Though critical essays were usually 
analytic and, to a certain degree, reflective, the 
intentions of the form marked it off at once from the 
earlier moral essay. Directed to a definable 
referent—books or works of art, systems of ideas, 
intellectual structures—this new kind of essay was 
valued according to the amount of specialized knowledge 
the author managed to apply to the subject.(315-316) 
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The Essay and Criticism 
Recently, deconstructionist critics have made even 
greater claims for the critical essay. Rather than seeing 
the form as a threat to literature, a rather standard 
response at mid-century from writers such as Randall Jarrell 
and Saul Bellow who decried the "Age of Criticism,™ some 
critics and writers now began to see the critical essay as 
the best literature of our time. Geoffrey Hartman is 
notable in both his championing of and experimentation with 
the critical essay. Writing in the New York Times Book 
Review on April 5, 1981, Hartman speaks of the critical 
essay as: 
prose above all, . . . [as] an essay above all: a 
literary and experimental work rather than a dogmatic 
pronouncement. I do not mean, of course, that everyone 
should purple his prose or load it with literary 
ornament. But if we are indeed in an Age of Criticism, 
and if a 'literature of criticism' now exists, and if 
there is no reason to deny the critical essay a dignity 
and even a creative touch of its own, then criticism, 
too, will have to be read closely. It should not be 
fobbed off as a secondary activity, as a handmaiden to 
more 'creative' modes of thinking like poems or novels. 
(1) 
Hartman's view thus stated is eminently sensible and in line 
with a more pluralistic view of discourse than the tradi­
tional literary elitist's. He remarks in the same article 
that the blurring of generic boundaries is a good thing in 
many ways, giving rise to different forms. Criticism, 
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believes Hartman, "is creative* that is, within literature 
rather than outside of it and merely looking in, and it is 
scientific, and must therefore develop its own language and 
methodology" (24). 
Actually, however, Hartman and other critics who 
"promote" the value of the critical essay, are traditiona­
lists about discourse in an important way: despite their 
cries for an egalitarian view of writing, they reveal their 
literary bias in their insistence on the "literariness" of 
the critical essay. Hartman, ironically enough, does "purple 
his prose [and] load it with literary ornament" when he 
writes critical essays for scholarly publications. Unlike 
the lucid prose he uses for the general audience of the New 
York Times, Hartman's literary criticism is as densely 
textured as "demanding" poetry. The implication is that in 
order for criticism to be as good as literature—and as 
autonomous—it must present the same sort of challenge. As 
Hartman has said in a "literary" critical essay in a 1976 
issue of Comparative Literature : 
What I am saying then, pedantically enough, and 
reducing a significant matter to its formal effect, is 
that literary commentary may cross the line and become 
as demanding as literature: it is an unpredictable or 
unstable 'genre' that cannot be subordinated, a priori, 
to its referential or commentating function. Comment­
ary certainly remains one of the defining features, for 
it is hardly useful to describe as criticism an essay 
that does not review in some way an existing book, 
show, or documented habit of thought. But the perspec-
tival power of criticism, its strength of recontextual-
ization, must be such that the critical essay should 
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not be considered a supplement to something else.(265) 
While Hartman proclaims that the essay is "as good as" 
poetry, Georg Lukacs, whose 1910 essay "On the Nature and 
Form of the Essay" serves as a model for HartmanSs specula­
tions about the lofty status of the critical essay (and, one 
suspects) for Hartman's "purple" style as well), contends 
that the essay surpasses poetry. Lukacs defines the true 
essay as the critical essay, but the sort of essay that 
achieves the status of "intellectual poem" (Lukacs 18). 
Poetry creates a world from images in the world; the essay, 
believes Lukacs, 
does not create new things from an empty nothingness 
but only orders those which were once alive. And 
because it orders them anew and does not form something 
new out of formlessness, it is bound to them and must 
always speak 'the truth1 about them, must find expres­
sion for their essential nature. (10) 
Richard Chadbourn has noticed the Platonic nature of 
Lukacs's preference for the formalism of the essay over the 
images of poetry (140-141) . In fact, Lukacs claims that 
Plato is "the greatest essayist who ever lived or wrote," 
whose life was inextricably bound to his thought, a life 
that was the "typical life for the essay form" (13). 
Socratic humor, the humor that Lukacs believes is an 
integral part of the essay tradition, is based on the 
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incongruous intrusion of the world of non-essentials and 
images into the world of essentials. Socrates's death, as 
portrayed by Plato, is one of these "intrusions." 
Death does not count here, it cannot be grasped by 
concepts, it interrupts the great dialogue—the only 
true reality—just as brutally, and merely from the 
outside, as those rough tutors who interrupted the 
conversation with Lysis. Such an interruption, 
however, can only be viewed humoristically, it has so 
little connection with that which it interrupts. (14) 
This same humorous irony informs the traditional 
familiar, casual voice of the critic/essayist: 
The irony I mean consists in the critic always speaking 
about the ultimate problems of life, but in a tone 
which implies that he is only discussing pictures and 
books, only the inessential and pretty ornaments of 
real life—and even then not their innermost substance 
but only their beautiful and useless surface. Thus 
each essay appears to be removed as far as possible 
from life, and the distance between them seems the 
greater, the more burningly and painfully we sense the 
actual closeness of the true essence of both. Perhaps 
the great Sieur de Montaigne felt something like this 
when he gave his writings the wonderfully elegant and 
apt title of "Essays". The simple modesty of this word 
is an arrogant courtesy. The essayist dismisses his 
own proud hopes which sometimes lead him to believe 
that he has come close to the ultimate: he has after 
all, no more to offer than explanations of the poems of 
others, or at best of his own ideas. But ironically 
adapts himself to this profound work of the intellect 
in face of life—and even emphasizes it with ironic 
modesty.(Lukacs 9-10) 
Speculations about the Platonic source of the 
essayist's traditional irony are a stock in trade of another 
critic who sets criticism on a lofty plane. Writing almost 
twenty years before Lukacs, Walter Pater, in his lectures on 
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Plato, gives an account of "the two streams of Platonism": 
What Plato presents to his readers is then, again, a 
paradox, or a reconciliation of opposed tendencies: on 
one side, the largest possible demand for infallible 
certainty in knowledge (it was he fixed that ideal of 
absolue truth, to which, vainly perhaps, the human 
mind, as such, aspires) yet, on the other side, the 
utmost possible inexactness or contingency, in the 
method by which he actually proposes to attain it. It 
has been said that the humour of Socrates of which the 
famous Socratic irony . . . was an element, is more 
than a mere personal trait .... It belonged, in 
truth, to the tentative character of dialectic, of 
question and answer as the method of discovery, of 
teaching and learning, to the position, in a word, of 
the philosophic essayist.(188-189) 
The "utmost possible inexactness" prized by Pater and Lukacs 
is also valued by deconstructionist critics such as Hartman 
who find precedent in Lukacs for their insistence on the 
arbitrary relation of text and meaning. It must be noted, 
however, that such radical skepticism is not Platonic. Of 
course, Lukacs later adopted a stringent system of belief 
that informed his mature criticism, just as the Deconstruc-
tionists' abandonment of interpretation has evolved into a 
system of interpretation. In criticism, indeed in all sorts 
of discourse, the Second Law of Thermodynamics seems to 
operate in reverse. 
Tentativeness and the Essay 
Some essayists—beginning with Montaigne—are so adept 
in their use of the undogmatic, self-deprecating voice 
("What do I know?") that many readers believe that these 
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authors are as charmingly feckless as they pretend, and, of 
course, some essayists are cynics. Actually, however, more 
often than not, the tentative essayist is more likely to be 
tentative in his approach to finding the truth than tenta­
tive in his belief that truth exists. Pater's connection 
between Socratic irony and the "tentativeness of dialectic" 
is important. The academic spirit of open-mindedness and 
exploration is an essential promised quality in the essay. 
Of course, some readers lose patience with the skeptical, 
Socratic method. G.K. Chesterton for instance comments 
that: 
the wandering thinkers have become our substitute for 
preaching friars. And whether our system is to be 
materialist or moralist, or sceptical or transcendent­
al, we need more of a system than that [of the essay­
ist] . After a certain amount of wandering the mind 
wants either to get there or to go home.(5) 
And Lukacs, who admires the essay's lack of system, 
nevertheless values the genre as a precursor to an ultimate 
system or "great aesthetic" (17). In the meantime, before 
the arrival of the great aesthetic, Lukacs sees, as did 
Pater, the role of the essay as a counterpoint to empirical 
truth. According to Chadbourne, this view is most forceful­
ly espoused by German critics. In a discussion of Bruno 
Berger's criticism, Chadbourne summarizes the prevalent 
German opinion: 
In German scholarship the essay is linked constantly to 
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'Wissenschaft,' that is 'science,' in the root meaning 
of 'knowledge.' It is the meeting ground between 'pure 
literature' and 'pure science,' the mediator between 
•poetry' and 'science.' It is a means of overcoming 
the isolation of specialists, of bridging the gap 
between science and the rest of society, between 
natural science and humanities. It can provide a 
synthesis of science and art at a 'common third level,' 
and on that level, can seek to restore the 'lost unity' 
of culture, to recapture a world-view (Weltbild), and 
to counteract the fragmentation of culture* the 
proliferation of isolated disciplines of learning, in a 
word, the disintegration of the mind. At this level it 
goes well beyond criticism in the ordinary narrow sense 
to become the criticism of life (Lebenskritik), as in 
the example of the great Romance philologist, Ernst 
Curtius. . . . (142) 
The Essay and Rhetoric 
The German view of the essay as "mediator" between 
science and poetry, as a bridge between the two cultures, is 
consistent with a view of the genre as a rhetorical produc­
tion. As Walter Beale has written, 
The other aims of discourse involve, in varying 
degrees, specializations and conventionalizations of 
discourse; the movement of rhetoric by contrast, is in 
every case toward the common interests, the common 
capabilities, and the common norms and values of 
communities. (192) 
The characteristics traditionally ascribed to the essay 
that I have discussed—its sermonic or suasory nature, with 
attendant choices of personal or impersonal voice, aphorist­
ic or narrative style and so on, and its concern with 
probabilities rather than empirical truths which make 
any judgment tentative in the long run—are essential 
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hallmarks of rhetorical discourse. 
- But many literary critics persist in seeing rhetoric as 
a handmaiden or? at best, a poor relation to serious prose. 
Because of this? they labor mightily to save the essay from 
the stigma of being categorized as rhetoric, sharing a bed 
with the deservedly reviled modern public speech. 
By "saving" the essay from rhetoric, however, literary 
critics have succeeded in obstructing the generic classific­
ation of non-fiction prose. In one sense, the essay is the 
equivalent of the ancient public speech, and, as such, is 
the essential rhetorical production. Rhetoric was developed 
to address problems of public concern; Aristotle saw it as a 
tool to persuade a general audience about questions of 
communal policy and value. The public speech was the 
vehicle of communication, since it reached the largest 
possible audience. Written material was for the private 
study of a selected audience, since its production was such 
a laborious, time-consuming process, and literacy was a 
rarity. The situation is reversed today. The invention of 
print has made written material the most efficient method of 
disseminating information and argument. A public speech is 
addressed to a more specific, isolated audience than a 
syndicated column, for example. 
Of course, as Walter J. Ong has noted, the electronic 
media have made this analysis trickier, since many people, 
who can read, are choosing to receive much if not virtually 
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all their information from television and radio. Neverthe­
less, a broadcast speech is usually a poor thing in compari­
son to a deliberative essay. Perhaps we have lost the 
ability to pay attention to a well-constructed verbal 
argument; it is certainly true that speechmakers are relying 
on visual and aural pyrotechnics rather than sound, tight 
arguments. Many essayists, however, have honed their 
rhetorical skills to a razor's edge. The casual, intimate 
voice and a seemingly discursive method of construction are 
effective charms to conceal a serious rhetorical 
intention—as effective as they were for Montaigne. So too 
is the cool "right reason" of literary and political 
critics, a legacy from the sermon and medieval lecture. The 
modern essay is a chameleon of various techniques, stylistic 
and literary as well as dialectical, designed to persuade 
general audiences. 
Lukacs is quite right to claim that the essay is as 
good as poetry, but he is wrong in believing that it is 
better. It is, simply, different. Hierarchical notions of 
discourse are reductive in that one or another genre is 
always in eclipse. One can believe in an ultimate truth as 
did Plato and proceed in a skeptical, juridical way to find 
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it. Different versions of truth are so essential, that any 
discourse theory must reflect a non-hierarchical orientation 
toward the productions that communicate these versions. 
Within genres, there are differences in quality, but not 
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between genres. C.S. Lewis's comments on literary genres in 
his essay "High and Low Brows" applies equally well to 
other genres of discourse: 
We have now made a fairly determined effort to find 
some useful meaning for the separation of literature 
into the two classes of classical and popular, Good 
Books and Books, literary and commercial, highbrow and 
lowbrow, and we have failed. In fact, the distinction 
rests upon a confusion between degrees of merit and 
differences of kind. Our map of literature has been 
made to look like an examination list—a single column 
of names with a horizontal line drawn across it, the 
honour candidates above that line, and the pass 
candidates below it. But we ought rather to have a 
whole series of vertical lines representing different 
kinds of work, and an almost infinite series of 
horizontal lines crossing these to represent the 
different degrees of goodness in each kind.(276) 
Rhetoricians have provided any number of perspectives 
on discourse, but for the purposes of analyzing whole works, 
I will rely on only two theories—James Kinneavy's and 
Walter Beale's. Kinneavy's A Theory of Discourse broke new 
ground in analyzing works in a non-reductive, non-hierar-
chical manner. However, Kinneavy's notion of "Expressive" 
discourse, the category to which he assigns the essay, is 
troubling in that he does not account for suasory and 
informative aspects of the essay. Furthermore, his category 
of "expressive" writing confuses genre with mode. Beale's 
theory, on the other hand, is more comprehensive, especially 
his analysis of rhetorical genres. 
Beale believes that it is important to remember that 
style and a way of conducting discourse are not inherent in 
23 
a genre; a generic classification can be thrust upon a piece 
of discourse only after account is taken of its context. He 
divides discourse into four broad "Aims": Scientific, 
Instrumental, Poetic, and Rhetorical. Beale's analysis of 
rhetorical discourse is particularly useful for a comprehen­
sion of "the essay" as genres 
[Rhetorical discourse's] primary aim is to influence 
the understanding and conduct of human affairs. It 
operates typically in matters of action that involve 
the well-being and destiny of communities and of 
individuals within them; and in matters of value and 
understanding which involve the communal and competing 
values of communities. Rhetorical writing includes a 
broad range of types, from deliberative essays to 
popular information, to occasional and reflective 
pieces, to commercial promotions, to the public 
resolutions and declarations of competing groups within 
a community. (94) 
Essential to Beale's conception of rhetoric is its 
centrality as an aim, not its relative lack of specializa­
tion. He defines the primary "motive" or specific aim 
within the larger aim of rhetoric as "the formation and 
information of opinion." The other specific aims or 
"motives" of rhetoric mirror the larger aims of discourse. 
To the extent that [rhetoric] seeks to establish stable 
and incontrovertible propositions of understanding, it 
moves in the direction of science; to the extent that 
it takes on the capability of directing human activi­
ties, as in the areas of information and certain types 
of resolution-making, it becomes instrumental; when the 
motives of formal beauty and enjoyment come into the 
picture, as very often happens in 'familiar' and 
reflective writing, rhetoric takes a turn toward 
poetic.(96) 
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In the chapters which follow, I intend to use Beale's 
terms in referring to specific essays. Nevertheless, I 
strongly concur with his contention that describing generic 
norms in no way reflects a desire for a dogmatic system of 
standardization and acountability; as Beale explains, 
An individual work of discourse succeeds partly by 
conforming to the norms and constraints of a given 
rhetorical genre, partly by transcending them, some­
times even by flouting them. . . [This] theory 
. . . has no stake in suppressing these variations and 
novelties; its goal is to account for them ... in a 
more satisfactory, more provocative, and less reductive 
way than do competing theories. (115) 
Beale is most comprehensive in his analysis of rhetori­
cal genres or "genuses," which he defines as deliberative, 
informative, performative, and reflective/exploratory. 
Interestingly, these genuses correspond to the larger aims 
of discourse. Following Beale's definitions of rhetorical 
genuses, a deliberative essay supports "opinions or theses 
about specific problems of policy, value, or understanding 
in human communities." A performative essay nperform[s] 
various acts of declaration, celebration, or commemoration 
in a public arena, calling into play and reinforcing the 
values of a particular community." An informative essay 
nform[s] and inform[s] public opinion through the non-techn­
ical and even entertaining presentation of subject matter. 
It may incorporate a number of secondary or covert motives, 
such as promoting its subject or a certain attitude toward 
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its subject." A reflective/exploratory essay nshare[s], 
explorels], and reflect[s] upon human experiences, usually 
in a highly individualistic and entertaining way. It uses 
various presentational forms, sometimes borrowed from 
literary art, to relate personal experiences and reflections 
to general questions of understanding and value" (114-115). 
Of course, as is the case with any piece of discourse, no 
essay is purely one thing or another; nevertheless, this 
categorization is a pragmatic tool for placing essays 
according to their aims. 
In the next chapters I shall use Beale's model in my 
discussion of examples of modern traditions of the essay 
genre. Before turning to individual examples, however, I 
want to examine in the next chapter one of the "promised 
qualities" of the essay which has received short shrift, and 
which seems essential to a rhetorical view of the 
essay—that is, the skeptical or "tentative" stance of the-
essayist, a stance which is as well suited to our own Age of 




See Chapter Three in Walter J. Ong's RhetPEiCr 
Romance, and Technology in which he discusses the limited 
generic possibilities in oral cultrues. The artistic 
rendering of free flowing conversation which is the hallmark 
of the essay would be impossible in an oral culture since 
oral literary genres depend on repetition, symmetry and 
other mnemonic and schematic devices for comprehensibility. 
Print makes such devices less necessary. 
2 
See Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New 
Rhetoric; A Treatise on Argnnipnf-ai-inri (London: U of Notre 
Dame P, 1969). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SKEPTICISM AND THE SPIRIT OF THE ESSAY 
"The essay is science minus the explicit proof." 
—Ortega y cisset 
In Chapter One I provided an overview of the history of 
the essay especially as it relates to Walter Beale's 
classification of the genre as rhetorical discourse. In 
this chapter I wish to speculate about some of the contem­
porary trends in American life and letters which have 
influenced the increasing importance of the essay. I 
particularly want to explore some parallels between our own 
cultural milieu and the climate of skepticism that charac­
terized the Renaissance and gave rise to the essay. 
It is always risky to comment on ones own time, but, 
fortunately, I am able to use as support the work of a 
number of critics of recent years who have analyzed the 
so-called "new journalism." Since a good deal of "new 
journalism" writing crosses over from reportage into the 
essay, the debate about the lineage and characteristics of 
new journalism is important to this study; critics recog­
nize the rhetorical base common to both. 
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In the last few years an interesting critical debate 
has centered on the generic classification of the style of 
journalism developed by Hunter Thompson, Tom Wolfe, Joan 
Didion and others. Ronald Weber's The Literature of Fact, 
John Hollowell's Fact and Fiction, and John Hellmann's 
Fables of Fact are typical of the critical works inspired by 
new journalism. The titles of these books indicate the 
direction of the debate about new journalisms the old lines 
between fact and fiction have broken down and the new 
journalism represents a hybrid or "bastard form," as Weber 
calls it (27). 
Underlying these works is a desire to refute the sharp 
criticisms levelled at new journalism by those journalists 
and critics who maintain that factual reporting must not be 
corrupted by fiction. The following quotation from Wayne 
Booth's "Now Don't Try to Reason with Me" exemplifies this 
sort of criticism, in this instance an attack on the 
"paralogical rhetoric" of modern journalism: 
Everyone knows that journalism has been transformed in 
recent years, especially in the news magazines, from 
reportage into new forms of paralogical rhetoric: 
political argument disguised as dramatic reporting. It 
would be fun to spend the rest of my hour simply 
describing the new rhetorical devices, and the new 
twists on old devices, that Time magazine . . . 
exhibits from week to week, all in the name of news. 
Mr. Ralph Ingersol, former publisher of the magazine, 
has described the key to the magazine's success as the 
discovery of how to turn news into fiction, giving each 
story its own literary form, with a beginning, a 
middle, and an end, regardless of whether the story 
thus invented matches the original event. Everyone I 
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know who has ever been treated by Time—whether 
favorably or unfavorably—has been shocked by the 
distortion of fact for effect, and the more they know 
about a subject the more they are shocked.(10) 
Many of the proponents of new journalism go to great 
lengths to legitimize the genre by attempting to demonstrate 
its literary as well as factual integrity. "The end [of new 
journalism] is that of all serious fiction and most espec­
ially of fabulist fiction: the perceiving and creating of 
patterns by which the individual can meaningfully experience 
his world," observes Hellmann (140). "Whether or not," 
writes Hollowell, "the new journalism prospers in the years 
to come, the best writers in the genre have already begun to 
convert the inchoate material of our experience into the 
meaningful structures of art" (152). 
We should note the assumption that lies behind Hollo-
well's remark: experience is "inchoate," while art brings 
order. This superficial line of reasoning is a kind of 
humanist fallacy which underlies much criticism and results 
in preciosity and reduction. Although in general these 
critics recognize the importance of the journalistic/factual 
component of the new journalism, nevertheless, they usually 
classify the form as literature. Hellmann, for example, 
draws on Northrop Frye's theory of modes to make a case that 
new journalism is "literary" rather than "assertive." "[It] 
is the genre of fiction in which the text, while (like other 
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genres of fiction) pointing finally or ultimately inward, 
points outward to the actual world without ever deviating 
from observation of that world except in forms—such as 
authorial speculation or fantasy—which are immediately 
obvious as such to the reader"(27). 
Critics of the new journalism and the "non-fiction 
novel," an extended piece of new journalism such as Truman 
Capote's In Cold Blood, have been concerned with the 
personal stance of authors in these genres. Weber believes 
the unabashed involvement of reporter/participants has 
incited the most critical comment, negative and positive 
(26). Hellmann asserts, for example, that the difference 
between conventional and new journalism is essentially the 
"conflict of disguised perspective versus an admitted one, 
and a corporate fiction versus a personal one" (4). 
Most new journalism critics and practitioners acknow­
ledge a debt to the essay, but maintain that new journalism 
is something different. Such dogmatism is curious given the 
many examples from the essay genre that fit the criteria for 
new journalism. Even critics' description of the form of new 
journalism articles is synonymous with that of many tradi­
tional essays. Hellmann's discussion, for example, of the 
similarities in theme and technique of "fabulist fiction" 
and "new journalism" offers a kind of blue-print of the 
traditional familiar essay: 
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[They] . . . often organize their materials into 
narratives 'framed' by forewords, afterwords, or other 
devices. Both use a. self-conscious and highly obtru­
sive narrator, alter the usual conventions of punctua­
tion or graphic composition and are either episodic or 
obviously contrived (instead of conventionally pat­
terned to and from a climax). Both use allegorical 
mythic patterns drawn from classical and popular-
culture sources, have heavily mannered styles, and 
adopt a stance of parody or satire. They are also 
characterized by a concern with large philosophical and 
social issues.(13-14) 
The origin of new journalism in newspaper feature writing 
gives it a different patina and "feel" from the traditional 
essay, but, nevertheless, with the exception of unconven­
tional punctuation, this list of characteristics fits even 
the oldest essays—Montaigne1s "To flee from sensual 
pleasures at the price of life," or Addison's "dream 
visions" in the Spectator, for example. 
Tom Wolfe makes a salient point: the traditional 
essayist 
has usually not done nearly enough reporting, nor the 
right type of reporting, to use the devices the new 
genre [new journalism] depends on. . . . The genteel 
tradition in nonfiction is summed up in the phrase 'the 
polite essay.' Legwork, 'digging,' reporting, especi­
ally reporting of the Locker Room Genre, is . . . well, 
beneath one's dignity. (43) 
Wolfe is essentially correct in his distinction between 
"genteel" essays and new journalism. On the other hand, he 
overlooks some important historical developments in the 
essay tradition. What Wolfe is arguing for is a more 
committed stance by the journalist—in short, a more 
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blatantly rhetorical stance. But what of the many essays 
that do offer a heavily rhetorical perspective, such as 
Orwell's pieces on the Spanish Civil War? No critic of the 
"new" journalism has taken into account such essays. The 
explanation, of course, is simple. Seeing the "true" essay 
as a literary rather than rhetorical genre casts other, more 
overtly argumentative pieces into the murky swamp of non-
fiction to be hauled out by critics with boathooks variously 
labelled "new journalism" or "non-fiction novel." Writers 
such as Hellmann reveal their prejudices—and confuse the 
issue further—by then insisting that the "rescued" non-
fictional genre actually must be literary/fictional because 
it is worthy. Rarely has a critical argument moved in such 
a perfect circle. 
Critics of "literary non-fiction," although misled in 
their generic classifications, are illuminating in their 
explanations for the phenomenal success and dominance of 
non-fiction in the last few decades. Their interpretations 
and those of other critics interested in non-fiction 
discourse, fall into two categories—sociological and 
literary. 
The Sociological Explanation 
The more high-flying, romantic explanation of the 
proliferation and success of non-fiction prose is the 
"nature of the times" argument, in which twentieth-century 
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America is viewed as poised on the edge of the Millennium— 
the "Grim Slide" view as Tom Wolfe has called it. This 
dramatic conception is shared by a surprising number of 
practitioners and critics of new journalism,, Hollowell 
accurately exemplifies this particular explanation: 
The best new journalism is a reflection of our unusual 
self-consciousness about the historical importance of 
our time. The assumption underlying most of the books 
of nonfiction I have discussed is that future histori­
ans will find these years unique, perhaps even part of 
a fundamental watershed in human consciousness.(147) 
Hellmann as well as other critics believe "the times" have 
become too complicated for the traditional genres of 
journalism and fiction to summarize and explain: 
Unable to capture American reality through realism, and 
convinced that America's problems were now too profound 
for the social and psychological levels that realism 
most effectively probed, [novelists in the 60*s] sought 
to create autonomous worlds which would indirectly 
probe and illuminate the actual one.(10) 
Hollowell believes that traditional literary realism, which 
had provided a good deal of the explanation and comment on 
the social upheavals of the nineteenth century, was unable 
to perform this same function in the sixties, and the new 
journalism filled the vacuum. Nineteenth century realism 
depended on its readers belief in external reality; 
but for most Americans in the 1960 "s—central reality 
was that everyday life now involved implausible 
characters and events delivered into the home by the 
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media. The realm of the believable had become an 
extremely doubtful concept. (9) 
One can acknowledge the extraordinary ferment and color 
of American society in the sixties as well as the contribu­
tion of the media, especially television news, to that 
ferment without taking on the baleful tones of the apocalyp­
tic critics; supposing that people are more interesting and 
times more dangerous than ever before is a form of melodram­
atic posturing in the long run. A critic who assumes such a 
stance risks becoming the butt of satirical essays by the 
same writers he seeks to promote. Affectation is still the 
true source of the ridiculous. 
The safest critical path, I believe, to pursue in 
discussing the current success of essayists/new journalists 
is to emphasize the rhetorical aim of such writers—their 
function as commentators on manners and morals. As Hollo-
well has said, "When the new journalism holds up a mirror to 
a small portion of the total social fabric—stock-car 
racers, drug freaks in San Francisco, a political conven­
tion—it succeeds best" (151). Now, as in the Renaissance 
or the Enlightenment or the Victorian Age, times are 
interesting and perhaps more confusing because we have more 
access to information. To sort things out, we look to 
latter day Bacons, Steeles, Bagehots, or Emersons to provide 
explanation and critical comment. 
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The Literary Explanation 
Fiction writers, of course, also try to explain us to 
ourselves, especially in the last few years with an increas­
ing number of heavily rhetorical novels and short stories: 
Doctorow's Ragtime. John Irving's Cider House Rules. A.N. 
Wilson's Gentlemen in England, and Walker Percy's Love in 
the Ruins, for example. These works inhabit the borderland 
between poetic and rhetorical literature—a DMZ traditional­
ly populated by expressive essays, autobiographies, satiri­
cal poems and stories. Tom Wolfe's assessment of the 
arhetorical nature of fiction in the Sixties does not apply 
as aptly to the Eighties. Nevertheless, Wolfe's analysis of 
the rise of non-fiction rings true; 
By the Sixties . . . the most serious, ambitious and, 
presumably, talented novelists had abandoned the 
richest terrain of the novel: namely, society, the 
social tableau, manners and morals, the whole business 
of 'the way we live now,' in Trollope's phrase. . . . 
There is no novelist who will be remembered as the 
novelist who captured the Sixties in America, or even 
in New York, in the sense that Thackeray was the 
chronicler of London in the 1840"s and Balzac was the 
chronicler of Paris and all of France after the fall of 
the Empire. Balzac prided himself on being 'the 
secretary of French society. • Most serious American 
novelists would rather cut their wrists than be known 
as 'the secretary of American society,' and not merely 
because of ideological considerations. With fable, 
myth and the sacred office [the novel as the spiritual 
genre] to think about—who wants such a menial role? 
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That was marvelous for journalists—I can tell you 
that. The Sixties was one of the most extraordinary 
decades in American history in terms of manners and 
morals. Manners and morals were the history of the 
Sixties. . . . [The] whole side of American life that 
gushed forth when postwar American affluence finally 
blew the lid off—all this novelists simply turned away 
from, gave up by default. That left a huge gap in 
American letters, a gap big enough to drive an ungainly 
Reo rig like the New Journalism through.(30-31) 
Although the public may read more "ungainly" non-fic­
tion, they continue to revere fiction and poetry as elite 
forms of discourse. Explanations for the continuing high 
status of fiction and poetry are many and varied: from 
Norman Podhoretz's view that the status is a vestige of 
nineteenth century Romanticism with its cult of poet/seers 
to Julian Jayne's speculation that it is a vestige of the 
prehistoric bicameral mind. 
Podhoretz's view is shared by the "ecological" critics 
who have emerged as a counter movement to post-structural 
1 
ism. These critics emphasize the historical and rhetorical 
dimensions of literature—the context of individual works 
dependent on other works of literature and society—disdain­
ing the view that literature is the preserve of an educated 
elite, the notion fostered by a long line of critics from 
Matthew Arnold to F.R. Leavis. David Morse in his critical 
essay "Author-Reader-Language: Reflections on a Critical 
Closed Circuit," echoes Podhoretz's view that the Romantic 
notion of the artist led irrevocably to the isolation of 
writers from their historical milieu. 
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In general terms the belief the writer transcends his 
time is one of considerable antiquity, but I believe 
the particular version of it that enjoys currency has 
its sources in the Weimar 'Classicism' of Goethe and 
Schillero Both were afflicted by the anxiety of the 
modernf they feared that the degraded world in which 
they lived might prove disabling and incapacitating for 
the production of great art.(53) 
The audience for serious modern literature is specialized— 
F.R. Leavis's "tiny minority" who are trained to understand 
highly idiosyncratic texts. As C.S. Lewis once mused in an 
address entitled "De Descriptione Temporum," 
In music we have pieces which demand more talent in the 
performer than in the composer. Why should there not 
come a period when the art of writing poetry stands 
lower than the art of reading it? Of course rival 
readings would then cease to be 'right' or 'wrong' and 
become more and less brilliant 'performances.' (9) 
"Untrained" readers have increasingly turned to non-
fiction as a source of interpretation and entertainment. 
This trend can be traced in the changing contents of 
magazines and newspapers. The proportion of fiction to non-
fiction in American "quality magazines"—Atlantic. Harper's. 
etc.—has diminished significantly in this century. As the 
means for disseminating information became more sophisticat­
ed and literacy became more widespread, readers' demand for 
"the news" became more insistent. In an article entitled 
"The Literary Essay and the Modern Temper," Mary Rucker 
discusses the "democratization" of quality magazines as it 
affected the fortunes of fiction and the "familiar" essay: 
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The commercial basis of the press, the redistribution 
of income resulting from urbanization, and the collect­
ivism theory of society disallowed the elitism which 
characterized the quality magazines of the early 
nineteenth century, and as the mass media were institu­
tionalized, many magazines ceased to be primarily 
literary. They were not only democratized but also 
standardized in content and technique, tending to 
perpetuate the status quo as they assumed their 
responsibility to readers in a world that has often 
been too complex to experience at first hand.(326) 
Although wrong in her assessment of the "decline" of the 
essay (i.e. familiar essay), Rucker is right to see the new 
journalism as an extension of the essay tradition, "an 
amalgamation of the conventional article and the familiar 
essay" (333 ). She is also right in perceiving the new 
journalism as "bridg[ing] the gap between life and culture," 
a gap between pure information and pure literature. 
As the Age of Information has proceeded, readers have 
become more sophisticated in their assessments of news. The 
skepticism that characterizes current opinions of the press 
can be traced to this increasing sophistication. "Mass 
media," writes Hellmann, "confront the individual with a 
national news comprised of distorted images and short-
circuiting information, while failing to offer the indivi­
dual a meaningful relation to it" (2). On the other hand, 
the printed word may be increasingly valued as a means of 
assessing the unceasing flow of information from the 
electronic media. Ben H. Bagdikian in his book The Informa­
tion Machines; Thej.1C Impact on Men and the Media asserts 
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that print journalism serves an increasingly critical, 
evaluative function as television delivers (or pretends to 
deliver) more and more "straight" news. Much of this 
critical evaluation is contained in deliberative essays. 
Because serious fiction and poetry are often isolated 
from the main stream, even the well-educated main stream, 
and because facts no longer captivate and convince as in the 
old "Industry on Parade" days, essays, whether in the form 
of newspaper editorials, new journalism features, or 
syndicated columns, provide a necessary gloss on contempor­
ary society. Non-specialists, the general reading public, 
have turned increasingly to the essay and other works of 
non-fiction as a means of interpreting the confusions and 
complexities of "pure" technology/science and elitist 
literature. It is interesting that many of the best essays, 
which are the bedrock of contemporary rhetorical non-
fiction, are written by scientists or fiction writers, for 
example Lewis Thomas and Joan Didion, who themselves are 
trying to find a middle way in the midst of the specialized 
conversations of science and literature. 
The search for a "middle way" is characteristic of all 
eras of extraordinary social ferment and change. Such was 
the case in the Renaissance which saw the birth of modern 
science and the death of scholasticism, resulting in the 
emergence not only of new information, but, indeed, a new 
way of interpreting reality. Basil Willey believes that "a 
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general demand for restatement or explanation" which we 
associate with the Renaissance humanists (and essayists) 
indicates a disharmony between traditional explanations 
and current needs. It does not necessarily imply the 
'falsehood' of the older statement; it may merely mean 
that men now wish to live and to act according to a 
different formula. (11) 
Although our own age seems almost as hungry for a "different 
formula" as was the Renaissance, now the missing component 
is exactly the opposite: "Science was undoubtedly what was 
most needed at the beginning of the seventeenth century; and 
. . . religion (but not scholasticism) is what is most 
needed now" (Willey 43). 
The urge for restatement and explanation as well as 
calling attention to the missing components of our version 
of reality, continues to characterize the "essayistic 
spirit" and, in a larger sense, the rhetorical spirit. 
Finding a middle way means not only acknowledging the claims 
of the competing truths of physics and metaphysics, of 
materialism and abstraction, but also formulating versions 
of reality that avoid the extremes of both dogmatism and of 
radical skepticism. This is an essentially "rhetorical" 
challenge, one that energized the classical tradition of 
Aristotle and Isocrates (Beale 161-162). It was also of 
great interest to Renaissance thinkers and essayists like 
Bacon and Browne. We forget that the scientific revolution 
that began in the Renaissance was at first a liberation from 
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dogma, a catalyst to reexamine the world. We forget because 
empiricism and the scientific method hardened into the dogma 
we now defy. John M. Steadman's description in The Hill and 
the Labyrinth of the Renaissance philosophical balancing act 
applies equally well to contemporary essayists! 
In seventeenth century England the problem of finding a 
middle way between the extremes of dogmatic claims to 
absolute certitude, on the one hand, and total skepti­
cism, on the other, confronts the theologian and the 
scientist alike; significantly, several of the writers 
who grapple with this problem are either scientists 
deeply interested in theology, or else churchmen who 
are also 'virtuosi' and apologists for the new science. 
(16) 
The Skeptical Temper 
What is needed is a descriptive definition for this 
temper or attitude, the temper that informs the essay. 
"Fideism," that is, a belief in the existence of ultimate 
truth accompanied by an equally strong belief that our means 
for reaching that truth are always inadequate, has strong 
theological overtones and cannot be extended very readily to 
secular forms of doubt-belief. However, "skepticism"— 
rightly defined--connotes secular and theological anti-
dogmatism as well as rhetorical pragmatism. 
By skepticism "rightly defined" I mean the sort of 
habit of mind exemplified not only in essays but in meta­
physical poetry—thriving on paradox and the ironies and 
ambiguities of human existence. As Margaret Wiley claims in 
her study of the influence of Renaissance skepticism on 
literature The Subtle Knot, this "right" notion of skepti­
cism is all too often superseded by the eighteenth-century 
connotation of cynicism, (A fairly recent and influential 
example of this modern use of the term is contained in Wayne 
Booth's Modern Dagma and the Rhetoric of Assent,, in which 
Booth equates the "skepticism" of the sixties and seventies 
with a sort of fatalism. For our purposes, the habit of 
mind that Booth is describing would be more accurately 
termed "radical skepticism" or nihilism.) What encouraged 
the liberating spirit of skepticism that characterized the 
Renaissance? First, Renaissance humanists were the recip­
ients of a tradition of disputation and analysis of texts 
and ideas from different vantage points. This was nourished 
by their rediscovery of the Classics. According to Barbara 
Bowen in The of Bluff, paradox and irony were very 
important to most writers of any influence in the Ancient 
world (10). She cites Platoxs dialectical and Lucian's 
paradoxical dialogues as well as Plutarch's Lives which are 
"based on the paradox of resemblances" (10). More impor­
tantly, according to Bowen, Renaissance writers were 
familiar with scholastic "disputation" and medieval Biblical 
exegesis, which interpreted scriptures literally, tropologi-
cally, allegorically, and anagogically—"the exact oppo­
site," comments Bowen, "of our own either/or complex" (10). 
It is ironic that modern readers and writers often have a 
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more stubbornly literal orientation toward texts than did 
those of the Renaissance, trained in the methods of the 
Middle Ages. 
This grounding in ambiguity and disputation helped 
Renaissance thinkers see many sides of an idea or argument. 
According to Wiley, the "new learning," especially the "new 
science," encouraged a suspension of judgment until all the 
facts were in, and Renaissance writers found a valuable 
precedent for this habit of suspending judgment in the 
tradition of classical skepticism or Pyrrhonism (10). 
Wiley's description of the "pattern" of skepticism is useful 
in understanding the essentially skeptical nature of the 
essay: 
This includes, in whatever order, a sense of the 
inadequacy of human knowledge, a consequent sensitivity 
to dualisms and contradictions, a concern with paradox 
as expressing the complexity of truth, a belief in the 
wholesome effect of doubt, and a conviction that where 
knowledge falters, a right life can supply the only 
legitimate confidence known to man (59). 
Unlike skeptics in the ancient world, Renaissance and 
modern skeptics see skepticism as a prelude or a "stepping-
stone," as V. Cauchy terms it, to a new phase—"a mind 
receptive to revelation, science or philosophical 
intuit ion" (27 8) . For example, the usual motivation of a 
Renaissance writer, believes Bowen, is to "disconcert" his 
reader, "to open up as many different perspectives as 
possible. This explains why, rather than symmetry, order 
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and balance, he will prefer paradox, enigma, argument, 
antithesis, and ambiguity" (6-7). 
The connections between skeptical philosophy and 
rhetorical practice are clear. Both are concerned with means 
rather than ends. Margaret Wiley's assessment of the 
skeptical enterprise is also true of the rhetorical: 
The emphasis of the sceptic, because he is interested 
in breaking up the narrow molds of dogmatisms, is upon 
the means he is using to arrive at a decision rather 
than upon the decision itself.(18) 
Wiley also notes the central importance of probability in 
the deliberations of the skeptics "There is an intermediate 
process by which the sceptic utilizes probability as a basis 
for action when he cannot determine where the truth lies" 
(21). 
Skepticism and rhetoric were intertwined from the 
beginning. Victoria Kahn in Rhetoric. Prudence, and Skepti­
cism in the Renaissance examines the contribution of Cicero 
to the conception of the orator as Academic or Platonic 
skeptic. She believes that Aristotle's emphasis on the 
"realm of the probable" as the proper field of rhetoric 
implies this connection (35) . She lists three areas of 
commonality between the orator and the skeptic as articulat­
ed by Cicero: 1. "Since man, according to the skeptic can 
know nothing absolutely, he is always concerned with the 
realm of the contingent and the probable, that is, the 
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realm of rhetoric." 2. "Furthermore, while the skeptic is 
traditionally less concerned than the orator with persuasion 
to action within this realm, he shares with the orator a 
refusal of dogmatism and an ability to 'speak persuasively 
on any side of any philosophical question.3. "Finally, 
the academic skeptic believes that within the contingent 
realm of human life the genuine exchange of ideas and 
opposing arguments in rhetorical debate will elicit the 
2 
practical truth we know as consensus" (35-36). 
Anti-Ciceronian Style 
In trying to characterize the philosophical underpinn­
ings of the essay, we must place Cicero's positive contribu­
tion to our notions of the connections between rhetoric and 
skepticism alongside his negative contribution, that is, the 
traditionally plain or "anti-Ciceronian" style of the essay. 
The Anti-Ciceronian movement was pre-eminent in the 
Renaissance; as Douglas -Bush has noted, it was the "comple­
ment" in prose of metaphysical poetry. Bush sums up 
the movement as: 
a revolt against the glowing oratorical period and the 
established verities which it commonly expressed, and 
an attempt to create a medium fitted to render the 
realistic questionings, complexities, and diversities 
of private experience in a world of changinq values. 
(132) 
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The Anti-Ciceronian style was "concise, flexible, semi-
colloquial" (192). 
Bush, like most critics of seventeenth-century litera­
ture, draws on the seminal work of Morris Croll in his 
discussion of the Anti-Ciceronian movement. Croll not only 
characterized the movement but analyzed the connections 
between Anti-Ciceronianism and Stoic philosophy. In the 
seventeenth century, as in our own day, Stoicism and 
skepticism are strangely allied. As Ted-Larry Pebworth 
observes in a 1972 PMLA article ("'Real English Evidence': 
Stoicism and the English Essay Tradition"), Stoicism, as a 
prevailing philosophy, emerges in times of great turbulence 
and confusion, and melancholy, like an underground river, 
nourishes the Stoic temper (101-102). 
Croll's account of Stoic rhetoric, as developed in 
Greece and Rome, bears directly on the development of the 
essay. Stoic rhetoric was derived from Aristotlean rhetoric 
and emphasized clarity, brevity, and appropriateness. The 
Ancient Stoics, like Renaissance skeptics, or "libertines" 
as Croll calls them, believed that truth was elusive and our 
comprehension of it fragmentary. 
A style appropriate to the mind of the speaker [be­
lieved the Stoics] ... is one that portrays the 
process of acquiring the truth rather than the secure 
possession of it, and expresses ideas not only with 
clearness and brevity, but also with the ardor in which 
they were first conceived. (89) 
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The Stoic rhetoricians' emphasis on brevity was 
connected with their belief in individual experience and 
enlightenment. As Croll observes: 
In the history of all the epochs and schools of writing 
it is found that those which aimed at the expression of 
individual experience have tended to break up the long 
musical periods of public discourse into short, 
incisive members, connected with each other by only the 
slightest of ligatures, each one carrying a stronger 
emphasis, conveying a sharper meaning than it would 
have if it were more strictly subordinated to the 
general effect of a whole period. Such a style is a 
protest against easy knowledge and the complacent 
acceptance of appearances. (87) 
Anti-dogmatism and individualism pervade Stoic philosophy as 
they do the writings of the essayists, who were, as Pebworth 
and other critics have observed, all Anti-Ciceronians. 
Croll suggests that Montaigne and his "Libertine" 
followers advanced from Stoical to skeptical habits of 
thought. Their temper was more buoyant and expansive than 
that of the controlled Stoics, and as skeptics, valued 
reason less: 
Certain traits of character and temper are common to 
sceptical rationalists of all periods. Curiosity about 
new ideas, for example, and readiness to adopt new 
opinions, an individual turn of wit and a constant 
tendency toward satire—these are traits just as 
conspicuous in scholars like Petrarch, Politian, and 
Erasmus as they are in their successors, the libertines 
of the later Renaissance.(160) 
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Montaigne and Bacon 
Croll's contrasting of Montaigne and Bacon is a 
standard convention in criticism of Renaissance prose style 
and of the essay, . Croll excepted, however, most critics 
wrongly see the Montaigne and Baconian schools as antitheti­
cal. On the contrary, both attempt to reproduce the 
stoical-skeptical brand of truth-seeking which clears the 
decks of cant while emphasizing the individual differences 
neglected and obscured by scholasticism just as science in 
our own day has neglected and obscured individual differ­
ences. Their essays, like those of their modern successors, 
seek to debunk and illuminate, while always maintaining 
their assumed identities of "mere," inconclusive attempts. 
Montaigne, according to Croll, 
discovered that the progress of rationalism meant much 
more than a change of orthodoxies, meant nothing less 
in fact than the full exercise of curiosity and the 
free play of individual differences. (180) 
Wit, personality, and spontaniety were and are the hallmarks 
of the Montaignesque essay. Bacon's essays, on the other 
hand, represented a different side of the anti-Ciceronian 
temper, the 
desire for ceremonious dignity, an ideal of deliberate 
and grave demeanor, which was partly, no doubt, an 
inheritance from the courtly past but was modified and 
indeed largely created by the profound moral experience 
which the new age was undergoing. (194) 
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According to Croll, Bacon's contributions to Renaissance 
prose style were largely a result of his ability to read 
Tacitus, a skill shared by few of his time. Gravity as a 
component of anti-Ciceronian style was an inheritance from 
Tacitus and Bacon's imitation of him (194-195). 
Both Bacon and Montaigne shared an "anti-Ciceronian" 
hatred of dogmatic complacency. The skeptical temper that 
informs their essays, their "mere" attempts, informs the 
essays of today. Skeptics, according to Wiley, are in­
terested in the "tendencies and spirits of objects, not 
their intrinsic value" (23). Their philosophical orienta­
tion is predicated on the unceasing change and flux in human 
affairs. Bacon and Montaigne, and their followers, like 
Wiley's skeptics, often exhibit a "mildness in their 
treatment of human beings"(38) because they sympathize with 
even as they satirize our feeble attempts to make sense of 
the universe. 
These traditions, which share a common spirit of anti-
dogmatism, nevertheless are characterized by two very 
different techniques or methods: Bacon's use of the 
aphorism and Montaigne's of the exemplum. As Elbert Thompson 
observes, 
Where the French writer is diffuse and informal, Bacon 
is terse and aphoristic? and Montaigne's early essays 
are tissues of examples where Bacon's first essays are 
absolutely without them.(23) 
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I do not suggest that the two essay schools can be neatly 
categorized since both borrow freely from the other tradi­
tion. However, a discussion of the aphorism and exemplum as 
used by the founders of the essay offers essential back­
ground and explanation for my analysis of modern traditions 
of the essay in the following chapters. 
The Aphorism 
It is curious that the aphorism, which on the face of 
it looks anything but skeptical, is nevertheless connected 
by history and rhetorical practice with anti-dogmatic 
thought. The Renaissance revived the use of the aphorism; 
its chief proponent and practitioner was Bacon. Although 
Bacon's aphorism is closely related to the proverb, maxim, 
sentence, epigram, and apothegm, it has a less metaphorical 
cast and a more universal character. Commentators on the 
modern version of the aphorism still insist on the indepen­
dent, universality of the form. 
According to James Stephens in his Francis Bacon and 
the Style of Science. Bacon's use of the aphorism not only 
"owes something to classical and Renaissance descriptions of 
witty forms of discourse," but is "also a method for handing 
on the lamp, as he calls it; it works to deliver knowledge 
by stimulating the thirst for it" (106). Stephens, Ann 
Righter and other Bacon critics have noted that Bacon 
considered the aphorism the proper mode for the represen­
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tation of truth. "The aphorism," he writes in the Advance­
ment Of Learning is "knowledge broken" (Selected Writings. 
304-306). As Stephens has said, 
[The aphorism] is employed to lead the reader from the 
confines of his own mental world into a new experience 
of invention. Though the risk of confusing the reader 
is present, the aphorism compels the more curious and 
competent readers to unravel the mystery and fill in 
the gaps. Since knowledge exists only in portions and 
fragments, an abrupt and bare style of delivery is most 
appropriate to it.(121) 
In all his efforts, philosophical, rhetorical, and 
scientific, Bacon was at war with complacency and Scholastic 
dogmatism. Anne Righter analyzes the motive behind his 
work: 
A double impulse, a need to discover and establish 
Truth on the one hand, and to prevent thought from 
settling and assuming a fixed form on the other, lies 
at the heart of all of Bacon's work.(24) 
Science, especially the inductive method, is for Bacon the 
antidote to mindless received ideas and bigoted thought. And 
aphorisms are the substance of science: 
For aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous cannot 
be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for 
discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of 
examples are cut off; discourse of order and connexion 
is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So 
there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some 
good quality of observation. (Selected Writings 126) 
The readers of aphorisms must take an active role in 
the making of meaning and the discovery of truth. Bacon 
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believed that heavily adorned prose was the enemy of truth 
seeking. As Stephens has noted, Ciceronian prose is most 
persuasive to general audiences who are lulled by the "false 
sense of completion" which such prose induces. This effect 
gives readers a fradulent notion of their reasoning powers 
as well as those of the writer (105). So, too, believed the 
first anti-Ciceronians, the followers of Seneca. 
In The Senecan Amble, George Williamson makes connec­
tions between the "fragmented," curt style of Seneca and 
that of Bacon. He also observes that Hippocrates, whose 
science was as "new" in his time as was Bacon's in the 
seventeenth century, made use of the aphorism as his 
characteristic form of discourse. "The aphoristic style was 
popular with the early medical writers, who apparently owed 
something to the oracular manner of Heraclitus" (178) . 
Bacon's view of scientific discourse "confirms," believes 
Williamson, "his sympathy with pre-Socratic times, and 
anticipates the Royal Society" (178). Williamson believes 
that "Bacon thought aphorisms not only the best way to 
reduce wisdom to precept, but the proper mode for works that 
did not pretend to finality" (180). 
There are two sorts of aphorisms in Bacon's works: the 
bare, unadorned kind found in his scientific writing and the 
more figurative concrete type found in the essay. Stephens 
analyzes the two categories in this way: 
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Within the philosophical works, the aphoristic method 
seems to be dictated not by the audience, which has 
determined the method initially, but by the state of 
learning in the field under discussion. In these 
works, it is the form taken by the aphorism which 
indicate the subject's standing among the sciences. If 
the material is part of a well-established body of 
knowledge or the result of observation and experiment­
ation, it is treated in the sparse prose of announce­
ment. Questions of theology, ethics, literature, or 
other matters in which certainties rarely exist, and 
questions of theory, call for something more than 
method. They demand particular clarity of presentation 
and adornment, and because their substance is composed 
largely of abstractions, figurative language must be 
employed to reduce them to the simple sensuous impres­
sions . . . most persuasive to thoughtful men.(107) 
As could be expected, the modern version of aphorism 
used in the Baconian essay is of the latter, "concrete" 
form, since the subjects of essays, as they have always 
been, are rhetorical, the ongoing discussions of probabili­
ties. Most of Bacon's essays begin with arresting aphorisms 
of the figurative sort. For example in "Of Beauty," Bacon 
delivers the following pronouncement: 
Virtue is like a rich stone, best plain set; and surely 
virtue is best in a body that is comely, though not of 
delicate features, and that hath rather dignity of 
presence than beauty of aspect; neither is it always 
most seen, that very beautiful persons are otherwise of 
great virtue; as if nature were rather busy not to err, 
than in labor to produce excellency; and therefore they 
prove accomplished, but not of great spirit, and study 
rather behavior than virtue.(188) 
In most of Bacon's essays, aphorisms are rich blends of 
figurative language and classical allusion. As such, of 
course, they defy the pure description he set forth in the 
Advancement. Nevertheless, several characteristics of the 
essentially barebones quality of aphoristic persuasion as 
defined by Bacon hold true in his essays and in those of his 
modern followers. 
John Gross in his Introduction to The Oxford Book of 
Aphorisms lists several attributes of aphorisms—ancient and 
modern. He contrasts the aphorism with the maxim and 
proverb; the aphorism differs from both by having a 
distinctly more "subversive" character ("often it is a maxim 
[it] set[s] out to subvert"[vii] ) and by having a more 
general character. Also, an aphorism, unlike the proverb, 
has an author. Furthermore, an aphorism, believes Gross, is 
"a form of literature, and a highly idiosyncratic or self-
conscious form at that." An aphorism "depends for its full 
effect on verbal artistry, on a subtle or concentrated 
perfection of phrasing which can sometimes approach poetry 
in its intensity" (viii). 
Modern practitioners of the Baconian type of aphoristic 
essay are known for their almost old-fashioned attention to 
balance, alliteration, anadiplosis and other stylistic 
displays. Baconian essays, still retaining the imprint of 
Bacon's imitation of Tacitus, are more serious in tone than 
the Montaignesque type—although, as I have noted, the 
underlying persuasive point of a reflective, Montaignesque 
essay may be very serious indeed. We find most Baconian 
essays in political commentary and literary criticism. 
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Unlike some commentators on the essay, I would argue that 
the "grave," authoritative personality is as important to 
the rhetorical success of the aphoristic essay as is the 
confidential, insinuating personality of the "familiar" 
Montaignesque essay. 
A certain magisterial quality has long been associated 
with aphorisms (and, of course, the aphoristic essay). 
Aristotle's pronouncements on the use of maxims in his 
Rhetoric can be extended to aphorisms: "The use of maxims is 
suited to speakers of mature years, and to arguments on 
matters in which one is experienced" (1395a). W.H. Auden in 
The Viking Book of Aphorisms rather caustically expands on 
this notion of the authoritative nature of aphorism; 
Aphorisms are essentially an aristocratic genre of 
writing. The aphorist doesn't argue or explain, he 
asserts; and implicit in his assertion is a conviction 
that he is wiser or more intelligent than his readers. 
For this reason the aphorist who adopts a folksy style 
with "democratic" diction and grammar is a cowardly and 
insufferable hypocrite (v-vi). 
Although the aphorism is not an argument, as Auden notes, it 
is often found in those essays which are most openly 
argumentative. In Bacon's essays, for example, an aphorism 
acts as a premise from which Bacon builds an argument. The 
same is true in many modern deliberative essays. 
The Exemplum 
The exemplum is associated with the familiar, Mon-
taignesque essay,, Montaigne stacks example on example in 
the fashion of the Renaissance. On the other hand, modern 
practitioners of the reflective, "familiar" essay often use 
only one example, as in Orwell's "A Hanging," fleshing it 
out in the manner of fiction and articulating the rhetorical 
point that the example illustrates in a calculatedly offhand 
manner at the end. This modern practice directly contradicts 
Aristotle's advice about exempla in the second book of the 
Rhetoric. Examples, he believes, must always follow an 
enthymeme. Otherwise, a speaker will need many of them to 
make a case, since he will be arguing inductively (2.20, pp. 
148-149). 
But Aristotle was talking about speeches. He had not 
envisioned the radical opportunities for artifice and 
illusion provided by an essentially written medium (Beale 
90-91) . Montaigne, who invented the personal sub-genre of 
the essay, understood the possibilities for persuasive 
artifice afforded by print. His use of examples was not 
only a shrewd deviation from straightforward Classical 
argument but an idiosyncratic play on the Renaissance 
conception of the exemplum. Renaissance exempla were 
descendants of Medieval homilies which were "homely" 
examples of Scriptural truths. The Commonplace books of the 
57 
Renaissance which were compendia of secular truths also 
contained examples from classical literature of these 
truths. As Robert D. Cottrell has written in Sexuality/-
Textuality; A Study of the Fabric of Montaigne's Essays, 
In the Renaissance, there was little question that 
wisdom and morality were embodied in the texts of 
antiquity. . . . The function of an 'exemplum' is to 
particularize or concretize this wisdom by means of a 
precise illustration.(58) 
Montaigne's use of the exemplum reinforced his skepti­
cal notions about the nature of man. In his first essay, 
"By diverse means we arrive at the same end,"(I.l, p.3), he 
upsets the conventional formula of listing examples to prove 
a foreordained conclusion. Montaigne argues on both sides 
of the question with equally powerful classical examples. 
In the course of the essays, his use of examples becomes 
even trickier, so that in many, for example, "That to 
philosophize is to learn to die™ (I. 20, p.56) , the stated 
aphorism at the beginning is disproved by the examples he 
chooses. 
Lino Pertile sees this "revolutionary" use of the 
exemplum as proof that "there is no truth for Montaigne that 
cannot be turned upside down" (208). Montaigne's examples 
are the key to his rhetorical stance, a stance adopted in 
one way or another by every one of his followers. His 
examples are drawn from anything and everything he has seen 
or read. In contrast, however, to many later practitioners 
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of the "familiar" essay, Montaigne's examples are rarely 
autobiographical. Steven Randall in his 1976 article "The 
Rhetoric of Montaigne's Self-Portrait" offers an interesting 
explanation for the curious impersonality of Montaigne's 
examples: 
Lacking evidence, it is difficult to challenge the 
validity of his portrait or to evaluate his own 
interpretation of his life. . . . [Montaigne] thus 
escapes in large measure one of the fundamental 
rhetorical difficulties of autobiography, namely the 
tendency of the reader to suspect that the events 
recounted by the autobiographer have been arbitrarily 
selected and presented in such a way as to confirm a 
predetermined pattern or judgment. Any argument from 
examples is open to this charge, especially when the 
audience has reason to doubt the speaker's integrity or 
the representativeness of his examples.(293-294) 
Montaigne's persona looms over the huge project of the 
essays, but his ethos is conjured only indirectly from his 
examples. As Randall has noted, his statements about 
himself—that he is boring, scatterbrained, obsessively 
worried and sensitive—are disproved by the scintillating, 
sharp, bold quality of his thought as revealed in his essays 
(290) . For Montaigne, then, The Essays are the largest 
exemplum of all—undergirding his continuing, skeptical 
point that all our dogmatic statements about ourselves can 
be contradicted. 
Another skeptical play by Montaigne on the traditional 
fashion of preaching virtue through the examples of saintly 
lives is his wry offer of himself as a kind of anti-example. 
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anti-saint. Once again, however, the dichotomy between the 
"ordinary" Montaigne and his extraordinary work exemplifies 
Lukacs's notion of the ironic stance of the essayist whose 
pretense of knowing nothing masks the sermonic, rhetorical 
aim of his essays. 
The self-deprecating pose is common in contemporary 
essayists as is the use of examples to overturn received 
wisdom. On the other hand, modern essayists differ from 
Montaigne in their frequent use of personal, autobiographi­
cal examples; and this is clearly an inheritance from the 
Romantics whose view of mankind differed sharply from 
Montaigne's and other Renaissance writers. A belief in 
individual diversity and skepticism about systematized truth 
are constants in the essay tradition throughout its history. 
Nevertheless, the notion of individual truth, that article 
of faith of all Romantics, is foreign not only to Renais­
sance writers but to some contemporary practitioners of the 
reflective essay as well. The confessional examples we find 
in the essays of Thoreau and Didion, for example, are 
missing in Montaigne's essays—and Tom Wolfe's and Lewis 
Thomas®s—whose "personal" anecdotes are really rather 
impersonal. For the anti-Romantics, or "Baroque" essayists, 
to borrow Croll's term, the familiar persona which is the 
trademark of the Montaignesque essay is created not by the 
revelations of personal examples, but by conversational tone 
and a playful delight in overturning received opinion. 
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Modern Traditions of the Essay 
In the following chapters I will analyze the essays of 
some modern followers of Bacon and Montaigne. I wish to 
build on the theoretical base of Beale's notion of the essay 
as rhetorical discourse by emphasizing the skeptical nature 
of the genre. The Renaissance conception of skepticism, as 
I have tried to show, is a constructive exploration of and 
argument about probabilities, the exploratory spirit that 
lies at the heart of rhetoric. Perhaps, rather than 
bemoaning our lot in living in such complicated times, as do 
the "Grim Sliders," we should celebrate our fortune in 
living in a sort of new Renaissance, in which, because the 
old scientific totem is overthrown, we have great freedom to 
pursue the eternal questions in the anti-dogmatic manner of 
the original humanists. When systems fail, rhetoric fills 
the vacuum. The popularity and influence of essays attests 




See, for example, the essays of David Morse, Homi 
Bhabha, Allon White, and Frank Gloversmith in The Theory of 
Reading# ed. Frank Gloversmith (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1984). 
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Excepting these insights, Kahn's treatment of 
Renaissance skepticism is tainted by a strong deconstruc­
tionist bias which leads her astray in her notions of the 
skeptical temper. As with Hartman, (Chapter One), the 




APHORIST, EXPERT, AND JUDGE: THREE BACONIAN ESSAYISTS 
"Learning teaches how to carry things in suspense, without 
prejudice, till you resolve." 
—Bacon 
In this chapter I shall analyze some of the techniques 
of three American essayists who draw more or less distinctly 
from the "Baconian" tradition: George Will, Paul Fussell, 
and Paul Theroux. I have deliberately chosen writers whose 
work is not easily categorized, which, in all three cases, 
resides on the outskirts of what Beale terms the "reflec­
tive/exploratory" genus, the category associated with the 
traditional "familiar" essay. Their work, by and large, 
exemplifies "the distinctively modern variety of suasory 
reflection . . . which focuses on topics of immediate social 
interest and controversy, but using strategies of reflection 
rather than of deliberation, and conveying a distinctly 
personal attitude" (Beale 157). 
I want to make clear that in offering these three 
writers as examples of modern traditions of the essay, and 
the three Montaignesue writers in the following chapter, I 
I am not attempting an overview of the entire spectrum of 
the form. In fact, I am only concentrating on one of 
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Beale's categories, the reflective/exploratory. This 
analysis does not include the base form of rhetoric, which 
is the deliberative essay, nor the informative, nor epideic-
tic genres. 
I concentrate on the reflective/exploratory essay 
because it is the most volatile, the most subject to 
invention and change. Beale notes that this type forms a 
bridge with poetic discourse, and because of this, the 
reflective essayist freely borrows from the traditions of 
fiction and poetry (152). I also concentrate on this form 
because I believe it tells us something not only about 
"modern traditions of the essay" but also about the Modern 
Tradition itself. The tendencies toward skepticism and 
individualism inform our age, as off-shoots of a neo-Renais-
sance distrust of authority. Debates on public issues and 
policy increasingly take the form of personal reflection. A 
possible reason for the predominance of the subjective is 
that while Aristotle envisioned for deliberation a 
circumscribed range of policy issues, modern deliberation 
quickly leads to questions about basic values and beliefs. 
Writers adopt a democratic stance, on apparently equal 
footing with their audiences. Furthermore, the pervasive use 
of the personal, familiar voice—and the concurrent decline 
of the authoritative high style writing—are byproducts, I 
think, of the flood of information. No longer do texts have 
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the same authority they enjoyed in the past when there were 
fewer publications and "the news" was difficult to obtain. 
The works of the three essayists I examine in this 
chapter are less personal than those of the writers in the 
fourth chapter. The impersonality of Baconian essays is, of 
course, their hallmark, although "impersonality" is 
actually a less precise term for aloofness or distance 
which, as Booth reminds us time and again in The Rhetoric of 
Fiction» do not stand for an author refined out of exis­
tence. An aloof persona, who tells us little of himself and 
assumes a superior or expert stance, positions himself above 
an audience for a reason. He is the boss behind the imposing 
desk, and his "personality" is as important as that of the 
neighborly, "familiar" essayist, who pretends to be in the 
typing pool with us. 
Will's pieces exemplify a contemporary brand of 
political commentary in which "the tactic ... is not that 
of the deliberative but rather of the familiar essayist: not 
a thesis supported but a connection drawn" (Beale 281). 
Actually, though, political opinion lends itself to a 
variety of techniques. Writers can assume the roles of 
experts, as do Will and Edwin Yoder, for example, or of 
"know-nothing" neighbors, as do Calvin Trillin and 
Russell Baker. As in the case of most rhetorical writing, 
the material itself does not dictate a conventional stance 
by the author. 
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This lack of a predictable stance stems from the fact, 
I believe, that most readers consider politics within their 
own realm of knowledge. In politics, especially, people 
tend to assume some sort of dialectical position above mere 
expertise. A reflective writer such as Will who chooses a 
Baconian persona must soften it somewhat with 
self-deprecating asides and occasional "familiar™ pieces. 
The same is not true of the more thoroughgoing deliberative 
essayists such as the editorialists for daily papers who 
write more about individual policies than moral contexts. 
Their expert stance is an expected convention, accepted even 
by readers who think they know at least as much and probably 
more. 
Paul Fussell's book reviews represent a different sort 
of tradition in the reflective/exploratory sphere. 
Fussell's reviews are extended critical versions of a well 
established "de facto genre." Within Beale's model of "aims" 
(rhetorical, instrumental, scientific, and poetic) de facto 
genres are assigned the lowest, least stable position: 
The rationale of such positioning is that "de facto 
genre" represents a category wherein certain typical 
functions are associated fairly consistently with 
certain conventions of form and strategy; and . . . 
anything perceived as a conventional form is subject to 
metaphoric transfer—to subordination to other ends. 
This happens, for instance, when what appears to be a 
book review turns out to be an extended presentation of 
a counterthesis or an extended promotion of the ideas 
contained in the book. (23) 
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A de facto genre like a book review or an obituary may be 
stable in form, but paradoxically, because of this stabili­
ty, vulnerable to appropriation by an author whose aim is 
more than a simple judgment about an artistic work. This 
theoretical notion of asymmetry confirms Lukacs's comments 
on the "ironic" stance of the essayist who pretends to be 
"just" examining "pictures and books" while he really is 
examining moral and aesthetic issues of much greater scope. 
Nevertheless—another paradox—although the author of a 
book review may pretend to a lowly aim, he is bound to 
a loftier relationship with his audience than are writers of 
other sorts of essays. He must assume a voice of expertise 
if he is to be credible. The "expert" voice of the simple 
book review survives, I believe, in extended "essay 
reviews"—the term used more and more often in magazines and 
periodicals. 
Beale discusses the notion of "direction"—-that is, 
audience/author relationship—and makes the following 
judgment about rhetorical discourse: 
In rhetoric, the author-audience relation is dynamic 
and open-ended. It is not determined by convention or 
the exigencies of subject, nor is it fabricated; 
rather, it is discovered or established by a successful 
author and is developed or exploited as a strategy of 
persuasion. (99) 
Although I agree on the whole, I do not think Beale's 
analysis takes fully into account the "exigencies" of 
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subjects which demand a certain assumption of superiority or 
expertise on the author's part if he is to be rhetorically 
successful. In the course of his reviews, Fussell, for 
example, may reveal intimate, even humiliating bits and 
pieces about himself, but the voice of the expert reviewer 
predominates nevertheless. We do not wish to read the 
critical comments of an ignorant person, no matter how 
"familiar" and engaging he appears to be. 
Theroux's travel pieces are even more difficult "cases" 
to classify. Some travel pieces are in the Montaignesque 
mode and others are Baconian, while many are mixtures of 
familiarity and impersonality. Nevertheless, I include his 
travel essays in this chapter because I think Theroux's 
persona is consistently more ironically superior, more 
worldly wise, more defensive and less self-mocking than the 
voices in the essays I examine in the next chapter. Further­
more, the didactic, even preaching tone of the Baconian 
essayist is striking in Theroux's writing. 
Although an essayist uses different voices at 
different times—-George Will writes "egalitarian" pieces on 
his family and Calvin Trillin uses "straight" reportorial 
prose in his "U.S. Journal" columns, for example—on the 
whole, however, a consistent thread runs through a particul­
ar writer's essays which places him or her in the Baconian 
or Montaignesque camps. Perhaps the key is an individual 
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writer's temperament, but that is a subject more fit for 
psychoanalysis than rhetorical criticism. 
A more objective index of a writer's characteristic 
style and stance is found in Beale's distinction between 
modal "stances" and modal "directions." The stances— 
discursive, narrative, dramatic—form a continuum of ways of 
establishing a conventional place-time relationship of 
author and reader, and certain characteristic ways of 
creating coherence attach to the different positions. The 
"directions," which can attach to any of the stances, use 
features of pointing to "direct" discourse in one of three 
ways: 1. towards the audience (affective)y 2.towards the 
subject (objective); 3. towards the author or narrator 
(expressive) . 
One of the hallmarks of the Baconian tradition is its 
relative restriction of modes in comparison to the Montaign­
esque tradition. Baconian essays are usually discursive, 
whereas Montaignesque essays are mixtures and variations of 
all three modes. Within the discursive mode, Baconian essays 
are more or less objectively directed, although some essays 
meet the more expressive Montaignesque type halfway. This is 
especially true with travel essays such as Theroux's 
"Memories of Old Afghanistan" or "Malaysia." In the rest of 
the chapter I hope to show a sort of continuum of reflective 
expression within the Baconian type, from the relatively 
objective pieces of George Will to the more expressive 
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pieces of Fussell and Theroux, whose essays make a bridge to 
the lyrical essays I discuss in Chapter Four. 
70 
I. George Will, the Aphorism, and the Op-Ed Column 
George F. Will's political commentary won acclaim from 
the beginning of his career in journalism, and such acclaim 
provided this relatively young man the necessary authority 
of an aphoristic Baconian writer. Will's essays are more 
reflective than most political commentary, which typically 
takes the short rather than the long view. 
Will's philosophical stance is a product of his family 
background and education as well as his own temperament. 
Will's father, Frederick Will, was a philosophy professor at 
the University of Illinois at Champaign. Although steeped 
in an academic environment, young George was not really 
intellectually engaged at Trinity College in Connecticut. In 
an interview with David Broder, Will described himself as "a 
late bloomer intellectually," not interested in much "except 
the National League until about my senior year in college" 
when he was promoted from sports editor to editor of the 
campus newspaper (Broder 422). His parents were Democrats 
and Will was a liberal in his undergraduate days, co-
chairing "Trinity Students for Kennedy" in 1960. After 
graduating from Trinity, Will enrolled in Oxford where his 
politics underwent a sea change. "I became," he now writes, 
"a thoroughly ideological capitalist": 
It was in Britain that I began to see how a state 
fueled by unclear ideas about egalitarianism and a sort 
of reflexive, trendy, intellectual anti-capitalism 
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could suffocate the social energies of a country, could 
condemn a lot of people to a frustrating future, by 
stamping out, in a nation where they needed it most, 
social mobility. (422) 
After Oxford, Will entered the Ph.D. program in 
political philosophy at Princeton. His hard-line politics, 
developed at Oxford, softened somewhat at Princeton where he 
increasingly began to see the need for government interfer­
ence to restrain the sometimes cruel forces of a completely 
free-wheeling capitalism. The ideas of Leo Strauss, the 
University of Chicago political philosopher, greatly 
influenced Will's emerging philosophy of a restrained 
capitalism (422) . After earning his Ph.D. at the age of 
twenty-three, Will taught political science at Michigan 
State and the University of Toronto. 
In 1970 Will left his teaching career to join the staff 
of Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado. Will was one of 
Allott's chief speech writers. At the same time, Will began 
to contribute to William Buckley's National Review. When 
Allott lost the 1972 election, Will became the Washington 
editor of Buckley's magazine. He also began contributing 
columns to the op-ed page of the Washington Post, and in 
1973 the column was syndicated. In 1974 Will began writing 
bi-weekly essays for Newsweek. He is also a commentator on 
David Brinkley's weekly television program on ABC, This 
Week. His rise as political commentator has been unusually 
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fast. With so much exposure in differing contexts, Will's 
views on politics and government are widely disseminated, 
and he is able to present and "play off his opinions in his 
television appearances and columns. Will has the luxury of 
repetition and amplification enjoyed by few columnists since 
Walter Lippmann. 
Will's essays are, for the most part, in the Baconian 
tradition: unabashedly deliberative, weighty, and baroque in 
style. His penchant for aphorisms—his own and others—is 
the distinguishing hallmark of his writing. Will won the 
Pulitzer Prize for distinguished political commentary in 
1977, and in 1983 U.S. congressmen and senators voted him 
the journalist they most respected. Will's commentary won 
acclaim from the beginning of his career in journalism, even 
from liberals who disliked his neo-conservatism. The columns 
Will wrote in his early thirties are, on the whole, "graver" 
than those he writes in his mid-forties. Furthermore, the 
structures of these earlier columns is more clearly defined. 
There is more of a shotgun quality to Will's later pieces as 
well as a more casual tone. 
Reading Will's essays in his three collections, The 
Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts (1978), The 
Pursuit of Virtue and Other Tory Motions (1982), and EM 
Morning After (1986) is interesting not only because of the 
content of the essays but because we can trace the metamor­
phosis of a persona that is consistently serious but 
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increasingly playful at the same time. Perhaps a youthful 
aphoristic writer must establish a reputation for gravi­
ty—and grow in confidence—before he can use to any great 
extent the traditionally self-denigrating humor of the 
skeptic. 
In his Introduction to The Pursuit of Happiness. Will 
states clearly that he writes from the stance of a moralists 
My subject is not what is secret, but what is latent, 
the kernel of principle and other significance that 
exists, recognized or not, inside events, actions, 
policies and manners. . . . these columns are 
meditations, my attempts to examine issues and events 
through the lens of principles that, I am confident, 
constitute a coherent conservative philosophy.(xv-xvi) 
Will's essays are remarkable for the clear-eyed vision of 
the values behind government policies and cultural drifts. 
In this same Introduction, Will allies himself firmly with 
traditional periodical essayists, such as Addison, Steele, 
and Johnson, who also were unapologetic moralists. He is 
also clear about the limits of rhetorical writing ("journal­
ism"). In his essay "On turning forty," he compares the 
aims of "journalism" and literature and concludes that the 
latter enlarges our sympathy by exposing us to "themes of 
ordinary life. Indeed, the older I get, the more I see the 
inexhaustible interestingness of the ordinary." On the 
other hand, journalism, believes Will, "illustrate[s] life's 
thorns and thistles" (PV, 378). 
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In Will's own thorny essays, there is a large measure 
of sympathy for the underdogs of our society. Will departs 
from more traditional conservatives in his endorsement of 
welfare distributed prudently by a strong central govern­
ment. In Statecraft as Soulcraft. his book outlining his 
political philosophy, he calls for a transformation of 
traditional conservatism into "conservatism with a kindly 
face." He consistently deplores the modern version of 
government promoted by such diverse thinkers as Adam Smith, 
and James Madison, because, among other reasons, such a 
mechanized view of forces and counterforces results in the 
"devaluing of government . . . radically lowering the 
stature of the political vocation" ( "Adam Smith," PV, 285). 
The stony-hearted brokering of factions that is our 
present view of government results in the unleashing of an 
equally stony-hearted selfishness, which is the underside of 
the enduring American trait of individualism, believes Will; 
the needs of the community are seen as second to the desires 
of the individual. Will finds symptoms of this roughriding 
individualism in a number of places—from films like Billy 
Jack (PH, 131-134) to the public's reaction to illegal 
drugs: 
The inadequacy of the ethic of individualism is 
apparent in the fact that people tend to worry about 
recreational drugs only in terms of danger to users' 
physiologies rather than damage to the community's 
character.(PH, 69) 
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The deleterious effects of unfettered individualism is 
one of the touchstones of Statecraft as Soulcraft. Will 
pleads for a strong government which aids the efforts of 
individuals and groups? "small platoons,n to help the 
luckless of society. James Neuchterlein in his 1983 article 
on Will and Statecraft as Soulcraft concludes that Will's 
support of strong government is more persuasive in his 
essays than in his book; "In the immediate and quotidian 
world of Will the columnist, his sympathies for strong 
government are regularly checked and restrained by his 
knowledge of government's habitual failures" (40). Neuch-
terlein's assessment of the columnist's strengths as an 
essayist, compared to his perception of Will's failures in 
the book-length Statecraft as Soulcraft,. can be extended to 
the strengths of the essay form itself; 
It is odd that an author should be more impressive in 
brief essays than in a fully developed argument, but 
that is the situation with Will. His columns, taken 
together, offer a richer and more satisfactory (if less 
systematic) public philosophy than does his book. . . . 
Will's columns normally begin with discussion of a 
specific issue and move on from there to more general 
analysis. Statecraft as Soulcraft too often lacks the 
anchor of particularity. (39) 
Regular essayists/columnists stake out certain terri­
tories for themselves, making contracts with regular 
readers. Audiences expect politically liberal argument from 
Anthony Lewis, accomodationist foreign policy interpretation 
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from Flora Lewis, ironic personal narrative from Russell 
Baker; columnists work hard to appear responsible as well as 
present a predictable slant. George Will produces conserva­
tive commentary from an historical, intellectual 
perspective. Such a niche has its dangers: because Will is 
associated with an intellectual high road, he may also be 
associated with pedantry and scholarly arrogance. Will's 
style is highly aphoristic, and, as I have discussed in 
Chapter Two, aphorisms are traditionally the province of 
"aristocratic," old sage personae—as well as tiresome old 
bores like Polonius. A recent series of "Doonesbury" 
cartoons by Gary Trudeau humorously exploits (and attacks) 
Will's reputation as a "quoter" (see appendix to this 
chapter). Trudeau's series ends with Will quoting, and 
identifying himself with, the ultimate "source." 
What Trudeau ignores, of course, is that quotation was 
at one time also a staple of the self-denigrating, "humble" 
Montaignesque essayist, a remnant of the Renaissance 
humanist's deference to his classical reading. In contemp­
orary essays, however, a penchant for quoting is an almost 
exclusive characteristic of the Baconian line of essayists 
with their equally pronounced characteristic of generating 
their own quotable aphorisms. 
A sampling of Will's aphorisms—his own and others—is 
an excursion into the relatively exotic world of traditional 
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rhetorical schemes and tropes, a world that was once 
familiar to every grammar school child. That Will is a 
conscious phrase-maker, that he exploits with relish 
anaphora, epistrophe, chiasmus, and other traditional marks 
of eloquence indicates to some extent his conservative 
reverence for historical tradition. His comments on Winston 
Churchill's baroque style ("Winston Churchill: In the Region 
of Mass Effects," PH, 31-33), are applicable to his own as 
wells 
Many people found the archaisms of his rhetoric 
offputting. Such people—who, I wager, prefer Le 
Corbusier to Wren, Hemingway to Flaubert—dismiss his 
rhetoric as the unfortunate consequence of exposing an 
impressionable youth to Gibbon and Macaulay. But it 
was much more than the residue of others1 eloquence. 
People who look upon history as a story of 
unreasonably slow progress from darkness to our current 
enlightenment, and hence as just a tiresome prelude to 
modernity, should dislike Churchill's rhetoric. In it 
style and substance are fused. (32) 
Will often begins his essays with a self-conscious 
rhetorical figure. For example, his piece "The 'Ordinary' 
Soviet Leaders" (PV, 157-160) begins with a double example 
of symploce (beginning and ending a clause with the same 
words): "For generations, the world has been awash with 
potent ideas about the impotence of ideas, and theories of 
history that discount individuals as makers of history" 
(157). Will also may end his essays with an aphorism, as in 
the elaborately figured close of his essay "The Soft Cushion 
of Detente" (PV, 163-165)s "Today, the Soviet regime is so 
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grotesquely ignorant and arrogant, so boorish and bullying, 
that its cruelty and recklessness may awaken Americans from 
their dogmatic slumber" (165). A connoisseur of rhetorical 
figures delights in such an interplay of anaphora (repeti­
tion of the beginning element "so"), polysyndeton (repeti­
tion of the conjunction "and") and isocolon (balance of 
syllables). 
More often than not, however, Will favors a curt 
statement as a way to bring an essay to a memorable, abrupt 
close and to carry his point home. For example in his essay 
on Wayne Hays' philandering ("An Appropriations Question," 
PH, 226-228) he ends the essay by asking a blunt question: 
"The question is; does his mistress type, or doesn't she?" 
Or in his answer to a personal attack on his character and 
writing in the Soviet Literary Gazette, an attack Will milks 
for all its inherent flattery and unconscious humor, he ends 
with the title of the essay: "Sorry, Mom, but that's 
dialectics" (PV, 175) . 
Will also uses quotations as beginnings and endings, as 
well as liberally sprinkling them throughout his columns. 
The practice is an old-fashioned one, as I have discussed, 
and a remnant of the old humanistic practice of drawing on 
wise commonplaces to lend rhetorical authority as well as a 
fine patina of learning to essays. It is a practice much 
counseled in older composition books but out of fashion now. 
Perhaps the modern distrust of authority as well as the 
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pains that writers take to assume the most intimate possible 
persona and the premium place on "honest expression" and 
"finding ones own voice" account for the relative rarity of 
the quoting practice. At any rate, Trudeau's parody of 
Will's "imperious" penchant for quoting hits home in these 
dogmatically democratic times. From C.S. Lewis to Steven 
Leacock to James Joyce, the list of Will's sources for 
quotations is a small Bartlett's. 
Aside from the traditional uses of authority, his 
quoting practice derives from an unabashed passion for fine 
phrases, and an uncommon humility (pace Trudeau), relatively 
rare among today's writers, in giving credit to other 
phrasemakers. Occasionally Will's quoting seems gratuitous 
and indolent,especially when he quotes less than memorable 
quotations by unknown "authorities." Who are Kin Hubbard? 
Abraham Myerson? Michael Ledeen? The list of unknowns is 
rather long. Perhaps this doesn't matter if the quotations 
are fine enough. For example, in quoting Charles Peguy, a 
name not likely to be recognized by the greater part of 
Will's audience, Will scores with a pithy, memorable phrase: 
"'It will never be known what acts of cowardice have been 
motivated by the fear of not looking sufficiently 
progressive'"("The 'Ordinary' Soviet Leaders," PV, 158). On 
the other hand, does Will really need to quote Ledeen in 
making a fairly obvious conclusion: "Michael Ledeen, writing 
in Commentary says Lacouture's recantation is part of 'the 
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debate among French intellectuals over the nature of 
communism—a debate which has now reached historic propor­
tions" ("Shame," PV, 152). Such dependence on sources known 
primarily to other journalists leaves Will open to a charge 
of professorial pedantry as does his sometimes high-handed 
wielding of facts. For example, in his essay on Dole's 
debate with Mondale in the 1976 campaign ("Hitting Bottom," 
PH, 188-189), Will chides Dole for his spurious charge that 
all the wars in this century were "Democrat." Will sets the 
historical record straight, but in doing so seems a bit like 
an irritated history teacher scolding a class of dunces. 
Too much scholarly arrogance is anti-rhetorical since the 
larger audience of the essay—other than Dole and his 
advisors—may feel a sort of reflected contempt. 
Usually, however, Will's writing is remarkably free of 
this stern pedantic tone—the persona that bedevils aphoris­
tic essays as much as does the narcissistic narrator of many 
reflective, Montaignesque essays. Will subdues the preachy 
pedant through a variety of methods. First of all, he 
balances his scholarly approach which includes a substantial 
knowledge of political history with a deep fund of common 
sense. In this respect, as well as its conservative 
philosophy and wit. Will's writing is reminiscent of the 
nineteenth-century English political essayist Walter 
Bagehot, whom Will quotes from time to time. 
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(See PH, 239 and PV, 378). What Norman St John-Stevas has 
written of Bagehot applies also to Will: 
Common sense saved him „ . . from the sterility to 
which his speculative, sceptical, intellect might 
otherwise have condemned him. . . . His uniqueness lay 
in this capacity to bridge the gulf between the 
practical and intellectual world. (Walter Bagehot 
23-24) 
Will's skepticism and common sense save him from 
sterile dogma and ingratiate him into the hearts of many 
doctrinaire liberals. In "The Disease of Politics," (PH, 
190-193), for example, he concedes, as he often does, that 
conservatism lacks a fully articulated social philosophy: 
Conservatism often has been inarticulate about what 
to conserve, other than "free enterprise," which is 
institutionalized restlessness, an engine of perpetual 
change. But to govern is to choose one social outcome 
over others; to impose a collective will on processes 
of change. Conservatism that does not extend beyond 
reverence for enterprise is unphilosophic, has little 
to do with government and conserves little.(192) 
Such commonsense criticism may irritate loyal Republicans 
but it enlarges Will's reputation on the whole with most 
readers. 
Common sense lies at the base of Will's arguments. A 
judicious use of self-deprecation and dry wit enhances his 
writing and, like common sense, shields him from charges of 
pedantry to which his baroque style makes him vulnerable. 
Will's uses irony not only as rhetorical ornament and 
strategy; his ironic stance is the outward manifestation of 
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his inward skepticism as applied to modern dogmas and idols. 
As Martin Peretz has written in The New Republic; 
[Will] has the capacity for scorn, fueled less by 
malice than by an aversion to cant. That aversion, 
however, is not much shared these days. Cant, in fact, 
is the vernacular of the public discourse, the mode of 
politician, "feuilletoniste" and celebrity alike. . . . 
Even when we disagree with him, which may be less than 
one would think, George Will is a great and rare 
exception. (30) 
In the next few pages, I will closely analyze several of 
Will's essays as a way of illustrating more completely some 
of his characteristic rhetorical strategies. The first 
essay, "The End of the Hostage Fiasco: Celebrating and 
'Feeling'" (PV, 167-169) was published on February 1, 1981 
and is a particularly good example of Will's essayistic 
skepticism and disdain for cant. Furthermore, it is a good 
representative of the contemporary political essay which 
does not argue straightforwardly but presents a set of 
opinions in the form of aphorism and example. 
Context is of primary importance in analyzing rhetori­
cal discourse, since rhetoric is conceived in response to 
specific events and experiences. The context for this essay 
was the outpouring of celebration at the return of the 
American hostages from Iran in January, 1981. People tied 
yellow ribbons on old oak trees and car antennae, held 
candlelight marches, sang patriotic songs and so on to mark 
the country's "victory" over the Ayatollah Khomeini. So 
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Will's opening sentence comes as a sort of Baconian shocker: 
"The movable feast of celebration about the hostages has 
abated a bit, so perhaps it will not seem intolerably 
churlish to ask what, precisely, people have been celebrat­
ing" (167). Will takes care to concede that he risks 
seeming "intolerably churlish" and "stone-hearted" but the 
hyperbole of these terms insures that his audience of 
reasonable people will not have such an overblown reaction 
to his skeptical theme. 
The next paragraph contains several aphorisms piled on 
top of each other, including a paraphrase of Orwell's dictum 
on insincere language. Will's remarkable ear for judicious 
alliteration and balanced phrases is exemplified particular­
ly in the second sentence: "When calamity is translated into 
the idiom of sport and christened a victory, when victims 
are called heroes and turned into props for telegenic 
celebrations of triumph, then it is time to recall George 
Orwell's axiom that the great enemy of clear language is 
insincerity"(168). 
It is useful to examine why such rhetorical flourishes 
as the repetition of "when," the alliteration of "calamity" 
and "christened," "telegenic" and "triumph," "celebrations" 
and "insincerity" as well as the careful balancing of 
syllables in each phrase is so pleasing, and more important­
ly so persuasive. One of the best answers is found in 
Kenneth Burke's A Rhetoric of Motives; in line with his 
view of rhetoric as inducing "identification," Burke recalls 
Longinus's notion of the "kind of elation wherein the 
audience feels as though it were not merely receiving, but 
were itself creatively participating in the poet's or 
speaker's assertion" (57-58). Burke's view is that "formal" 
rhetorical strategies exploit the potential for such 
participation by an audience. In the first sentence of Will 
paragraph, for example, we anticipate the beginning "then" 
of the final clause after the successive "whens" of the 
first two clauses. The feeling of closure is undeniable. Of 
course, the danger of such formal rhetorical appeals is 
that, as Burke writes, "Once you grasp the trend of the 
form, it invites participation regardless of the subject 
matter" (58). Baconian rhetoricians like Will induce 
"participation in the form" and "include a partisan state­
ment within this same pale of assent" (59). People who 
dismiss old school rhetoric as a mindless study of schemes 
and tropes do not understand the power of "formal assent." 
Other examples of Will's schematic persuasion are found in 
the fifth, eighth, and ninth paragraphs. "A nation that 
confuses catharsis with the defense of its interests is a 
nation that cannot distinguish between attitudinizing and 
acting," exemplifies Will's characteristic reliance on 
anaphora, isocolon, and alliteration. "Love confessed to 
disc jockeys, like grief expressed to Merv Griffin, is 
however real the psychic need it nourishes, still synthetic" 
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is stinging in its ironic coupling of love and disc jockeys, 
grief and Merv Griffin. By placing such disparate and 
disproportionate elements in close proximity, Will is 
working in the tradition of moralists who constantly draw 
our attention to the confusion of values in society. "A 
nation that was built by muscle and preserved by blood is 
increasingly fueled by hyperbole and sustained by euphem­
ism, " writes Will as an aphoristic summary of the plight of 
society. It is no accident, I am sure, that "muscle 
and . . . blood" recall the popular song "Sixteen Tons" from 
the fifties, an era Will sees, perhaps, as more responsible 
and less "synthetic" than our own. 
Will's argument proceeds from Orwell's notion of the 
links between insincerity and murky language. "Synthetic" 
feeling, the sort of mob emotion which accompanied the 
hostage homecoming, is the latest in a series of debase­
ments" exemplified and exacerbated by the "inflation 
debasing the language." It includes "the manufacture of 
frivolous appetites" such as designer jeans and "an enter­
tainment industry geared to the manufacture of the lowest 
moods (using bathos and titillation)." 
In the analogy he draws between the hostage homecoming 
and the "vigil" kept by many people outside John Lennon's 
apartment after the singer's death, Will displays his 
essayistic talent for using a visual image as emblem for a 
larger state of mind, in this case the flower covered gate 
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outside the Dakota apartment building which Will describes 
as looking like an altar. "A pent-up yearning for public 
witness found release in worship of a rock star.™ The 
yearning for togetherness exemplified by the worshipful 
crowds at Lennon's apartment and those paying "tribute" to 
the hostages are symptomatic of the nation's desire to feel 
rather than think. To those people who justified the 
public's sentimental response to the hostage homecoming as a 
"good thing" by saying that it engendered national cohesion, 
Will offers another analogy as rebuttal; "So did Pearl 
harbor, which was not a good thing and would have been worse 
if America's response had been vigils and ribbons" (168). 
Will drives home his point by offering another example 
of our society's growing penchant for feeling rather than 
thinking or acting. Students in the 1960s began answering 
questions by offering their personal "reactions" and 
"feelings." Will stands a quote on its head to summarize 
the trends "Descarte's 'Cogito, ergo sum' . . . became 'I 
feel, therefore I am.'" In the final paragraph, Will refers 
back to his focusing event, the hostage homecoming, and 
offers a curt aphorism as a conclusion; "The celebrating 
will end when the thinking begins." 
The essay is typical of many of Will's characteristic 
strategies—using an aphorism as a starting point, a 
"premise" for a suasory piece which is not a true argument 
but rather a series of opinions clothed in extra-logical 
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appeals, especially analogies and the decorous Baroque 
phrases of the traditional Baconian style, which draw on the 
power of formal assent. Typical too is Will's analysis of 
current events as symptomatic of the moral condition of the 
nation. Will works in the tradition of the skeptical 
essayist who uses events, objects, and people as focusing 
events for philosophical inquiries and who delights in 
running against the grain of received opinion. 
In his latest collection, The Morning After, Will has 
chosen essays of an even less topical nature than those in 
the earlier collections. Also, there are many more essays 
of an apolitical nature on "familiar" themes such as 
children, heroes, and baseball. Is Will reflecting the 
current mania for personal expression or are these themes 
dearer to an older man than those related to political 
battles? Either way, Will's cast of mind as revealed in his 
writing seems more thoroughly "essayistic" than ever. 
Will's mature style is "broken" in Bacon's approving 
definition of the aphorism as "knowledge broken." Transi­
tions are at a minimum and readers must patch in middle 
terms. The effect is not one of carelessness, however, as 
one might say of Buckley's latter-day slapdash writing (we 
can believe Buckley's "boast" that he writes his columns in 
twenty minutes). Will moves with breakneck speed from one 
aphorism or quotation to another and the result is economy 
and elegance rather than lazy writing. One example of this 
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galloping aphoristic style is contained in his essay, 
"Conservatism and Cheerfulness: Bill Buckley at Sixty": 
Politically committed people live in constant danger 
of becoming politically obsessed and winding up like 
Gatsby, whose warped personality was the price of 
living too long with a single dream. The occupational 
hazard of political movements is terminal earnestness. 
Political journals often become lumps of dullness 
leavened only by outbursts of hysteria. What was said 
of Gladstone is true of them: They do not exactly lack 
a sense of humor, but they are not often in the mood to 
be amused. 
Furthermore, because conservatism is realism about 
mankind's limitation, it does not lend itself to the 
flattering of the species. Conservatives are healthily 
disposed to detect signs that the clock of time is 
running down and things are going to wrack and ruin. 
This disposition frequently gives them a certain 
grimness. Bill's singular achievement has been a 
compatible marriage between conservatism and cheerful­
ness. (MA, 399-400) 
"Proof" for Will's premise that Buckley is a rare 
item—a cheerful but politically engaged conservative—is in 
the form of a piling up of aphorisms descriptive of politic­
al and conservative tempers. These aphorisms serve as a 
kind of definition of the politically committed species, 
genus conservative, with the antithetical description of 
Buckley's rare temperament placed at the end as contrasting 
anomaly. 
A further example of induction based on an accretion of 
aphori sms is found in another "familiar" essay in The 
Morning After entitled "Sport and Civility" concerning one 
of Will's most frequent apolitical themes: 
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In an age short on craftsmanship and long on shoddi-
ness, anything done well—laying bricks, writing poems, 
playing games — deserves honor. Worked at 
intelligently, sport is not just compatible with 
academic purposes, it complements them because it 
involves striving for excellence, but striving governed 
by standards of fairness and seemliness. As the 
ancient Greeks understood, sport is a civic, a moral 
undertaking because it can teach appreciation of worthy 
things, such as courage and beauty. A use of the body 
that is strenuous yet elegant—be it ballet or basket­
ball—can enlarge and express the spirit. Watching a 
great athlete is, strictly speaking, good for the soul. 
(109-110) 
The last sentence is the crowning general proposition for a 
set of aphorisms which are thematically connected, although 
so various—skipping from college sports to the Greek 
conception of sport to the spiritual nourishment of sports— 
that the passage is close in tone to the calculated "rambl-
ings" of the traditional Montaignesque essayist. 
Nevertheless, I believe Will's place is with the 
Baconian essayists, and that his reflective pieces are 
closer to deliberative essays than the other Baconian pieces 
I will analyze in this chapter. To account for his place on 
the continuum of reflective discourse we should turn to a 
different sort of essay—one of the thoroughly deliberative 
essays that appears in Will's columns from time to time. An 
example of a refutation argument in the traditional sense is 
found in his essay "•Compassion' that Dehumanizes" (MA, 162-
164). Analyzing this essay gives us an insight into Will as 
logician and debater, aspects of his rhetoric which are 
often subordinated to his philosophical ruminations. 
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"'Compassion* that Dehumanizes" is a classic example of 
values deliberation in the form of a refutation argument. 
Will is answering the charges of two other columnists, Carl 
Rowan and Ray Jenkins, that he has been mean-spirited and 
inconsistent in an earlier column. This column concerned a 
television documemtary by Bill Moyers on the troubled black 
family. Will, as he often does after encountering a book, 
movie or television show that he finds interesting, summar­
ized the program for his readers and elaborated on one 
aspect of it—the case of a young black man named Timothy, 
the unmarried father of six children. (See "Beyond Civil 
Rights," MA, 160-162). Will sees Timothy as a "paradigm of 
those persons whose sexual irresponsibility produces misery 
but who feels (sic.) little of the guilt that changes 
behavior" (163). 
Jenkins and Rowan subsequently accused Will of a double 
standard; he is compassionate about his son Jonathan who 
suffers from Down's Syndrome, but he is harsh in his 
denunciation of another "handicapped" person. Will uses 
Jenkins' and Rowan's argument against them by stating that 
they "buttress my argument with their objections to it" 
(163). 
Will rejects the standard by which Rowan and Jenkins 
judge his sympathy to the black under-class. "Ameliorative 
programs are necessary but are doomed to be overwhelmed if 
the family, the primary value-generating institution, 
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collapses" (162). He repeats his blunt judgment from the 
earlier column: "I say again: The Timothys are more of a 
menace to black progress than the Bull Connors were because 
only political will was required to remove the Connors. I 
now add: Another menace to black progress is the 'compas­
sionate' portrayal of such black men as utterly passive 
victims, as no more to be judged than infants—as less than 
men" (164). 
Thus Will redefines Jenkins' and Rowan's position as 
condescending rather than compassionate. His definition of 
"personhood" is that its "essence ... is an irreducible 
element of responsibility for one's choices and deeds" 
(163). He implies that by holding a person like Timothy to 
this standard, he is paying him the respect of judging him 
as a man, and by extension Rowan and Jenkins do not pay him 
this respect. 
He also rejects the other columnists' comparison of a 
"genetic defect" like Down's syndrome to the environmental 
misfortune of being raised in the ghetto. Furthermore, he 
rebuts Rowan's characterization of the twenty-six year old 
Timothy as "another handicapped youngster, a ghetto lad" 
(163). Will compares Rowan's irresponsible use of "young­
ster" and "lad" to the demeaning use of "boy" to describe 
adult black males. 
In the fashion of classical argument, Will concedes 
something: "Timothy, having grown up in a social setting of 
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material deprivation and moral underdevelopment and narrow 
horizons, is indeed somewhat a product—a victim, if you 
prefer—of bad circumstances" (163). Nevertheless, he 
refutes Rowan's and Jenkins8 implied definition of Timothy 
as helpless. Using the topic of cause and effect, Will 
postulates that by "thinking of him, and telling him to 
think of himself, as just as much a 'victim of fate' and 
'handicapped' as a child with a retarding genetic defect," 
people like Rowan and Jenkins do no service to "the thinking 
of whites and the self-esteem of blacks" (163) . 
Will's final argument is based on the comparison of his 
son Jonathan with Timothy. Although he rejects Rowan's and 
Jenkins' attempt to define Timothy's and Jonathan's disabil­
ities in the same category, he does not reject the compari­
son completely; if one accepts his premise that "personhood" 
is defined by the ability to be responsible in "making moral 
choices," then Jonathan too is defined as a person and must 
be held to that standard. The implication, of course, is 
that Timothy, who is not mentally deficient, is certainly as 
or more accountable than Jonathan. 
Will's conclusion is in the form of a warning aphorism 
which summarizes his arguments "Black Americans should be 
spared the condescending 'compassion' that portrays irres­
ponsible black men as not really responsible because they 
are not really men" (164) . Will manages to deflect the 
charge of lack of compassion by redefining Rowan's and 
Jenkins' "advertised 'compassion•n as a cruel form of 
dehumanization. He is so successful in this essay because 
he argues logically about an issue which could easily have 
evoked a personal, irrational response. Rowan's and Jenkins 
took the low road of an ad hominem argument in bringing 
Will's son's disability into the argument, and Will wisely 
refused to argue in kind. When he quotes Rowan's character­
ization of his (Will's) argument as "meanness and ignor­
ance," he uses irony as defense: "the light touch is not 
Carl's specialty," another example of arguing to the man, 
certainly, but forgivable for its admirable restraint and 
understatement under the circumstances. 
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II. Paul Fussell, the Expert Voice and the Review/Essay 
In contrast to George Will's elaborate style, Paul 
Fussell's seems studiedly unschematic. He makes pronounce­
ments, but these do not announce themselves in the mnemonic 
symmetries and repetitions of true aphorisms. Nevertheless, 
as with the case of Will's rhetoric, Fussell often couches 
the judgments in his review/essays in the clear, don't-
argue-with-me dictates of the Baconian essayist. Consider, 
for example, this explanatory paragraph in the "Preface" to 
The Boy Scout Handbook, his collection of essays: 
I am persuaded by the performance of George Orwell that 
literary, cultural, social, ethical, and political 
commentary can be virtually the same thing, and I am 
persuaded that the audience for each one is in the 
nature of things the audience for the others. I have 
rejected the notion that readers of literary criticism 
must be learned in mathematics, linguistics, computer 
science, and analytic philosophy; I have expected them 
to be interested only in human nature as revealed in 
human behavior. I have rejected likewise the notion 
that criticism demands the masquerade of solemnity. In 
the literary pieces I have tried to understand litera­
ture very broadly, assuming that regardless of its 
social status or intellectual pretensions a thing is 
literature if it's worth reading more than a couple of 
times for illumination or pleasure, (vii) 
Fussell' s pluralistic notion of "literature" squares 
with his own evolution as a writer who has immigrated from 
the island of the scholarly elite to the rhetorical 
mainland. He has been an academic since 1951 when he began 
teaching at Connecticut College. Currently Donald T. Regan 
Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania, 
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Fussell is best known to the general public for his The 
Great War and Modern Memory (1975), a study of World War I 
literature and its connections with mythic patterns. Before 
Great-War Fussell wrote scholarly books on poetic theory and 
eighteenth-century literature. He sold no more than 8,000 
copies of these works. Finally, he said in an interview in 
Publisher's Weekly., "I got tired of writing what I was 
supposed to write. I felt I was repeating myself and could 
have gone on for years shifting the pieces around" (7). 
Great War was generally acclaimed and sold 40,000 copies. 
"This sudden discovery that I could write for the layman was 
amazing. I only regretted that I got to be so old before 
discovering it" (7). Since Great War's publication, Fussell 
has written several other successful "general audience" 
books: a study of travel writing between World War I and II 
entitled Abroad; British Literary Traveling between the Wars 
(1980) and a book on the "invisible" American class system, 
Class (1983). 
In these books Fussell makes ingenious connections 
between cultural artifacts and the Zeitgeist which informs 
and is informed by them: from the poems of the English 
aristocrat soldiers in World War I to the outsized TV in a 
"high-prole" living room. In short, Fussell makes the kinds 
of unprovable, provocative connections between matter and 
spirit which characterize essayistic writing. 
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Fussell's academic area is eighteenth-century English 
literature, especially the Augustan Age, and it is not too 
presumptuous to suppose that his concentration on this age 
of public discourse has influenced his own desire to write 
for a wider audience (as well as the promise of increased 
sales, of course). In discussing his critical interests with 
Publisher's Weekly. Fussell declares that he is 
interested in writing that most people don't regard as 
literature, writing that's not ostentatiously artistic-
-war memoirs, autobiographies, travel books, of course, 
even college catalogs. Anything that has a delusive 
effect on the reader is literature and ought to be of 
interest to critics. What literature does, after all, 
is to plant us in a different, credible environment. 
(7-8) 
Like many professors of literature, Fussell's own 
writing style exhibits characteristics of the age he 
studies: he is often arch, ironic, and decorous. In his 
scholarly work The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism. 
Fussell discusses the reactionary impulse which drove the 
Augustan writers who preferred to look backward to the 
seventeenth century rather than to join in the celebration 
of progress. "Their rhetorical careers," believes Fussell, 
"conduct a more or less constant warfare with the 'official' 
assumptions of their age, assumptions held by most of their 
contemporaries" (20). Fussell's work, too, reveals a deep 
vein of skepticism about beaming progress. 
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Fussell is a prolific writer of essays, which he 
contributes to such "elite" general audience magazines as 
Harper' s and The New Republic. He also writes reviews and 
essays for Encounter. Virginia Quarterly Review. Partisan 
Review, and other publications. His audience, judging by the 
subjects he chooses, is an educated one though not necessar­
ily an academic one. His book reviews, which are the 
subject of this analysis, are pitched to people with a good 
deal of literary knowledge and presuppose a readership 
interested in new books on William Carlos Williams or Graham 
Greene or Walt Whitman, for example. 
Fussell's assessment of books on literary topics is in 
a context of his own specialized training. Because of the 
expert knowledge he brings to these review/essays, they must 
be classified with the impersonal Baconian tradition which 
rests on a relation of inequality between author and 
audience, despite Fussell*s rather populist stance in his 
"Preface." Reviewing, for example, Vladimir Nabakov's Notes 
on Prosody, he writes: 
It is the whimsicality of Nabokov's approach to poetic 
technique, his constant pursuit of the outre, his late-
romantic impressionism and idiosyncrasy, that finally 
are the most striking things about this little volume. 
He has always enjoyed parody, and what we have here is 
like a parody of an academic dissertation or a 
textbook. The genre he is working in seems close to 
that of Pound's ABC of Reading, but if in Pound's work 
we catch the tones of an angry midwestern Populist of 
the late nineteenth century, Nabokov's spiritual 
ancestry goes even further back, extending through 
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Lewis Carroll and Thomas Love Peacock to Laurence 
Sterne himself. (94-95) 
I quoted this passage at some length because it 
exemplifies many of the characteristics of Fussell's 
reviews. He is able to provide a good deal of help to 
readers in placing works in an historical literary context 
("late romantic impressionism and idiosyncrasy," "Nabokov's 
spiritual ancestry," analogy with Pound) as well as in the 
context of an individual author's oeuvre (Nabokov's "whimsi­
cality" and enjoyment of parody) . Even more striking is 
Fussell's ability to provide social commentary as well as 
literary evaluations. This is the primary characteristic 
which squarely places his reviews in the essay tradition of 
social criticism. In the section of The Boy Scout Handbook 
entitled "Hazards of Literature," Fussell "uses" literary 
works to examine cultural trends. In "The Purging of 
Penrod," for example, he compares the original version of 
Tarkington's "good bad book" with the 1965 edition as a way 
of illustrating the prissy attempts of modern editors to 
expurgate what they see as potentially "offensive" passages 
from older books and in so doing destroy not only much of 
the original pleasure and meaning but commit worse offenses 
themselves. 
In the essay, "Smut-Hunting in Pretoria," Fussell 
deals with another sort of nasty nice censorship--the 
"Publications Act" in South Africa, which has banned not 
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only The Joy of Sex and various "sexual aids" but The 
Portable Mark Twain/ Down and Out in Paris and London. £& 
Hell and Back, A Streetcar Named Desire, and The Road to 
Xanadu. Analyzing "this bizarre situation" (71), Fussell 
reaches some conclusions about the Afrikaners: 
Sitting on the time bomb of revolutionary racial 
violence, the heirs of the Dutch pioneers continue 
worrying about the threat of vibrators and outre sexual 
images, devoting that energy to literal-minded acts of 
classification that could be spent on social reform 
before it is too late.(78) 
Fussell's eye for concrete detail as symptomatic of a larger 
moral condition is the stock in trade of essayists, a skill 
we have already seen exemplified in Will's writing. It is a 
technique which originated in poetic discourse and is a link 
between reflective/exploratory essays and fiction. 
Fussell is clear in his definition of what he conceives 
the book review to be. In his essay "Being Reviewed" (BSH 
101-113), he writes; 
Authors of some rhetorical sophistication know that a 
reviewer has an obligation that goes beyond deposing 
accurately and justly on the contents and value of the 
book in hand; he has an obligation to be interesting, 
which means, variously, funny, dramatic, significant, 
outraged, or winning. The reviewer is writing an 
essay, and the book in question is only one element of 
his material.(107) 
Fussell not only exemplifies the rhetorical temper in his 
own writing but argues for more of it in literary discourse. For 
example, in an essay/review of several books on Williams 
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("William Carlos Williams and His Problems" BSH, 30-36), Fussell 
extends the review to include his own analysis of Williams's 
shortcomings, "chief of which is the self-reflexiveness of the 
imagists: 
An old-fashioned way of diagnosing what has gone wrong 
is to say that he has neglected rhetoric, and that 
neglect haunts much later poetry inspired by Williams's 
example. Poetry, say, like Charles Olson's, where the 
subject very seldom attains the form of the publicly 
available.(34) 
Fussell understands the contemporary phenomenon of the 
reading public's official homage to poetry and fiction and its 
secret devotion to rhetorical discourse. He introduces his 
analysis of some works of hybrid novels ("Some Truth about the 
War" BSH,197-201), with the following pronouncements 
I think critics and literary historians of the next 
century are going to patronize us no end. I think they 
will stigmatize us as canting phonies. For they are 
bound to perceive that regardless of the class prestige 
we publicly assign poetry and fiction, our hearts are 
elsewhere. They will see that our most dearly loved 
literary forms are really memoir, biography, and 
popular historiography. These we manage best, with the 
result that most readers curious about the contours of 
contemporary experience go not to fiction but to works 
like memoirs, biographies, topographical books, books 
trying to explain Hitler and the bunker crowd, popular 
historical works synthesized from other popular 
historical works, books conveying truths—or at least 
frissons'—about Auschwitz and Vietnam and the prison 
system and the black predicament, books by Mailer and 
Tom Wolfe and Anne Frank and Joan Didion and Philip 
Caputo and Gloria Emerson and Malcolm X.(197) 
In a scorching attack on Graham Greene, he lists "impressive 
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managers of the English sentence," . . . "Philip Larkin, 
Kingsley Amis, Christopher Isherwood, Gore Vidal, Tom 
Wolfe"— a list which seems dominated by writers who do not 
neglect rhetoric. 
Fussell's own attentive rhetoric as displayed in his 
essays is distinguished by several characteristics, most of 
which relate to his Baconian persona: 1. an acerbic tone; 2. 
ironic distance; 3. irreverence and skepticism; 4. aphoris­
tic pronouncement; 5. an aura of expertise and instruction; 
6. some self-reference but remarkably little self-depreca­
tion. His air of hauteur rankles some critics, and, one 
suspects, some readers as well—a vocational hazard of the 
Baconian essayist. Michael Gorra, for example, writing in 
the Nov. 27, 1982 issue of The Nation, criticizes Fussells's 
"sarcasm" and flippancy and sees a certain narrowness in his 
interests; 
A loathing for modern life as embodied in shopping 
malls is by now a sentimental cliche, and one to which 
Fussell stoops with tedious regularly. . . . Fussell's 
enthusiasms are so strong that he sometimes presents a 
narrow and misleading view of his subjects.(566) 
Unlike Gorra, I believe that Fussell's "strong enthusiasms" 
are a function of his rhetorical bent rather than a 
mean-tempered narrowness. I will analyze a Fussell review in 
the next few pages to show in some detail how he uses an 
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ironic voice not only to criticize but to form a bond with 
his readers. 
In "Literary Biography and Its Pitfalls" (BSH 79-88) 
Fussell's ostensible subjects are two books? Samuel Schoen-
baum's Shakespegye's Lives and William B. Ober's Boswell's 
Clap and Other Essays; Medinal Analyses of Literary Men's 
Afflictions. His larger subjects are literary biography and 
scholarly writing in general. Fussell's pairing of these two 
reviews conveniently allows him to structure an essay which 
examines first an exemplary scholarly book, Schoenbaum's, 
and second an amateurish failure, Ober's. 
Fussell begins his essay with an extended aphorism 
which introduces the subject of Schoenbaum's book and 
foreshadows his analysis of what he sees as Ober's fatal 
weakness as a literary biographer: 
The problem for any biographer of an imaginative writer 
is that writers pursue their mystery by telling great 
resounding inventions, or lies. The more important of 
these are called novels, plays, and poems; the less 
important, letters, prefaces, memoirs, journals, and 
diaries, and we can add essays and travel books as 
well. When an amateur or a literalist gets hold of 
any of these and, avid to write a biography of their 
author, pores over them with care, look out.(79) 
Fussell ends the essay with another summarizing 
aphorism which encapsulates his notion of good literary 
scholarship, an ideal met in Schoenbaum's writing and missed 
in Ober's: 
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Schoenbaum's book is a model for literary scholarship, 
and by that I mean that in addition to being learned 
and sparsely annotated it is frank, unpretentious, 
skeptical, ironic, and vastly amusing, with not a 
single dull page among its 838. Nor has Schoenbaum 
repressed his personality in the interests of either 
pseudo-objectivity or "good taste."(84) 
Fussell's departure from straight summary to general 
ruminations on the ideal these books raise in his own mind 
is the means by which he transforms the plain review, the de 
facto genre, into an essay. 
His insistence on personal expression is another key to 
the characteristically essayistic quality of his review 
writing. He asserts in this review that great scholarly 
writing proceeds from covert personal motives, citing 
Northrop Frye's Fearful Symmetry and F.O. Matthiessen• s 
American Renaissance as examples. His desire to appeal to a 
larger rhetorical audience than an academic one is exempli­
fied in this passage in his expressed disdain for 
most academic writing; "Like all good scholarly books about 
literature—and there aren't many—Schoenbaum's is something 
more than it seems" (80). 
Although his aphorisms are more rambling and less 
decorous than Will's, Fussell knows the mechanics of 
inducing formal assent and exploits the compelling nature of 
such techniques as balance, repetition, and alliteration in 
his pronouncements. In this essay, for example, he muses: 
[The] assumed simple one-to-one correspondence between 
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the non-literary identity of the author and his 
management of conventional symbols on a page is a 
superstition which has entered Shakespearean biography 
everywhere, and it would be interesting to launch a 
deep inquiry into why most human beings seem to require 
this belief—is it to persuade themselves that in real 
life duplicity is as rare? (82) 
The aphoristic question comes at the end, using the case of 
Shakespearean biography as a starting point. We barely 
notice the repetition of sibilants ("is," "persuade,n 
"themselves," "duplicity," "is," "as"). The careful balance 
of syllables in the aphorism is more obvious. "Is it to 
persuade themselves" is in symmetrical opposition to 
"duplicity is as rare" connected by four blunt monosyl­
lables. 
Clearly, however, Fussell's aphorisms are not as self­
consciously crafted as Will's. My placing him among the 
Baconian reflective writers is predicated more on his 
didactic persona than his polished aphorisms. A frequent 
ingredient of the professorial voice used by a Baconian 
essayist is irony--a more concentrated form than the 
smiling, diluted version of the Montaignesque writer. In 
this essay/review, for example, Fussell's persona is clearly 
that of the literary expert disdainful of the "quackery" he 
sees in some literary biography. 
His academic training lies behind his instructive 
classification of Shakespeare's Lives: 
Schoenbaum's book seems to be a history of Shakespeare 
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idolatry and a disclosure of the pitfalls awaiting 
those who try to write literary biography without a 
grown-up's sense of evidence. But actually it is a 
satire which uses "scholarship" only as its medium, the 
way a poet uses metaphor and cadence and a painter line 
and color. In the early eighteenth century, before 
there was such a thing as "English scholarship," it 
would have taken the form of Swift's "Tale of a Tub." 
( 8 0 )  
Because readers of the Baconian essay expect writers 
like Fussell to assume the podium as expert, they are also 
willing to accept and indeed enjoy a large measure of 
vitriolic, unsmiling irony as a concomitant characteristic 
of the instructive voice. A Montaignesque writer with such 
an acid tongue would probably be seen as violating his 
contract with readers expecting amiability. In this essay, 
for example, Fussell as expert exposes Ober as an amateur 
ignoramus: 
[Dr. Ober's] most common technique for getting things 
wrong is to assume that works of fiction, including 
poems, constitute all-but-direct autobiographical 
registrations. Thus Lord Rochester is said to have 
"painted directly from life" in his poem "The Imperfect 
Enjoyment," actually a standard, traditional late-
seventeenth-century comic-porno complaint about 
premature ejaculation.(86) 
Interestingly enough, his more biting pronouncements 
are couched in figures characteristic of the Augustan 
satirists—isocolon, antithesis, and anti-climax. "Not all 
Dr. Ober's essays are ridiculous," he writes. "Some are 
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pointless" —delivering his anti-climax with a hard right 
punch. In the last paragraph of the essay, Fussell careful­
ly balances the grammatical and rhythmic elements in his 
sentences to harness the power of formal assent and knock 
out once and for all the unfortunate Ober: 
Dr. Ober likes to drop names like Xenophon and Mozart 
and Pirandello to show that despite his barbarous 
diction and insecure grammar and clumsy sentences and 
pretentious jargon he's really a man of broad "cul­
ture," not just the hick technologist we took him for. 
. . . I'm ready to believe that Dr. Ober is an able 
pathologist, but as a perceiver of what writers do, and 
as an interpreter of literature, he's a quack.(88) 
The style here is rather elaborately baroque. The poly­
syndeton of the beginning part of the first sentence is 
juxtaposed against the clipped, brutal "hick technologist" 
of the second. In the same way, the polysyllables of the 
clauses of the last section—"able pathologist," "perceiver 
of what writers do," "interpreter of literature"—are set 
against the curt "quack" of the last final clause. 
How does Fussell get by with so much vitriol? How does 
he ameliorate the harshness of the critic-persona while 
going full tilt against the Dr. Obers he despises? In this 
essay, he attempts to ingratiate himself with his readers by 
establishing certain bonds. The first is the collaborative 
bond of irony. Wayne Booth discusses the "secret communion, 
collusion, and collaboration" that irony builds (Rhetoric of 
Fiction!. 304) . Although Booth discusses this notion in the 
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context of the "unreliable narrator" who misses the point 
that the author and reader, with their superior information, 
are able to grasp easily, the idea of collaboration extends 
to the author and reader of a review such as Fussell•s which 
mocks the ignorance of a writer who does not have the 
"superior information" of the knowledgeable reviewer, the 
"information" the reviewer tactfully grants the reader as 
well. 
Furthermore, in the course of this essay, Fussell 
rather unexpectedly introduces a personal exemplum; 
As a representative of a profession which for ten years 
has been stumped to diagnose a mild tropical disease I 
picked up somewhere in the Near East, even with my 
person and its effluents available for empirical 
scrutiny, [Dr. Ober] proposes to diagnose and interpret 
the ailments, or causes of death, of a number of 
prominent wits and authors running all the way back to 
Socrates . . ».(85) 
The effect of such a sudden switching to the narrative mode 
is an injection of warmth and irreverence, the light touch 
of the Montaignesque writer. Fussell exploits the bond that 
the personal voice creates between author and audience at 
the beginning of his harsh attack on Ober. We too may have 
been frustrated by medical ignorance. We too may have 
sometimes resented the arrogance of know-it-all specialists. 
In fact, Fussell cashes in on the secret resentment that the 
laity have for professionals. "We," he implies, appealing 
to his readers' pride, define doctors not as intimidating 
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experts but as "hick technologists." The bonds he forges 
with irony, personality, and a shared sense of injury 
act as buffers against the harshness of his attacks in this 
essay. 
Fussell's review of Schoenbaum's and Ober's books is a 
concrete departure point for his own thesis about the prere­
quisites for writing good literary biography, and these 
prerequisites are moral as well as aesthetic; candor, 
skepticism, and irony. Fussell's critical pieces are wide 
nets which extend the de facto genre of the book review into 
the deeper rhetorical waters of the essay. 
By way of comparison, it is useful to examine one of 
Fussell's more personal essays contained in this collection. 
In "My War" (253-272), Fussell tries to reconstruct the 
genesis of the "ironical" nature we see in his essay-
reviews. Fussell's explanation is that "my war [World War 
II] is virtually synonymous with my life" (254), and—only 
half in jest—that the persona in his reviews is really "a 
pissed-off infantryman, disguised as a literary and cultural 
commentator" (254). 
One of the standards for judging a Montaignesque essay 
is the same as that for judging lyric poetry—the extent to 
which the writer can evoke a mood or experience. In the 
case of a reflective essay, the rhetorical success of the 
piece depends on this ability. It is fair then to ask if 
Fussell succeeds in engaging us in his experience so that 
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the ironical "flip" side to his nature is explained and 
vindicated. 
"My War" is a successful apology, and the instruments 
that Fussell uses to achieve his end are those of the 
Montaignesque tradition; self-deprecating comedy, emblematic 
exempla, and skeptical honesty. Paradoxically, Fussell's 
ability to construct a defense in the softer, confessional 
mode of the Montaignesque writer may give him more credence 
with some readers in his natural sub-genre, the "impersonal" 
review/essay. Furthermore, some of the machinery that 
Fussell uses in his typical critical reviews is in evidence 
in this different sort of essay, particularly the superior 
position he occupies in relationship to his subject—in this 
case, his younger self. 
The first section of "My War" begins with a comic/path­
etic account of Fussell's haphazard entrance into the army 
as an infantryman. In the manner of Thurber's persona in 
"University Days," the young Fussell's decision to take 
R.O.T.C. in college was based purely on practical, short-
term considerations: he could substitute military training 
for gym. Fussell was unathletic and valued his privacy; he 
was "fat and flabby, with feminine tits and a big behind" 
(254) and dreaded especially the communal showers of gym. 
The first irony of his military life was dramatic. He did 
not foresee that R.O.T.C. could lead him to a life of 
exhausting physical exertion and complete lack of privacy. 
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Other ironies came on thick and fast. Fussell's 
skeptical eye sees the undeniable discipline and heroism of 
the Germans, as well as their irrational willingness to die. 
"It was my first experience of the profoundly irrational 
element, and it made ridiculous all talk of plans and 
preparations for the future and goodwill and intelligent 
arrangements" (259). Central to Fussell's conversion to 
irony and skepticism is the emblem of the first dead Germans 
he saw in France: 
If darkness had hidden them from us, dawn disclosed 
them with open eyes and greenish-white faces like 
marble, still clutching their rifles and machine-
pistols in their seventeen-year-old hands, fixed where 
they had fallen. (For the first time I understood the 
German phrase for the war-dead: die Gefallenen.) 
Michelangelo could have made something beautiful out of 
these forms, in the Dying Gaul tradition, and I was 
startled to find that in a way I couldn't understand, 
at first they struck me as beautiful. But after a 
moment, no feeling but shock and horror. My adolescent 
illusions, largely intact to that moment, fell away all 
at once, and I suddenly knew I was not and never would 
be in a world that was reasonable or just. The scene 
was less apocalyptic than shabbily ironic: it sorted so 
ill with modern popular assumptions about the idea of 
progress and attendant improvements in public health, 
social welfare, and social justice. To transform 
guiltless boys into cold marble after passing them 
through unbearable fear and humiliation and pain and 
contempt seemed to do them an interesting injustice. I 
decided to ponder these things. (257-258) 
Fussell's gifts as a writer, his ear for the rhythms 
and nuances of language enable him to evoke and recreate the 
experience—its horror, deadly repetitions, and youthful 
bravado: "After that, one day was much like another: attack 
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at dawn, run and fall and crawl and sweat and worry and 
shoot and be shot at and cower from mortar shells, always 
keeping up a jaunty carriage in front of one's platoon; and 
at nighty "consolidate" the objective, usually another hill, 
sometimes a small town, and plan the attack for the next 
morning" (258). 
The mood of "My War" is reminiscent of Orwell's Homage 
to Catalonia,, in which battle is viewed with an extraordin­
ary lack of cant and self-glorification* Fussell, like 
Orwell, is wounded and like Orwell refuses to view himself 
as a hero. In fact, Fussell explains that his wound came at 
the end of a day of "cowardice," as he attempted to stay 
behind his men and was "severely rebuked by a sharp-eyed 
lieutenant-colonel who threatened court martial if I didn't 
pull myself together" (261). At the hospital, Fussell "did 
what I'd wanted to do for months. I cried, noisily and 
publicly, and for hours. I was the scandal of the ward" 
(262). Again, he uses polysyndeton to recreate the rush of 
events and emotions: 
I must have cried because I felt that there, out of 
"combat," tears were licensed. I was crying because I 
was ashamed and because I'd let my men be killed and 
because my sergeant had been killed and because I 
recognized as never before that he might have been me 
and that statistically if in no other way he was me, 
and that I had been killed too.(262). 
Fussell's unwillingness to glorify anything about the 
war—and indeed, to make himself out as a comic nincompoop, 
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even a coward, is, again reminiscent of Homage to Catalonia. 
In the manner of Montaignesque writers, especially the post-
Romantic confessional sort, Orwell and Fussell enlist our 
sympathy because their confessions of lack of gallantry are 
in the context of scenes of undeniable horror, described 
skillfully by both writers. Since readers possess a secret 
knowledge of their own cowardice in the face of far less 
terrible events, they are sympathetic to the "cowardly" 
Fussell and Orwell—far more sympathetic, in fact, than they 
would be if the writers' accounts had been more vainglori­
ous. 
Fussell is even more breathtakingly candid in -his 
"analysis" of his youthful letters. In this section of the 
essay, Fussell is back to his Baconian form. He begins with 
an aphorism; "To become disillusioned you must earlier have 
been illusioned." In the Baconian style, Fussell is coolly 
critical rather than intimately engaging; the trick, of 
course, is that he is employing his critical abilities to 
unfavorably "review" his own works. Fussell uses the third 
person in his analysis not only to establish a credible 
critical stance, but also to distance his mature persona 
from his younger self. 
The letters, like any work, reveal the mind behind 
them. Fussell is as unflinching in his analysis of his 
youthful mind as he is, for example, in the case of the 
unfortunate Dr. Ober. "The writer," says Fussell, is 
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childish, "like a bright schoolboy seeking approval," always 
.joking but with no real sense of humor, self-deceptive and 
"fatuous"—forever claiming that the war would be over soon, 
pretentious, less than literate, and at times displaying 
"unimaginative cruelty" and "genuine insensitivity." 
He begins the last section of the essay with a summar­
izing reaction to the letters: "The only comfort I can take 
today in contemplating these letters is the ease with which 
their author can be rationalized as a stranger. Even the 
handwriting is not now my own" (266) . The important word, 
of course, is "rationalized," since his readers may say that 
the mature Fussell retains many vestiges of this younger 
self. Although he could not be described as unlettered, 
childish or humorless, he still reveals an "unimaginative 
cruelty"and "genuine insensitivity" from time to time (See 
particularly Class). Nevertheless, his use of "rationalized" 
supports our view of him as an honest writer. None of us 
can go far enough in judging ourselves; if nothing else, a 
kind of survival instinct takes over at some point. 
The next passage that Fussell quotes from his letters 
is strikingly different from the ingenuous "schoolboy" 
exclamations. We now can see that the youthful Fussell had 
more powers of observation and perception than the older 
Fussell has so far given him credit, and that this analytic­
al sense lies at the base of Fussell's ability as a literary 
critic. In the hospital the young Fussell is able to 
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articulate—via the emblem of the amputees—how the grotes­
que and abnormal can come to seem "normal11 (267) . "One or two 
scales are beginning to fall from his eyes," comments 
Fussell on this passage and uses it to prove once again that 
the experience of the war shaped his ironic view of life. 
The war not only supplied him with a world view but a 
profession. He discovers he can "explain things" and so is 
fitted for teaching. That he pursued literature was not only 
a function of his own interests but a reflection of a kind 
of faith, a "quasi-religious obligation" of many of his 
generation: 
Thousands of veterans swarmed to graduate schools to 
study literature, persuaded that poetry and prose could 
save the world, or at least help wash away some of the 
intellectual shame of the years we'd been through.(268) 
And Fussell and his fellow veterans retained a strong sense 
of hierarchy. His description of his habitual categorizing 
of T.A.'s, instructors, assistant professors as analogous 
army personnel is a funny passage which contrasts with the 
darkness of the rest of the essay. By closing the essay in 
this way, Fussell has assumed his familiar role as Baconian 
explicator and critic. 
His conclusion is a summary of the "code" of the World 
War II veteran of the line who possess: 
a special empirical knowledge, a feeling of a myster­
ious shared ironic awareness manifesting itself in an 
instinctive skepticism about pretension, publicly 
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enunciated truths, the vanities of learning, and the 
pomp of authority.(270) 
A critic of the essay will notice that these "manifest­
ations" are also characteristics of the skeptical essayist 
who may not have experienced a disillusioning war or have a 
"special empirical knowledge," but who is, nevertheless, a 
congenital doubter. One may wonder if Fussell might not 
have had this mental disposition if he had never fought in 
the war. Reading "My War" alongside Fussell's more imperson­
al literary essays may not completely "explain" his ironic 
bent, but does give us a glimpse of a less austere and more 
sympathetic persona. Nevertheless, we must still categorize 
him on the whole with the Baconian essayists, not only 
because of the preponderance of impersonal critical essays 
but because of the distance that he manages to keep even in 
this very personal essay. He is, after all, writing about a 
younger self, one who seems a "stranger" to him now. Unlike 
the Montaignesque essayist, he does not use his present 
shortcomings and pratfalls as "sweeteners," but only those 
which happened long ago. His present "expert" persona 
remains intact. 
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III. Paul Theroux, Moral Judgment, and Travel Essays 
Moving further still in the direction of the Montaig-
nesque "personal" essay, we encounter the travel writing of 
Paul Theroux. Classifying Theroux as a Baconian essayist is 
certainly arguable. First of all, many of his more inter­
esting travel writings are books, not essays—The Great 
Railway Bazaar, The Old Pataaonian Express, The Kingdom bv 
the Sea—although a case could be made that these books are 
really essays stitched together with a common theme of 
geography. Second, as is the case with most writers, 
Theroux's pieces do not fall neatly into a stylistic 
category. Some of his essays such as "Sunrise with Sea-
monsters" and "Scenes from a Curfew" are intensely personal 
reminiscences presented almost entirely in the narrative or 
dramatic modes which characterize what Beale terms the 
"lyrical or experiential" essay, which is "the central or 
paradigmatic reflective-exploratory type, contributing most 
directly to the larger continuum between rhetoric and 
poetic" (277). Such essays are surely more akin to Montaig­
ne's than Bacon's. Nevertheless, although Theroux's writing 
is often "personal," an essential didactic element is almost 
always present. Theroux's stance vis a vis his audience is 
usually a superior one. This is due, in part, to the nature 
of the genre of travel essays. It is also due to an 
inescapable, undisguised characteristic of Theroux's 
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writing—its clear articulation of evaluations. Rarely does 
he practice the careful self-deprecation of the Montaignes-
que writer making a point with exquisite delicacy, good 
humor and tact. Theroux's judgments are of sterner stuff. 
Theroux was born on April 10, 1941 in Medford, Massa­
chusetts. The family eventually included seven children, all 
of whom liked to write, publishing family newspapers and 
journals. Paul's father, a salesman, encouraged the child­
ren's writing; every night he read to the family, especially 
from Dickens and Whitman, often by candlelight (Mew York 
Times Magazine 65). The strong strain of romanticism which 
informs Theroux's travel writings can be traced in part, 
perhaps, to this early literary experience. We are remind­
ed, when reading Theroux's travel essays, of Robert Stang's 
comments on the nineteenth-century contribution to essay 
literature—the nature essay—which were quoted in Chapter 
One (pp. 11-12). Theroux's essays, too, seem "a reaction to 
. . . growing urbanism, a response to the newly possible 
bourgeois luxury." Certainly his intended audience are 
"city dwellers . . . sheltered from the harsher aspects of 
outdoor life." 
Theroux received the B.A. from the University of Maine 
and became a peace corps volunteer in Africa. He was 
"fired" in 1965 for becoming involved in an assassination 
plot against the President of Malawi, although Theroux's 
"involvement" was unwitting. Next he taught English at 
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Makerere University in Uganda. Here he met V.S. Naipaul, 
who was also on the faculty. Naipaul became Theroux's 
mentor, reading every word he wrote. His advice to Theroux 
reflected a strong rhetorical biasD In an interview with 
the Manchester Guardian. Theroux quoted Naipaul as telling 
him that "style is not very important, style's nothing 
really. But a book needs a reason for being written." 
After the riots in Kampala in 1968, Theroux left Uganda 
and taught English at the University of Singapore for three 
years. He had written one "beginner's™ novel, Waldo, In 
Singapore he wrote short stories and a critical appreciation 
of Naipaul. By the time he had left teaching for a full-time 
writing career, Theroux had written three more novels. He 
settled in England, wrote one more novel, The Black House, 
and embarked on an extended railway journey through Asia 
which resulted in The Great Railway Bazaar (1975). The book 
was a critical and popular hit, and is one of the rare 
travel books to become a bestseller. Arthur Cooper wrote in 
Newsweek >. "Rarely have subject and sensibility been so 
splendidly conjoined. ... He embarks on every project with 
all senses fully engaged" (72). 
After the success of The Great Railway Bazaar. Theroux 
wrote more travel books and novels, all of which enjoyed 
respectable sales. In nearly all his books of travel and 
fiction, Theroux has explored the nature of the exotic and 
the feeling of alienation that travel engenders. In his 
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Introduction to Sunrise with Seamonsters. his collection of 
travel essays, Theroux describes the influence of his 
travels on all his work; 
I had once thought [the essays collected in the book] 
fell naturally into categories: Travel, Photography, 
Books, Writers, Family, and Trains. I realized that I 
habitually mixed these topics together: travel was not 
only an experience of space and time, but had its 
literary and domestic aspects as well. Travel is 
everything, and my way of travelling is completely 
personal. This is not a category—it is more like a 
whole way of life. And it is impossible to write about 
a subway without alluding to The Wasteland, or to deal 
with Burma without mentioning Orwell. My piece about 
my family—"My Extended Family"—owes a great deal to 
my having lived in Africa. They are all personal.(3) 
This notion of the consuming experience of travelling 
on a writer is reflected in the encompassing, synthesizing 
nature of travel writing itself. As could be expected, the 
protean nature of travel literature has inspired the same 
kind of critical controversy as that which revolves around 
the essay, "new journalism,™ and other rhetorical genres. 
One could say that two broad categories of travel writing 
correspond with two kinds of journalism: straight informa­
tion and essayistic journalism or "new journalism." 
Straight information is easily disposed of as a kind of de 
facto genre. People reading Fodor'sP for example, are 
probably planning a trip to a foreign place contrasting with 
those who read travel "essays" who are more likely journey­
ing inside a particular writer's head. The critical argu­
ments which swirl around travel literature are the same that 
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swirl around the essay: the openness of the form, the search 
for "true" travel literature, and the connections of the 
form with other types of writing—history, geography, and 
letters, for example,. The history of travel writing is as 
tangled as that of the essay, from the histories of 
Herodotus to the letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montague to 
the full blown masterpiece of travel writing such as 
Doughty's Travels in Ayabia Peseta. 
Travel essays are to such travel books as short 
stories are to novels. They are literature of lasting value 
but of a briefer length and, therefore, subject to and 
capitalizing on the compression and distillation of brevity. 
Nevertheless, serious travel literature of any length is 
informed, I believe, by the skeptical spirit of the essay. 
Paul Fussell in Abroad describes travel literature as moral 
essays in disguise: 
It is . . . possible to consider the between-the-wars 
travel books as a subtle instrument of ethics, replac­
ing such former vehicles as sermons and essays. A fact 
of modern publishing history is the virtual disappear­
ance of the essay as a salable commodity (I mean the 
essay, not the "article"). If you want to raise a 
laugh in a publisher's office, enter with a manuscript 
collection of essays on all sorts of subjects. . . . 
The more we attend to what's going on in the travel 
book between the wars, the more we perceive that the 
genre is a device for getting published essays which, 
without the travel "menstruum" (as Coleridge would 
say) , would appear too old-fashioned for generic 
credit, too reminiscent of Lamb and Stevenson and 
Chesterton. (204) 
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Fussell believes such essayistic travel writing to be 
almost extinct—excepting certain anomalies like Theroux's 
books. On the other hand, other writers? Theroux among them, 
see the volume of reflective travel writing as increasing. 
Characteristically sardonic, Theroux's belief is that this 
interest is probably the result of the proliferation of 
"mock travel" package tours in which experience is synthe­
tically arranged (Sunrise 135). 
Percy Adams, too, believes there is a surge in demand 
for travel literature, and he makes the interesting point 
that the demand is being met by writers such as V.S. Naipaul 
and Jonathan Raban exploiting the techniques of fiction in 
their travel books (Travel Literature and the Evolution of 
the Novel 284) . Adams is one of several critics who link 
non-fiction such as travel writing with poetic discourse 
such as the novel. This direction in criticism is a 
salutary one. It is particularly appropriate in the case of 
travel essays which, like other reflective-exploratory 
pieces, occupy the DMZ between rhetorical and poetic 
discourse and thus yield to the analytical methods of 
literary criticism. When Fussell in Abroad argues for the 
literary merit of travel writing, he notes its connection 
with poetry and fiction; 
Like poems—and like any successful kind of literary 
performance—successful travel books effect a trium­
phant mediation between two different dimensions: the 
dimension of individual physical things, on the one 
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hand, and the dimension of universal significance, on 
the other. . . . The travel book authenticates itself 
by the sanction of actualities—ships, trains, hotels, 
bizarre customs, odd people, crazy weather, startling 
architecture, curious food. At the same time it 
reaches in the opposite direction, most often to the 
generic convention that the traveling must be repre­
sented as something more than traveling, that it shall 
assume a meaning either metaphysical, psychological, 
artistic, religious, or political, but always ethical. 
A travel book is like a poem in giving universal 
significance to a local texture.(214) 
This interpretation of the cosmic by the quotidian, the 
abstract by the concrete informs all art and, therefore, the 
essay. Paul Theroux"s experience as a novelist serves him 
well as a travel essayist, especially his attention to 
detail and his ear for dialogue. His essay "Malaysia," for 
example, opens with a conversation between Theroux and "a 
sultan whose nickname is 'Buffles.1n Theroux captures the 
comic tenor of the pampered sultan's speech—very precise 
with no contractions and absolutely vapid in content, the 
peculiar mixture of correct form and no substance that we 
associate with high society small talk: "'A very rich 
American once told me that he had shot grizzly bears in 
Russia and elephants in Africa and tigers in India. He said 
that bear-meat is the best, but the second best is horse-
meat. He said that. Yes!"' (106). 
Theroux revels in such absurdities. In fact, the more 
ridiculous or uncomfortable or surprising a country is, the 
better Theroux likes it; or at least, this seems to be true 
in his earlier essays. The note of disdain that informs 
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Theroux's judgmental persona is reserved for the comforta­
ble, predictable countries of the West. Theroux delights in 
exotic people and places with a notable lack of discrimina­
tion in this very discriminating man. In Malaysia, for 
example, he discovers a tree called "The Midnight Horror," 
which emits a noxious scent every night when its blossoms 
open. "Bats . . . find the odor of The Midnight Horror 
irresistible; they hang by the claws on their wings to the 
corollas and poke their noses into the flower's throat" 
(108). "Malaysia" is uncharacteristically good humored and 
ebullient; Theroux's inventory of concrete details creates a 
consistent picture of delight and surprise. 
Usually, however, Theroux's essays are darker in tone. 
Details are often more gruesome than comic. His description 
of rats devouring a newspaper stained with human excrement 
at the train station in Rangoon in "Seven Burmese Days," for 
example, is typical of the sort of unfortunate nightmarish 
scene he favors. The lean, aggressive rats of Rangoon are 
Theroux's particular index to the state of the economy: 
The outside splashing and pools of excrement had 
stained the tracks and a litter of crumpled newspapers-
-The Working People's flails—a bright yellow. A rat 
crept over to the splashed paper and nibbled then 
tugged, and hopped in the muck. Another splash, and 
the rats withdrew; they returned, gnawing.(55) 
One can't help thinking that Theroux's loving attention to 
grotesque details originates in a desire to shock his 
124 
readers as well as the attraction of the grotesque itself. 
The impulse to shock, of course, is inherent in the 
skeptical temper—the enemy of the status quo. In Theroux's 
case, the sermon behind the horrific landscape in his essays 
is a harsh one? come to the Third World, where he locates 
the exotic (147), his essays exhort us, and see how illusory 
is the ideal, how fatuous are our ideas of paradise. 
"Nothing is more valuable than that irony in suggesting that 
the exotic is partly illusion" (147). There is a great deal 
of anger in Theroux's writing, directed, presumably, to the 
comfortable at home who have no idea of the barebones 
existence of the rest of the world. 
This sermonizing tendency is unsoftened by the standard 
Montaignesque ploy of self-deprecation. Unlike Orwell's, for 
example, Theroux's essays do not focus on his own shortcom­
ings to carry the message. A Theroux version of "Shooting 
an Elephant" would probably portray another Westerner 
carrying out the deed while Theroux acted as indignant 
observer. Theroux is more likely to judge the shortcomings 
of other people than his own. 
There are exceptions, such as his account of his brief 
career as an unwitting agent of the German equivalent of the 
C.I.A. when he served in the Peace Corps in Africa. In "The 
Killing of Hastings Banda" Theroux portrays himself as a 
callow youth, but the inherent Montaignesque comedy is 
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eviscerated by Theroux's continuous effort to "justify" his 
stupidity; 
My readiness to say yes to favors may suggest a 
simplicity of mind, a fatal gullibility; but I was 
bored, and the daily annoyance of living in a dictator­
ship, which is like suffering an unhappy family in a 
locked house, had softened my temper to the point where 
anything different, lunch with a stranger, the request 
for an article, the challenge of a difficult task, 
changed that day and revived my mind. The risk was 
usually obvious, but it always seemed worth it—better 
than the tyranny of the ordinary.(69) 
A writer more thoroughly at home with the humble Montaig-
nesque persona would never undercut the technique with such 
a bald defense. 
In "Scenes from a Curfew" (23-30), another essay 
stemming from Theroux's Peace Corps days in Malawi, he does 
portray himself in a thoroughly unflattering light, but, 
even here, the self-accusation inherent in the dismal scenes 
of selfish drinking and whoring is diluted somewhat by 
Theroux's detached, unemotional tone. As in an Orwell 
essay, the villain is a brutish political system; unlike an 
Orwell essay, however, it is unclear whether Theroux 
recognizes the depth of his own savagery. We condemn 
Theroux for his insensitivity, and we need more reassurance 
that he feels the same way. The trick in a Montaignesque 
essay is to engage our judgment and our sympathy, but this 
Theroux often fails to do. The ambivalence he stirs in his 
readers makes his categorization as Baconian or 
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Montaignesque essayist a tricky business. On the one hand, 
he often uses the narrative mode as well as the personal 
revelations of the Montaignesque essayist; on the other, he 
hardly ever mocks himself or seems anything but a confident, 
sharp-tongued expert. 
It is difficult to agree with the Time reviewer who 
maintains that Theroux "is just as haifd on himself as he is 
on his competitors—and the world around him" (July 1, 1985, 
p. 60). A good deal of the reason for Theroux's severity 
stems, strangely enough, from the romantic element in his 
travel pieces. Paul Fussell who has placed Theroux in the 
"post-modern tradition," analyzes the connections of travel 
writing in general with romance and pastoral literature. 
The protagonist, writes Fussell, "leaves the familiar and 
predictable to wander, episodically into the unfamiliar or 
unknown, encountering strange adventures, and finally, after 
travail and ordeals, returns safely" (Abroad 208). But as 
in the aristocratic genres of romance and pastoral, the 
protagonist is "almost always richer and freer than those he 
is among" even as he condemns the fallen state of his 
industrialized homeland while gazing on the innocent natives 
(&&LQM 210) . 
As intrepid adventurer, Theroux travels through all the 
exotic places he can, including the New York subway system 
("Subterranean Gothic"). He is appalled and frightened by 
the violent, insane, impoverished people he finds in the 
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subway, and compares the trip to jungle travel or a "night­
mare, complete with rats" (245) . 
But Theroux in this instance and in other nightmarish 
landscapes as well is one of the lucky elite, one of the 
gentlemen who can view "the rustics" from the safety of his 
favored status. (In the subway he is accompanied by two 
plainclothesmen.) And, as in pastoral or romance, the 
"rustics," although often terrifying and certainly pitiable, 
seem more alive and vital than all the bland faceless 
comfortable people back home. 
Sunrise with Seainonsters. his collection of travel 
essays, is arranged chronologically. The more mature travel 
essays at the end of the book are often variations of the 
subway trip? that is, Theroux travels to a known place and 
experiences the strange. For example, in the last essay, 
from which the title of the collection derives, Theroux 
takes a journey in a rowboat near his home on Cape Cod, and 
a superficially prosaic trip becomes a frightening test of 
his strength and courage. The tone of the last essays, too, 
is more thoroughly Montaignesque, more compassionate and 
less judgmental. Nevertheless, Theroux continues to write 
travel essays about standard exotic places. And when he 
does, as in his recent books, The Kingdom bv the Sea and 
Sailing hhmngh rhinar the voice is a mixture of Theroux's 
Baconian and Montaignesque personas. In the next few pages I 
shall examine two of his mature essays from Sunrise with 
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Seamonsters. "Stranger on a Train: The Pleasures of 
Railways" and "Discovering Dingle" which exemplify this 
"mixed" voice in which Baconian severity predominates. 
"Stranger on a Train"® is another sort of hybrid, half 
newspaper feature and half lecture. Theroux explains in his 
"Afterword" that the first half was written for the London 
Observer in 1976 and the second half was the first Thomas 
Cook Travel Lecture, given in London in 1981. That the tone 
is so seamless can be accounted for in two possible ways: 
1 .Theroux1 s lecture was written as an essay rather than a 
lecture and/or 2. the two pieces were heavily edited for 
inclusion as one essay in the collection. 
The essay is a mock-definition piece. Theroux divides 
train lovers into two categories: railway buffs who know all 
about trains but never travel and those who know nothing 
about trains, but like to travel on them. What is interest­
ing, since it reflects Theroux's superior persona, is that 
he places himself in a singular category: someone who knows 
nothing about trains, like to travel on them, and has no 
destination: "Mine is the purest form of travel, a combina­
tion of flight and suspended animation. I enjoy getting on 
trains; I loathe getting off: (126). 
The rest of the first part of the essay is a narrative 
of some of Theroux®s adventures on trains including an 
impulsive trip through the U.S. to avoid a hurricane in New 
England. (The excuse, of course, is so flimsy that we get 
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some idea how easily Theroux can persuade himself to board a 
train.) He lists some of the pleasures of train travel: 
truthful, intimate conversation ("There is nothing I like 
better than putting my feet up, tearing open a can of beer 
and auditing a railway bore in full cry" [127]), landscape, 
•eating at whim, "never know[ing] the ghastly jollity of 
group games," and debarking whenever one wants. Theroux 
denounces the decline of British Rail in the "characteristic 
frenzy of false economy" in contrast to the paradoxically 
more civilized journeys afforded by the trains in less 
progressive places such as India and Turkey. 
Theroux associates "intense experiences" with train 
travel, and by relating some of the primal scenes he has 
witnessed—of courtship and death—he proves his point. His 
description of a boy and his dying father on the Trans-
Siberian Express is a perfect miniature of the grim paradox­
es that fill his essays and fiction. The boy drinks sweet 
champagne opposite the dying man in a 
compartment [that] had a smell of death about it, the 
clammy decay of a tomb; and the combination of the 
champagne drinker looking out at the snowy forests of 
Central Russia and his father dying in a narrow berth 
were more than I could bear. Stretcher-bearers—men 
wearing harnesses—appeared on the platform at Sverd­
lovsk; the old man's face was waxen and the boy told me 
in German, "I think he is dead."(129) 
Theroux ends this essay with a celebration of the 
opportunities of train travel to fulfill "every traveller's 
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wish to see his route as pure, unique, and impossible for 
anyone else to recover" (130). The emphasis on the pleasures 
of travelling in the old style foreshadow the second half of 
the essay, which was originally a lecture,, Rhetorically it 
is more interesting than the first part, for here Theroux 
addresses a group under the auspices of a travel agency 
(Thomas Cook) and criticizes the nature of modern "Mock 
Travel"—the kind of travel, in other words, arranged by a 
travel agency- It is a characteristically cantankerous view 
which also meshes with his romantic notion of the rewards of 
"comfortless" travel put forth again and again in other 
essays in the collection. 
This part of the essay is also a categorization piece: 
travellers are divided into two groups. The first group are 
those who cling "to the traditional virtues of travel, the 
people who endure a kind of alienation and panic in foreign 
parts for the after-taste of having sampled new scenes" 
(131). Theroux9s use of the words "traditional virtues" and 
"endure" is not accidental; it is clear in this part of the 
essay that he is making an ethical judgement about the kinds 
of travel people choose to make. The "real" travellers do 
not travel as a form of relaxation. Theroux's description 
of real travel excludes the comfortable: 
On the whole travel at its best is rather comfortless, 
but travel is never easy: you get very tired, you get 
lost, you get your feet wet, you get little co-opera­
tion, and—if it is to have any value at all—you go 
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alone. Homesickness is part of this kind of travel. 
In these circumstances, it is possible to make 
interesting discoveries about oneself and one's 
surroundings. Travel has less to do with distance than 
with insight; it is, very often, a way of seeing.(131) 
Those who mistake comfortable tourism for travel try to make 
the unfamiliar yield to the familiar. They "travel," 
believes Theroux, "in order to feel at home, or to have an 
idealized experience of home" (133). 
The stern judgment in the second half of the essay 
presents several rhetorical problems for Theroux. Undoubt­
edly many of those in his lecture audience as well as 
readers of the expanded essay travel in just this way; 
furthermore, anyone who has read any of Theroux's works 
knows that he belongs to the "first group," the group he 
defines as the only ones doing anything of "value" in their 
solitary, uncomfortable voyages. 
He tries to soften the judgment in several ways: first 
he makes it clear that such mock-travel is not the exclusive 
failing of modern bourgeois English or American tourists but 
is the traditional mode of travel for the rich in all 
centuries; second, he concedes that the two week vacations 
prohibit the long trips he describes as real travel; third 
he injects a bit of personal testimony that he too has 
indulged the homesick traveller's longing for a taste of 
home. "I found it extremely pleasant to have a cheeseburger 
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and a beer at the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul, Afghan­
istan" (133). 
Nevertheless, these ploys are rather ineffectual in the 
face of Theroux's strict definitions and sneering examples 
of mock-travellers who complain of cold in Siberia or of 
having never walked anywhere in their travels. In fact, much 
of Theroux's travel writing (see especially The Kingdom by 
the Sea, and Sailing through China) is peopled by mock-
travellers versus natives and one real traveller—himself. 
We do not believe him when he asserts that he is "not 
sneering at these odd forms of travel, or these homely 
recreations" but simply "calling attention to the phenomenon 
because it is so far from the traditional notion of travel 
as going away" (134). 
The voice of the Baconian expert permeates this essay. 
Theroux is more interested in preaching a message than in 
engaging an audience. Even his attempted optimism about the 
silver lining on the cloud of modern tourism at the end of 
the essay reflects frustration, even anger—at the mock-
travellers remaking the world into versions of England, 
American, or Japan—rather than any real hopes 
Mock-travel has produced a huge interest in clumsy, 
old-fashioned travel, with its disgusting food and 
miseries and long nights. It has also given rise to a 
lively interest in travel literature, and the affirma­
tion that the world is still large and strange and, 
thank God, full of empty places that are nothing like 
home.(135) 
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This is Theroux at his most judgmental and least 
likable. Contrasting favorably is the more engaging "Discov­
ering Dingle." The difference between the two is the padding 
and insulation which writing about a place provides for 
Theroux11 s judgments about travel—the difference between 
sermon and parable and aphorism and example. A comparison of 
the two essays provides a clear picture of the division 
between Baconian suasion and Montaignesque lyricism and 
serve as a transition to Chapter Four. 
"Discovering Dingle" begins with an extended aphorism 
setting the tone for the piece; "The nearest thing to 
writing a novel is traveling in a strange country," declares 
Theroux, who proceeds to describe this Irish island with a 
novelist's mastery of the concrete. The rest of the 
aphorism sounds again Theroux"s insistence on the necessity 
of discomfort in travelings 
The best landscapes, apparently dense or featureless, 
hold surprises if they are' studied patiently, in the 
kind of discomfort one can savor afterward. Only a 
fool blames his bad vacation on the rain.(140) 
In the tradition of travel literature we find ourselves 
more and more drawn into the strange landscape and atmos­
phere of Dingle Island. We travel with Theroux and his 
family and ineluctably we reach the same conclusions that he 
does. Theroux "brings us along" in several ways. 
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First of all, his use of the narrative mode in most of 
the essay works the same way as in a story. We too feel the 
disorientation of Theroux and his family? we too become 
assimilated to the cold and strangeness so that when Theroux 
and his family visit Great Blasket Island we participate in 
the eerie peace they find there. In fact, the narrative 
verges on the dramatic—a common trick of Theroux's—with 
his use of the first person and dialogue. We see things 
through his eyes. When he describes his climb in west Dingle 
he switches from guidebook present tense to narrative past 
tense, but the effect is that of heightening the dramatic: 
Climbing west of Dingle is deceptive, a succession of 
false summits, each windier than the last; but from the 
heights of Brandon the whole peninsula is spread out 
like a topographical map, path and road, cove and 
headland. Down there was the Gallarus Oratory, like a 
perfect boathouse in stone to which no one risks 
assigning a date . . ..The coastal cliffs are genuinely 
frightening, the coves echoic with waves that hit the 
black rocks and rise—foaming, perpendicular—at the 
fleeing gannets; and the long Slieve Mish Mountains and 
every valley—thirty miles of them—are, most weirdly, 
without trees.(142) 
Second, Theroux's gift for concrete description binds 
us to the narrative. The second paragraph is a series of 
details calculated to evoke in us the sense of paradox, 
comic surprise, and strangeness which Theroux believes 
characterizes the island. "Gloomy gypsies," "pelting rain," 
"uninhabited castles," "an island . . . composed entirely of 
rabbit droppings," "a local language that sounds like 
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Russian being whispered" creates the necessary mystery and 
sense of dislocation. Where are we? we wonder, and are 
surprised to find it is an island off the Old Sod. 
Theroux11 s interspersing of dialogue, too, enriches the 
narration: "Sure it's a wonderful place to commit suicide" 
is a fey remark which captures the grim humor of the place. 
Theroux's ear is a good one, and many of his essays are 
replete with such careful transcriptions of dialogue. He is 
also has an uncanny ability to find the apt metaphor and 
analogy which enhances his essays as much as his fiction, 
for example: "The cries of gulls which—shrill and fran­
tic—mimic something tragic, like a busload of schoolgirls 
careering off a cliff" (142), and the islands which "had the 
appearance of sea monsters—high backed creatures making for 
the open sea" (144). 
Finally, Theroux depends in this essay on comparisons 
to carry his essayistic point—that of the surprising peace 
and comfort of the bleak island. First is the "remoteness" 
of the place and disinterest in religion "which breeds 
political indifference" and contrasts so sharply with the 
troubled Irish mainland (and other busy, more civilized 
places as well) . The second comparison is a kind of para­
dox. Although the island is dangerous and solitary, it is 
this same danger and solitude which induce such tranquill­
ity. At the end of the essay when Theroux and his family 
travel to the deserted Great Blasket Island off the coast of 
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Dingle, we are captivated too by the strange comfort of this 
solitude. 
Here on the lee side the heather was three feet thick 
and easy as a mattress. I lay down, and within minutes 
my youngest child was asleep on his stomach, his face 
on a cushion of fragrant heather. And the rest of the 
family had wandered singly to other parts of the silent 
island, so that when I sat up I could see them prowling 
alone, in detached discovery, trying-—because we could 
not possess this strangeness—to remember it.(145) 
This is a typical Theroux description emphasizing the beauty 
of bleakness and the companionship of solitude. The pastoral 
element is strong, an element Theroux recognizes: "The 
city-slicker's triumphant holiday is finding the right 
mountain-top or building a fire in the rain or recognizing 
the wildflowers in Dingle: foxglove, heather, bluebells" 
(144). 
This essay is less judgmental than many of Theroux's 
pieces, but I still would classify it as predominately 
"Baconian." Like all essayists, Theroux delights in 
upending expectations, in shaking up the comfortable. The 
element of personality is more muted, however, than in a 
thoroughgoing Montaignesque essay. Theroux is an acute 
observer of concrete things which illustrate his point, a 
point which is usually a romantic judgment on the impossi­
bility of the civilized life's providing the sort of 
tranquil solitude which allows "detached discovery." 
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Theroux often seems at war with the modern age, and 
as with his fellow essayists Fussell and Will this impa­
tience is usually articulated in the dry tones of irony. In 
"Discovery Dingle," however, he simply describes an 
alternative landscape, enlisting his considerable skills as 
a narrator without much ironic commentary. 
Conclusion 
The Baconian essay has survived by adaptation. In this 
anti-authoritarian age, the stern voices of the aphorist, 
critic, and judge are softened by techniques they have 
learned from the Montaignesque essayists. In that, too, 
they follow in the tradition of Bacon himself, whose essays 
were increasingly subjective and anecdotal. 
It is obvious after examining several Baconian essays 
that no clear category suffices. The essay's protean nature 
makes strict classifications contradictory and insufficient. 
Nevertheless, general tendencies and techniques seem to 
adhere around the two contrasting personas of Baconian 
expert and Montaignesque friend, particularly in the 
different "directions" of the essays. Baconian essays point 
more to subjects while Montaignesque essays are more 
directed toward the audience, or, in the case of romantic 
Montaignesque essays, toward the writer. Some essays are 
best categorized as "cross-overs," combining characteristics 
of both personal and impersonal writing: Theroux*s travel 
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pieces exemplify such "transitional" essays as do the 
reflective science pieces of Lewis Thomas which I shall 
examine first in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER POUR 
MYSELF I PORTRAY: THE MONTAIGNESQUE SPIRIT IN THE ESSAYS 
OF LEWIS THOMAS AND JOAN DIDION 
"My defects will here be read to the life, and also my 
natural form, as far as respect for the public has allowed. 
Had I been placed among those nations which are said to live 
still in the sweet freedom of nature's first laws, I assure 
you I should very gladly have portrayed myself here entire 
and wholly naked®™ 
—Montaigne 
Although Beale believes that the tendency of all 
rhetorical writing is toward deliberation (120), in the case 
of the reflective essay there seems to be an equally strong 
pull in the direction of poetic discourse. Many critics 
have noted the similarity between the subjective, highly 
concentrated lyric and the essay—the most important point 
of congruence being the individual voice of the lyricist and 
essayist. As Lewis Leary has written: 
The essayist then is a personality, a man speaking his 
mind. His first claim to our attention is just that, 
but he becomes inevitably also a guide, discovering 
directions for the minds of other men. Next to lyric 
poetry, which it in some manner resembles, the essay is 
the most personal kind of writing, both in expression 
of the person who writes it and in reception by the 
person who reads. Its dependence on fact is less 
important than its revelation of point of view. Its 
relation to truth is only that portion of truth 
glimpsed by the particularized and therefore imperfect 
vision of the essayist. Neither historian nor philo­
sopher, and not limited to the findings of what we call 
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scholarship, the essayist is finally only essayist, not 
oracle. When he has disclosed something of attitude 
which might not have been so clearly known before, or 
of mood which is attractive, he has done his work. We 
do him disservice when we expect more. (9-10) 
Leary's comments are in the sentimental tradition of the 
"True Essay,11 and, as we have seen in Chapter Three, rather 
useless when examining the flintier Baconian essay, which 
does rely a good deal on facts and from which we expect a 
good deal more than attitude and mood. 
In the case of the Montaignesque essay, however, such 
a definition is enlightening, especially the connection 
between lyric poetry and the essay. Since criticism about 
the essay is notoriously sketchy and impressionistic, we 
will turn to criticism of lyric poetry—which is more 
rigorous—to provide information on the lyrical aspects of 
the reflective essay, especially the Montaignesque variety. 
This background, coupled with Beale's analysis of the type, 
form a platform for a closer analysis of two representatives 
of the Montaignesque essay: Lewis Thomas and Joan Didion. 
Lyricism and the Essay 
The lapidary quality of the Montaignesque essay is also 
a quality of the lyric poem. C. Day Lewis in The Lyric 
impulse writes of the "singlemindedness" of lyricisms 
A poet writing lyric . . . must disinvolve himself 
from the intellectual subtleties and complex verbal 
plays which other kinds of verse may properly exploit 
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today. He has to communicate with poetry's primal 
source directly .... I do not mean that his verse 
should be bardic, or surrealist, but that he recognize 
and submit to the lyric impulse, when it comes his 
way—the impulse to grieve or to rejoice singleminded-
ly, to discover images and rhythms which convey the 
elemental states of mind a man shares with all other 
living men and has in common with his remotest ances­
tors. (146) 
Daniel Albright writes that "lyric poetry is fundamentally 
an attempt to approximate the condition of music" (ix) . 
Lyricism is, he believes, a mode not a genre. This view is 
echoed by Beale who, unlike Kinneavy, categorizes "expres­
sive" writing as a modal direction rather than a genre (81). 
The expressive direction is a subjective one—toward the 
author—and is characterized by use of the first person. As 
in the case with the other modal directions (objective and 
affective) , it can occur in any of the modes—narrative, 
discursive, or dramatic. 
Some critics have tried to explain the increasingly 
expressive direction of prose. Elizabeth Hardwick, for 
example, writing recently in The New York Times Book Review, 
explains the pervasiveness of the first person as a symptom 
of writers' uncertainty rather than their conceits 
In the contemporary essay, as in contemporary fiction, 
the use of the first-person narrator or expositor has 
become so widespread it must be seen as a convenience. 
This is a puzzle having to do, perhaps, not with self-
assertion to fill every available silence, but with 
modesty, a fear of presumption. In fiction a loss of 
movement is accepted by the choice of "I" in order to 
gain relief from knowing and imagining without the 
possibility of being there to know. That at least may 
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be one of the esthetic considerations. Also, the 
dominance of the first-person narrator in current 
fiction seems to reflect uncertainty about the classic­
al conception of character^ often the contemporary 
psyche is not seen as a lump of traits so much as a 
mist of inconsistencies, flights, constant improvisa­
tions. . . o In the essay we find the intrusion of the 
"I" even where little is autobiographical. (44) 
Beale explains the phenomenon as a historical develop­
ment related to the "encroachments of science into every 
area of human concern" and the concurrent rise of romanti­
cism which "placed a premium upon explorations of the self" 
(206). Although he believes that such an expressive 
orientation began with Montaigne, nevertheless, as we have 
seen in Chapter Two, Montaigne's intimacy is much more 
artifice than true confession. Perhaps the matter becomes 
clearer if we adopt C. Day Lewis's distinction between 
personal/impersonal on the one hand and subjective/objective 
on the other in his discussion of lyricism. He reminds us 
that English lyric poetry, although written in the first 
person, was at its conception in the Renaissance actually 
rather impersonal. This, he believes, was a result of "the 
discipline imposed upon it by music"(5). At the end of the 
eighteenth century, the lyric as a genre became increasingly 
diffused into a pervasive lyricism in all sorts of writing: 
"Today once could almost say there is no lyric poetry since 
every poem has a lyrical quality" (13). And, of course, 
lyricism permeated the work of the romantic essayists such 
as Lamb, Hazlitt, and Hunt. Day-Lewis's comments on the 
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nature of this lyricism are instructive: this expansion 
resulted "not in a different balance between the personal 
and the impersonal, but as a general movement from objective 
to subjective" (13). 
With the rise of science and the flood of new informa­
tion which characterize the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, a subjective slant on age-old questions seems a 
sensible one. Hardwick suggests, however, a less fortunate 
aspect of increasing subjectivity which is increasing 
tentativeness, not in the philosophical sense of traditional 
skepticism, but in the sweaty-palmed indecisiveness of 
modern Prufrocks. Day-Lewis defines this unhappy aspect of 
modern writing as the cult of "sincerity," and denounces it 
as an altogether bad thing for lyric poetry, and we might 
add, for lyrical essays as well: 
Once a poet begins thinking in terms of sincerity, he 
lays himself open to that self-consciousness which 
clogs the springs of the lyric impulse. If it is more 
difficult now to write a simple poem in praise of 
nature because we know too much about nature's mechan­
ism, so it must be more difficult to write a simple 
love poem:--do I really feel as much about her as I 
want to say I feel? is she really so beautiful, 
graceful, charming, mysterious, as I make her out to 
be? When a poet loses his nerve in this sense, begins 
measuring and hedging, he may write an excellent poem 
but it will not be a lyric. Yet, although his feelings 
about the beloved will illude him into believing her a 
nonpareil, the lyrical poet must have the courage of 
these illusions or else deny the power of his feelings. 
(21-22) 
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A lyric poet does not screen out "personal feelings or 
memories" but breaks "through them to the ground of their 
being, a ground which is the fruitful compost made by 
numberless human experiences of a like nature" (139). 
The difference is often a matter of discipline, in 
poetry and essays. W. H. Auden, in his Introduction to a 
book of Chesterton's essays, admitted that he did not like 
the light, familiar essays so popular in Chesterton's day 
and so missed by devotees of the "true essay" in our own. 
Such "effortless" pieces all too often result in a kind of 
narcissistic display—the undisciplined hedging of the 
"sincere" lyricist, perhaps. 
My objection to the prose fantasia is the same as my 
objection to "free verse" . . . namely, that while 
excellent examples of both exist, they are the excep­
tion not the rule. All too often the result of the 
absence of any rules and restrictions, of a meter to 
which the poet must conform, of a definite subject to 
which the essayist must stick, is a repetitious and 
self-indulgent "show-off" of the writer's personality 
and stylistic mannerisms. (397) 
To digress a bit, this view calls into question several 
current methods of college composition instruction which see 
the exploratory lyrical essay as a therapeutic tool in which 
students are invited to "free write" (Peter Elbow) or 
emulate a version of the Montaignesque essay which is 
actually foreign to the controlled original. William 
Zeiger, for example, writing in a recent issue of College 
English, describes Montaigne's motive as purely free­
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wheeling and speculative. nHe had no investment in winning 
over his audience to his opinion" (455). Actually, as many 
critics have recognized (see Chapter Two), Montaigne's 
essays were often deliberate attempts to overturn received 
opinion and dogma. His "subject," despite his contradictory 
claim, was usually something other than himself. Teaching 
students to write from this distorted model may be akin to 
teaching budding poets to write lyric poems "spontaneously," 
in an imitation of the self-mythologizing Shelley. 
Literary critics' discussion of lyricism not only 
centers on the orientation of the poet/narrator to the work 
—the subjective direction of the lyrical mode—but the 
characteristic quality of the lyrical narrator's voice. 
Daniel Albright believes that the lyric mode has a "bardic" 
quality—"a certain appeal to the prehistoric, to some 
prelapsarian harmony prior to the division of the usual 
categories of things" (55). However, he also believes that, 
as time goes by, poets feel "increasingly estranged" from 
"the bard" (57). Paradoxically—even poignantly—poets 
redouble their efforts to "simulate" the bard, the wise, 
mythic voice of the lyric mode, to imitate "the aggressively 
antidiscursive mental and verbal habits a bard would have 
had a bard existed" (57). 
The gulf between the lost bard and his modern simula­
tion results in what Albright terms "lyric irony." His 
discussion is reminiscent of Lukacs's notion of the essayist 
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as egoist manque, although Albright believes that the irony 
of the lyric poet is unintentional, a dramatic irony 
perceived by his audience but unrecognized or unacknowledged 
by himself. 
The sudden awareness of the discrepancy between the 
poet as bard and the poet as fallible man results in 
what may be called lyric irony. ... I suspect that 
the grace of many of the highfalutin lyrics in English 
is due to lyric irony, the consciousness of the 
audience that the poet is not the loud-spouting 
rhapsode who is the ostensible speaker of the poem, but 
instead is a fairly ordinary fellow who is putting on a 
show. (81) 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the case is quite different 
with the Montaignesque essayist: a serious message usually 
lies behind the humble, know-nothing pose of the essayist, a 
pose which is as carefully constructed as that of the poetic 
bard. 
Albright's discussion of the wise voice of the lyrical 
poet, however, does augment our notion of the oracular, 
sermonic aim of the essayist—even the "regular fellow" of 
the Montaignesque variety—and proves once again the strong 
connections between the lyric and essayistic modes. 
Other elements of lyrical poetry such as simplicity 
and brevity are also shared by the lyrical essay. However, 
the lyrical essayist can and often does indulge a more 
complicated notion of metaphor and word play than that 
associated with the lyric poem and proscribed by Lewis as 
antithetical to its essential nature—its "elemental" 
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nature, displaying verbal patterns and subjects "common to 
all men." 
In fact, the opposite is often true in lyric essays. 
Modern essayists frequently use current events and issues as 
symbols of larger aspects of life* Beale has noted that 
although romanticism and the "belles lettres" traditions 
play important roles in modern reflective-exploratory 
essays-—more important really than in modern poetry—there 
is an equally strong tendency for modern essayists to 
explore "distinct fields of subject matter" (273). Joan 
Didion, for example, discusses the hippies of Haight-Asbury 
as paradigms of a larger problem in society that is at once 
immediate and eternal; Lewis Thomas uses current scientific 
findings—such as the symbiotic relation of the medusa and 
the snail—to represent the heartening indications of a 
natural tendency to harmony that balances the more depres­
sing aspects of Darwinian competition. 
On the other hand, Day-Lewis's notion of the "single-
minded" emotion of lyric poetry is often true of the 
lyric essay. The brevity of both forms makes such single-
mindedness inevitable. Brevity also plays a part in 
the echoes and repetitions in lyric essays which are a 
counterpart to the lyric "refrain." For example, the titles 
of essays—unlike the titles of longer works—often act as a 
kind of repetition device, since title and text are always 
in close proximity. Even in a longer lyric essay, such as 
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Montaigne's "On Vanity," repetitions and variations on the 
theme of the essay act as a kind of mnemonic refrain. 
Other Lyrical Techniques and the Lyrical Essay 
Simplicity, brevity, "bardic" wisdom, and repeti­
tion are the literary techniques of the Montaignesque essay 
which are particularly related to the lyrical mode. Other 
techniques are derived from different literary traditions. 
Beale emphasizes the importance of three "conceptual 
patterns" which occur again and again in reflective-explora­
tory essays, and I would add, particularly in the Montaign­
esque, lyrical sub-genre. These are: 
1. paradox; 2. enigma; 3. emblem. 
The first has been discussed at some length in Chapter 
Two, although we should notice once again the relationship 
of paradox and the skeptical spirit. Beale links paradox 
with contradiction and "contrary opinion," the kind of 
surprising "reversal" or "overturning" we often see in 
essays of this kind (275) . An enigma is simply a puzzle or 
mystery, the kind of dislocation beloved by skeptics and 
contrarians. As Beale has written, "An essay based upon an 
enigma usually states or reveals the situation in which the 
enigma became apparent, and then it attempts to resolve it 
and reflect upon its significance" (276). Finally, the 
emblem works in essays as it does in literature, as a rich 
symbol which is at once memorable itself and allusive. 
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"In reflective/exploratory rhetoric, as in literary art, 
emblems are powerful intellectual devices because they are 
integral to the way the mind absorbs, interprets, and 
retains experience," writes Beale (276). One should notice 
that these devices are categories of the Montaignesque 
exemplum discussed in Chapter Two. 
In this chapter I will discuss some of the essays of 
Lewis Thomas and Joan Didion in the context of the Montaign­
esque tradition of the essay. On the whole, the essays of 
these authors represent the part of the reflective/explora­
tory continuum which is closest to poetic and farthest from 
deliberation, and for this reason most readily yields to the 
instruments of the literary critic. 
150 
I. Lewis Thomas and Lyrical Science 
Lewis Thomas's essays are at a mid-point on the 
continuum between Baconian and Montaignesque writers, that 
is between suasory reflective essays and lyrical ones. On 
the whole, Thomas's essays can be categorized with the more 
personal Montaignesque variety since, with certain excep­
tions, his pieces contain a strong element of lyrical 
celebration. 
His praise of the biological world is delivered in the 
patient, ingratiating tones of an old-time doctor. Thomas's 
persona contributes a good deal to the success of the 
essays, which present biology with a kindly face. For those 
with unpleasant memories of being stuffed with esoteric 
biological facts, Thomas's essays on the independence of 
organelles, the toughness of human physiology, and the 
seamlessness of the natural world are invitations as well as 
celebrations. 
Thomas's original audience were medical doctors, for 
his first essays were published in The New England Journal 
of Medicine. The son of a doctor and a nurse, Thomas is a 
doctor by training, graduating from Harvard Medical School 
in 1937 after earning a B.S. in biology from Yale. Thomas 
served his residency in neurology at the Neurological 
Institute of New York. But he was more interested in 
medical research than in practicing medicine. While serving 
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in the Navy during World War II, he carried out research on 
infectious diseases. After the war he practiced medicine 
once again as a pediatrician with the Harriet Lane Home for 
Invalid Children in Baltimore, but at the same time he was 
an assistant professor of pediatrics at Johns Hopkins 
University Medical School and conducted research on rheumat­
ic fever as well as directed the bacteriology lab. 
From 1948 until the present day, Thomas has been a 
teacher and administrator. He served as a professor at 
Tulane University School of Medicine, the University of 
Minnesota Medical School, New York University-Bellevue 
Medical Center, Yale University School of Medicine and as 
dean of both N.Y.U. School of Medicine and Yale's medical 
school. He capped his career in 1973 by being named 
president and chief executive officer of Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center in New York City. In 1980 he became 
the Center's chancellor. A bibliography of his scholarly 
publications contains over two-hundred entries. 
In 1982 in an interview with Diane Dowdey, Thomas 
recounted the series of events that began his avocation as 
an essayist. In 1970, the editor of The New England Journal 
of Medicine. Franz Inglefinger was an old friend from his 
residency days. He asked Thomas to submit some essays to 
the Journal after Inglefinger read a published speech of 
Thomas's. Inglefinger and Thomas made a deal; Thomas would 
not be paid, and Inglefinger would accept the essays as they 
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were, making no editorial changes. Inglefinger's only 
editorial dictate was that the essays fit on one page. The 
essays were very popular and soon reached a non-medical 
audience. (In his autobiographical celebration of medicine, 
The Youngest Science (1983), Thomas writes that it was Joyce 
Carol Oates who wrote praising the essays from the Journal 
(243) and suggesting that he collect them.) Eventually, 
Viking published the essays in the collection entitled The 
Lives of a Cell,, which surprised Thomas by not only selling 
very well but receiving a National Book Award. A second 
collection, The Medusa and the Snail was published in 1979, 
although by this time, after Inglefinger's retirement, 
Thomas had stopped writing for the Journal. In 1980, at the 
request of another friend, Andrew Heiskell who was Chairman 
of the Board of Time-Life, Thomas began writing essays for 
the popular science magazine Discover. 
In several places he has described his essay writing 
as "fun" and biological - research as "fun" as well (See 
Dowdey 517). Trying to make people see the interesting side 
of science has been one of his preoccupations. In answering 
Dowdey's question about what he is trying to convey to his 
"non-professional audience" Thomas replieds 
Well, I don't have any big comprehensive picture, but 
there are some misperceptions of scientists that I 
think exist in the general public mind that I would 
like to try to change. One of them is that science has 
acquired so much in the way of factual information and 
data that we're almost home with all the information 
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that's needed for comprehending the world and that 
scientists should just go to work and sort it out and 
piece it together. My position is that what has 
happened in this century* when most of the science 
that's ever been done has been done, really has been 
the discovery of how little we know about nature and at 
the same time how puzzling and interesting what we 
don't know is. I think that's a new phenomenon. . . . 
The things that are happening in biology now are as 
mystifying as the things that began to happen earlier 
in this century in physics. It's a very strange place, 
and we're nowhere near settling anything. I want 
people to know it's great fun to have a chance to look 
at it. (524) 
When Dowdey asked "why [he thinks] it's important to 
have people realize that doing science is fun?" Thomas 
replied that accomplishing this is his "occupation" (524), 
and thus gives an important clue as to his perceptions of 
the audience he wanted to reach in the Journal: 
Medical students are an oppressed class, engaged in 
intensive competition, trying to get high grades, and 
some of the fun gets taken out of it. Some of the 
brightest ones who should be doing research stay out of 
it because sometimes they think there is nothing more 
to be done except to patch up a few loose ends. 
Sometimes they think it's too hard or too competitive. 
I guess I try to persuade them that it's a good way to 
live a life. (524) 
When he describes his notion of his audience for the 
Discover column, Thomas emphasizes his concern for the 
"undergraduates and grad students" who may read his essays 
(515) . Comments such as this as well as Thomas's essays 
themselves create an impression of the essayist as a 
combination of interested teacher and benevolent doctor. 
Unlike the Baconian "suasory" essay, the Montaignesque type 
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depends heavily on the nurturing of such a kindly persona, 
a mild friend instead of the sharp-tongued critic we have 
seen in Will, Fussell, and Theroux. Furthermore, the 
persona of the Montaignesque essay usually is self-effacing, 
not only about his or her own importance but about the 
expectations he or she may have for the essays. Thus we have 
Montaigne assuring his readers that 
if I had written to seek the world's favor, I should 
have bedecked myself better, and should present myself 
in a studied posture. I want to be seen here in my 
simple, natural, ordinary fashion, without straining or 
artifice; for it is myself that I portray. . . . Thus, 
reader, I am myself the matter of my book; you would be 
unreasonable to spend your leisure on so frivolous and 
vain a subject. (2) 
And we see Lewis Thomas—who is a self-admitted devotee of 
Montaigne (see "Why Montaigne Is not a Bore" MS 145-150)— 
professing a haphazard route to essay writing: 
I had not written anything for fun since medical school 
and a couple of years thereafter, except for occasional 
light verse and once in a while a serious but not very 
clear or very good poem. Good bad verse was what I was 
pretty good at. The only other writing I'd done was 
scientific papers, around two hundred of them, composed 
in the relentlessly flat style required for absolute 
unambiguity in every word, hideous language as I read 
it today. The chance to break free of that kind of 
prose, and to try the essay form, raised my spirits, 
but at the same time worried me. I tried outlining 
some ideas for essays, making lists of items I'd like 
to cover in each piece, organizing my thoughts in 
orderly sequences, and wrote several dreadful essays 
which I could not bring myself to reread, and decided 
to give up being orderly. I changed the method to no 
method at all, picked out some suitable times late at 
night, usually on the weekend two days after I'd 
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already passed the deadline, and wrote without outline 
or planning in advance, as fast as I could. This 
worked better, or at least was more fun, and I was able 
to get started. ("Essays and Gaia," YS 242) 
In line with this approach to writing his essays, 
Thomas told Dowdey that he does "very little" revising, 
although some "outright rejecting." 
I'll read through something and discover it doesn't 
work, but when it does work, I don't change it much. I 
write in longhand and I look it over after the secre­
tary types it, but once the first draft is done, I 
don't go back and do much revision. (518) 
He compares his experience with writing essays to writing 
poetry and claims once again that he writes essays "for fun. 
It's a bit like writing poetry only easier. In poetry, when 
I write it, it very much has to sound right and that's hard" 
(517). 
Thomas frequently mentions poetry in his essays and 
interviews—his own "good bad verse" as well as his favorite 
poets. To Dowdey's question about his favorite essayists, 
he mentions "E. B. White, E. M. Forster, C.S. Lewis, David 
Daiches" (520), but later in the interview, when Dowdy asks 
whom he wishes he could emulate as a writer he replies: 
mostly poets and not too many of them. I love reading 
Wallace Stevens, St. John Pierce, Auden, Nemerov. I 
don't know whether they've influenced me all that much 
or not. It's hard to tell. (525) 
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In fact, Thomas's essays often exemplify a pronounced 
lyricism, as we shall see in a closer analysis of several of 
his essays. 
Before doing so, however, it is worthwhile to examine 
the background of the particular sub-genre of the essay in 
which Thomas is working—the popular science essay, a 
category which includes a number of talented scientist/writ­
ers such as Loren Eiseley, Steven Jay Gould, and Jeremy 
Bernstein. 
While the contribution of the familiar essay to its 
scientific offshoot cannot be overemphasized, of equal 
importance is the legacy of scientific discourse to the 
genre. The development of a model for scientific writing 
has not been as easily charted, of course, as that of the 
familiar essay. The methods and processes of science have 
played an increasingly important role in almost every area 
of our lives, including language. In the history of 
scientific writing, champions of rhetoric and "pure" science 
have contended for the heart of scientific discourse, and at 
different periods of history, each has dominated notions of 
scientific communication. James L. Gooch gives a capsule 
history of science (writing in a 1976 issue of Bioscience) 
tracing the style from the seventeenth century, when 
"science" was communicated via the popular dialogue genre. 
In fact, according to Gooch, until the nineteenth century, 
"scientific prose conformed to literary models" (717). 
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The nineteenth century saw the explosion of new 
scientific discoveries which continues to our own day. 
After Lyell, Darwin, and Freud constructed the "paradigma­
tic" foundation* as Thomas Kuhn has called it, the special­
ized data collecting and experimentation of modern science 
began in earnest. The pace of technical spadework has only 
quickened with the passing years? an accompanying problem 
and concern is the accurate and readable reporting of the 
myriad developments, discoveries, and debunkings in modern 
science. 
Joseph Wenzel, in his 1974 Quarterly Journal of Speech 
article "Rhetoric and Anti-Rhetoric in Early American 
Scientific Societies," gives an informative synopsis of the 
American scientific community's response in the nineteenth 
century to the debate over scientific writing. After 
studying the proceedings of various scientific societies— 
English and American—Wenzel concludes that scientific 
writing reflected the debate among rhetoricians. In the 
seventeenth century, under Bacon's guidance, scientists 
eschewed an ornamental style of writing, because ornament 
and other matters of style were associated with the truncat­
ed notion of rhetoric current at the time which emphasized 
style rather than methods of argument. "Style," explains 
Wenzel, "had lost all functional connection with the 
substance of discourse" (329), and scientists, led by 
Bacon, perceived this disjunction. 
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American scientists of the eighteenth century were 
influenced by the Royal Society's promotion of Ramistic 
"plain style" for scientific writing (332). Nevertheless, 
the battle over scientific style reemerged in the nineteenth 
century. Wenzel writes that 
the ambivalence grew stronger as the century progres­
sed. It was the tension between the desire for artless-
ness in scientific discourse, on the one hand, and on 
the other, the growing realization that any form of 
discourse must be governed by art if it is to be 
perfected. Hence, about the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the general proscription of ornamentation 
gradually gave way to a general prescription for a new 
rhetoric conceived to meet the needs of a new age. 
(333) 
This new rhetoric of science which Wenzel outlines 
broadly as a tailored version of the classical process of 
invention does not seem to have quashed the debate between 
rhetorical and "plainstyle" scientists. In this century, 
the public has become more and more alienated from the 
arcane communications of scientists. Scientists and 
science-watchers continue to explore, blame, and praise 
scientific writing. For example, Paul Newell Campbell, 
writing in the December 1975 issue of Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, explores "The 'Personae8 of Scientific Writing" and 
debunks the "neutrality" of these personae. 
Certainly an approach that treats facts only as 
illustrations of theories is committed to the theories 
the facts illustrate. And to be committed to certain 
theoretical points of view is, of course, to advocate 
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precisely the views to which one is committed; it is a 
rhetorical stance. (391-392) 
The famed "unprejudiced™ scientific viewpoint results, be­
lieves Campbell,, in a "persona" perceived by the public as 
"displaying positively and actively . . . coldness, . . . 
disdain, . . . alienation" (405) . 
Such an alienated stance contrasts sharply with the 
deliberative aims of such authors of revolutionary scientif­
ic paradigms as Charles Darwin, Joel Black, in a paper read 
at the 1981 MLA conference, sees these paradigms, "by virtue 
of their inherent creativity and their relatively general 
intelligibility" being appropriated by "literature and 
humanities curriculums" (2). Black links these "paradigms" 
with the science essays we see sprouting everywhere—in 
magazines, newspapers, and anthologies. I believe, with 
Black, that these essays come in response to the public's 
thirst for scientific knowledge, a thirst analogous to the 
desire of the Renaissance public for classical moral 
teachings when the essay also served as a stop-gap measure. 
For these reasons, it is hard to view the sub-genre of the 
scientific essay as anything other than the "scientific" 
reflective-exploratory essay. Black's link between the 
scientific rhetorical paradigm and modern scientific essays 
holds up only in certain cases. Although Lewis Thomas may 
write an occasional deliberative essay on scientific 
matters, usually scientific deliberations are confined to 
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the context of scientific treatises. Furthermore, a 
deliberative essay by Thomas is likely to concern politics 
or ethics—not scientific theory., He may denigrate the 
"hideous prose" of scientific writing, but he continues to 
use that prose in his scholarly papers. 
Thomas and other science popularizers such as Gould are 
at pains to make the public understand that there are 
arguments in science—and much room for doubt and wonder as 
well. One of Thomas's consistent themes, in fact, is the 
vast number of mysteries in science. He writes in "Humani­
ties and Science" (LNT 143-155) that, on the whole "the 
scientific community is to blame" (147) because 
over the past half century, we have been teaching the 
sciences as though they were the same academic collec­
tion of cut-and-dried subjects as always, and—here is 
what has really gone wrong—as though they would always 
be the same. . . . Moreover, we have been teaching 
science as though its facts were somehow superior to 
the facts in all other scholarly disciplines, more 
fundamental, more solid, less subject to subjectivism, 
immutable. . . . And it is, of course, not like this 
at all. In real life, every field of science that I 
can think of is incomplete, and most of them ... are 
still in the earliest stage of their starting point. 
(147-148) 
Thomas cites as an example the current "running battle" 
between sociobiologists and "antisociobiologists"s 
To observe, in open-mouthed astonishment, the polarized 
extremes, one group of highly intelligent, beautifully 
trained, knowledgeable, and imaginative scientists 
maintaining that all sorts of behavior, animal and 
human, are governed exclusively by genes, and another 
group of equally talented scientists saying precisely 
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the opposite and asserting that all behavior is set 
and determined by the environment, or by culture, and 
both sides brawling in the pages of periodicals such as 
The New York Review of Books, is an educational 
experience that no college student should be allowed to 
miss. The essential lesson to be learned has nothing 
to do with the relative validity of the facts underly­
ing the argument, it is the argument itself that is the 
education: we do not yet know enough to settle such 
questions. (149) 
What one recognizes in such a passage is Thomas's 
rhetorical skill brought to bear on a deliberative point 
about science—that uncertainty and therefore the capacity 
for change undergird and inform the scientific enterprise as 
much as they do the humanities. But still, Thomas's 
argument is not about a particular scientific problem, and 
most scientific debates cannot be comprehended by readers of 
The New York Review of Books. 
When Dowdey maintains that "there really seems no way 
for a humanist to do science the way a physicist can read a 
novel, so it becomes a closed world" (528), Thomas concedes 
that he too feels shut out of many scientific fields. But 
he also points out that humanists should know enough—and be 
interested enough—to "catch a glimpse" of many issues in 
science. To promote that interest, and to give a "glimpse" 
of the excitement in biological research is the larger 
motive behind his essays—both the suasory and lyrical 
varieties. It is also the aim, I suspect, of other science 
essayists such as Gould and Eiseley, who hope to stimulate 
interest in the broader areas of scientific research, the 
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areas accessible to non-scientists, and to act as teachers 
of a public which perceives science as a world if not dull 
then certainly closed and secret. We will now turn to some 
of Lewis Thomas's essays to see the variety of rhetorical 
resources he brings to his task of reaching both "cultures." 
Several themes consistently appear and reappear in 
Thomas's essays, but underlying almost every piece is his 
notion of the universe as a seamless whole. For example in 
"The Music of this Sphere" (LC 20-25), Thomas suggests that 
the sounds that different creatures make—from the head 
banging of termites to the breast beating of gorillas—are 
forms of music, and that all music, including our own, 
might be the recapitulation of something else—an 
earliest memory, a score for the transformation of 
inanimate, random matter in chaos into the improbable, 
ordered dance of living forms. (24) 
This seems a curiously romantic notion for a professional 
biologist to hold—and a view that contrasts rather sharply 
with the writings of a more hard-headed scientist/essayist 
such as Stephen Jay Gould. But as well as a biologist, 
Thomas is also a teacher, doctor, and poet, and it is these 
latter styles which predominate in the essays, and are the 
sustaining note of his apologia for the scientific enter­
prise, an enterprise in his opinion that makes a reveren­
tial—even ecstatic—response to the natural world not only 
understandable but inevitable. 
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Thomas seeks to dispel some unfortunate myths about 
science and scientists, especially the reductive idea that 
science is a compendium of dry, indisputable facts collected 
by dry, solitary specialists,, Thomas challenges this 
stereotype with a very different picture of working scien­
tists in his essay "Natural Science" (LC 100-102): 
I don't know of any other human occupation, even 
including what I have seen of art, in which the people 
engaged in it are so caught up, so totally preoccupied, 
so driven beyond their strength and resources. 
Scientists at work have the look of creatures 
following genetic instructions; they seem to be under 
the influence of a deeply placed human instinct. They 
are, despite their efforts at dignity, rather like 
young animals engaged in savage play. When they are 
near to an answer their hair stands on end, they sweat, 
they are awash in their own adrenalin. To grab the 
answer, and grab it first, is for them a more powerful 
drive than feeding or breeding or protecting themselves 
against the elements. 
It sometimes looks like a lonely activity, but it is 
as much the opposite of lonely as human behavior can 
be. There is nothing so social, so communal, so 
interdependent. An active field of science is like an 
immense intellectual anthill .... (101) 
Thomas's insistence on the "naturalness" of scientists— 
their resemblance to young animals at play, their sweaty 
compulsion to keep playing even as they are "awash" in 
adrenalin—contradicts the desiccated "unnatural" stereo­
type. It is apparent in such passages that Thomas's eye for 
concrete, allusive language--his poetic gift—fuels the 
often unspoken rhetorical aims of his essays. 
Thomas's apologies for scientists—and their work— 
often take the form of lyrical descriptions of the wonders 
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they explore, especially in his branch of science. His 
lyricism reaches its highest pitch when he describes the 
look of life itself, from the smallest organism to the 
largesto All are interesting and strange, and all seem 
related so that the earth appears to be an enormous teeming 
entity: 
The overwhelming astonishment, the queerest structure 
we know about so far in the whole universe, the 
greatest of all cosmological scientific puzzles, 
confounding all our efforts to comprehend it, is the 
earth. We are only now beginning to appreciate how 
strange and splendid it is, how it catches the breath, 
the loveliest object afloat around the sun, enclosed in 
its own blue bubble of atmosphere, manufacturing and 
breathing its own oxygen, fixing its own nitrogen from 
the air into its own soil, generating its own weather 
at the surface of its rain forests, constructing its 
own carapace from living parts: chalk cliffs, coral 
reefs, old fossils from earlier forms of life now 
covered by layers of new life meshed together around 
the globe, Troy upon Troy. 
Seen from the right distance, from the corner of the 
eye of an extraterrestrial visitor, it must surely seem 
a single creature, clinging to the round warm stone, 
turning in the sun. ("The Corner of the Eye," LNT 16-
17) 
There are many such passages in Thomas's essays in 
which the earth is portrayed as a living organism. "Viewed 
from the distance of the moon, the astonishing thing about 
the earth, catching the breath, is that it is alive," he 
begins his essay "The World's Biggest Membrane" (LC 145-
148). "It has the organized, self-contained look of a live 
creature, full of information, marvelously skilled in 
handling the sun" (145). Again and again Thomas emphasizes 
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the liveliness of the world, using such words as "warm," 
"sun," "generating," "breath," and "breathing." But Thomas 
is not just giving voice to a poetic impulse in such 
writing, although his aesthetic pleasure at this "splendid" 
place is certainly sincere. His other aim, which has become 
increasingly overt over the years, is rhetorical: the 
"teaching" voice predominates in the essays from Discover 
and collected in Late Night Thoughts. It is a more blatant­
ly suasory voice, in other words, than in the earlier essays 
written for The New England Journal of Medicine. And the 
point that Thomas wishes to make about living things is not 
only that they are sublime and worthy of lyric praise, but 
that humans must be more responsible, especially in this age 
of nuclear weapons. This theme is sounded with increasing 
frequency from one collection of Thomas's essays to another. 
On the other hand, Thomas's "doctorly" voice resounds 
through the earlier essays—an appropriate persona for 
Thomas to cultivate in addressing medical students and other 
doctors from month to month. This voice is often as lyrical 
as Thomas the teacher, but its cast is completely different. 
Whereas Thomas as teacher warns, Thomas as doctor reassures. 
In many essays in Lives of a Cell and The Medusa and the 
Snail, Thomas tells his readers that nature is not only 
tough and resilient, but amazingly well planned as well, so 
that the natural events that people find the most terrify­
ing—disease and death—can be viewed as interesting and 
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even kind. In "Germs,n for example, he assures his readers 
that the worst aspects of disease are not caused by bacter­
ia, but by the elaborate defenses which "overreact" to 
certain stimuli (LC 75-79). Our neurotic fears about 
disease result in a society saturated with disinfectant 
sprays and swathed in plastic. "Watching television, you'd 
think we lived at bay, in total jeopardy, surrounded on all 
sides by human seeking germs ..." (75). Instead, "in real 
life . . . even in our worst circumstances we have always 
been a relatively minor interest of the vast microbial 
world" (76). 
Death too, for Thomas, has few alarms. He suggests in 
"On Natural Death" (MS 102-105) that endorphins rush through 
the system of a dying creature because "pain is useful for 
avoidance, for getting away when there's time to get away . 
. however "when it is end game, and no way back, pain is 
likely to be turned off, and the mechanisms for this are 
wonderfully precise and quick" (105). The spate of books on 
death suggests that dying is "a new sort of skill which all 
of us are now required to learn" (102). But Thomas, the 
seasoned doctor, reminds us here and in other essays that 
dying is not only painless but part of a synchronic system: 
We will have to give up the notion that death is 
catastrophe, or detestable, or avoidable, or even 
strange. We will need to learn more about the cycling 
of life in the rest of the system, and about our 
connection to the process. Everything that comes alive 
seems to be in trade for something that dies, cell for 
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cell. There might be some comfort in the recognition 
of synchrony, in the information that we all go down 
together, in the best of company. ("Death in the Open," 
LC 98-99) 
This is sound advice for all his readers, but especially 
useful perhaps for the medical students whom Thomas liked to 
envision reading his essays in the New England Journal. 
The doctor and teacher merge in the many passages in 
Thomas's essays which explain and celebrate the intricacies 
of living creatures--the celebration and explanation 
enhanced by a lyricism which rarely transgresses C. Day 
Lewis's standards of brevity, simplicity, and subjectivity 
rather than personality. Nevertheless, in some instances 
Thomas cannot make an essay work, and I believe the fault is 
usually related to a lack of lyric restraint. Since this is 
the kind of failure which I see as an occupational hazard of 
the Montaignesque essayist, and one that is rather wide­
spread in an age suffused with expressive writing, it is 
useful for us to compare a successful essay with an example 
of what may be viewed as one of Thomas's lyric failures. 
Both essays are written on the same difficult theme. 
"An Earnest Proposal," one of Thomas's earlier essays, was 
first published in the New England Journal of Medicine and 
included in Lives of a Cell (26-30). It is the first essay 
in Thomas's collections to sound the note of one of his 
continuing themes—the danger and stupidity of nuclear 
weapons. This is also the theme of the title essay of his 
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last collection, Late Night Thoughts on Listening to 
Mahler's Ninth Symphony. The treatment of the theme is very 
different in each essay, however, and illustrates Auden's 
idea that there is as much need for discipline in a lyrical 
essay as in a lyrical poem. 
"An Earnest Proposal" is a much more restrained piece 
than "Late Night Thoughts." The restraint is mainly a 
result of understatement and irony, the sort of irony 
meticulously practiced by Montaigne, who is forever shrugg­
ing his shoulders and feinting half-hearted interest in 
matters which interest him the most. Thomas's title 
suggests Swift's sardonic "A Modest Proposal" which develops 
ironic understatement into a perfect satire of "reasoned," 
"dispassionate" argument. Swift's essay and a number of 
other literary precedents from Great Expectations to The 
Waste Land demonstrate the astringent value of irony in a 
presentation of subjects which might otherwise overwhelm 
both author and audience—subjects of deep moral and/or 
emotional significance. 
In "An Earnest Proposal" Thomas is able to merge irony 
with metaphorical description. The essay relies on paradox; 
Thomas suggests that "until we have acquired a really 
complete set of information concerning at least one living 
thing" we should "defer further action" on nuclear weapons 
(27). After all, much of our planning and thinking is 
increasingly done by computers, "that will be giving 
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instructions to cities, to nations" and, he implies, to 
nuclear weapons as well. We all would agree—even "our 
practical men" who run things—that these machines should 
"contain every least bit of relevant information about the 
way of the world" (27). Thomas implies that the chore may 
be bigger than we at first imagine and underscores his point 
by picking one of the simplest creatures on earth as the 
"one living thing" we should attempt to understand before we 
resume planning for nuclear war. "Even the nuclear rea­
lists, busy as their minds must be with calculations of 
acceptable levels of megadeath, would not want to overlook 
anything" (27). 
The core of "An Earnest Proposal" is a detailed 
description of the tiny one-celled organism which is 
Thomas's candidate for exhaustive research, an humble 
creature which dwells in the gut of Australian termites. 
Its name appropriately enough is Mysotriclia paradloxa. In 
explaining what biologists know about this organism Thomas 
suggests two points: first that even the smallest creature 
is an infinite mystery and secondly that every form of life 
seems connected. The latter is a direct contradiction of 
what "the practical men" view as the natural order—the 
darkest version of evolutionary theory: 
They have been taught that the world is an arrangement 
of adversary systems, that force is what counts, 
aggression is what drives us at the core, only the 
fittest survive, and only might can make more might. 
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Thus, it is in observance of nature's law that we have 
planted, like perennial tubers, the numberless nameless, 
missiles in the soil of Russia and China and our 
Midwestern farmlands, with more to come, poised to fly 
out at a nanosecond's notice, and meticulously engi­
neered to ignite, in the centers of all our cities, 
artificial suns, (27) 
For Thomas, the flyxotricha is a contradiction to this 
"tooth and claw" version of the natural world. With his 
teacher's—and poet's—gift for metaphorical descriptions, 
he presents Myzotricha as not only more complex but more 
beautiful than "practical" unimaginative men may guess. 
With careful attention to connotation—using such phrases as 
"epicenter" of "the termite ecosystem, an arrangement of 
Byzantine complexity"—he elevates his one-celled subject to 
a central position in a splendid subterranean kingdom. The 
termite too is edified as a creature whose wood excretions— 
made possible by Myzotricha—are "geometrically tidy pellets 
. . . use[d] as building blocks for the erection of arches 
and vaults in the termite nest" (28) . Hyxotricha himself 
(I adopt Thomas's familiar use of the masculine rather than 
the colder neutral pronoun) is a little world of smaller 
entities instead of the self-sufficient packet of cytoplasm 
we might imagine. Thomas reminds us in this essay as well 
as many others (for example, see "Organelles as Organisms" 
LC 69-74) that the organelles—such as the mitochondria, 
lysosomes and so on—contained in one-celled creatures were 
once free-wheeling prokaryotic creatures until they were 
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absorbed by the eukaryotic unicellular organisms billions 
of years ago. Thomas uses the biological fact that living 
things tend to coalesce to draw a picture of all nature's 
interdependence. 
If we could understand this tendency, we would catch a 
glimpse of the process that brought single separate 
cells together for the construction of metazoans, 
culminating in the invention of roses, dolphins, and, 
of course, ourselves. It might turn out that the same 
tendency underlies the joining of organisms into 
communities, communities into ecosystems, and eco­
systems into the biosphere. If this is, in fact, the 
drift of things, the way of the world, we may come to 
view immune reactions, genes for the chemical marking 
of self, and perhaps all reflexive responses of 
aggression and defense as secondary developments in 
evolution, necessary for the regulation and modulation 
of symbiosis, not designed to break into the process, 
only to keep it from getting out. of hand. (29) 
In short, if Myxotricha is the way of the world, then 
the "practical men" and their nightmare vision of conten­
tious nature are wrong, and the missiles, "planted like 
perennial tubers," are an unnatural aberration. It is a 
point made subtly and with great effect: Thomas guides his 
reader to this conclusion with a minimal amount of overt 
prodding. His secondary theme—the infinite mystery of 
everything in nature—is reiterated at the end of the essay 
when he contrasts once again the simplicity of our machines, 
the machines so beloved by the practical men, and the 
complexity of the "simplest" one-celled creature. Thomas 
concludes that the result of an exhaustive analysis of the 
humble Myxotricha paradoxa in fulfillment of his "earnest 
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proposal" would be a befuddled computer crying uncle and 
delaying nuclear war indefinitely : "Requests more data. How 
are spirochetes attached? Do not fire" (30). 
This elegantly crafted essay which leads the reader to 
an ineluctable conclusion about a formidable topic contrasts 
sharply with Thomas's essay on the same subject, "Late Night 
Thoughts on Listening to Mahler's Ninth Symphony" (LNT 164-
68) „ Analyzing this essay is instructive in several ways: 
first because we can see a different sort of ethical appeal, 
one that is not as successful as the dry, ironic persona of 
so many Thomas essays; and second, as I already indicated, 
this essay demonstrates some of the shortcomings of a rather 
undisciplined lyricism that is personal—to the point of 
"showing off," as Auden puts it—rather than subjective. 
The essay relies on one of Thomas's most persistent 
themes—music—as a controlling metaphor. As we have seen, 
Thomas sometimes uses music as signifying the harmony of the 
universe ("The Music of This Sphere" LC 20-25). On another 
level, both music and language are for Thomas symbols of 
transcendent wonder, and a cause for celebration that humans 
can make such a things 
Surely, music (along with ordinary language) is as 
profound a problem for human biology as can be thought 
of, and I would like to see something done about it. . 
. . [A government funded committee could start] on a 
very small scale and with a very limited mission and a 
modest budget: a narrow question, like Why is The Art 
of the Fugue so important and what does this single 
piece of music do to the human mind? Later on, there 
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will be other questions, harder to deal with. ("Things 
Unflattened by Science" LNT 79) 
In "Late Night Thoughts" Thomas uses music once again 
as an important symbol, but in a very different way. In 
describing his response to Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Thomas 
expresses his terror and despair at the prospect of nuclear 
war. At one time, he 
took this music as a metaphor for reassurance, confirm­
ing my own strong hunch that the dying of every living 
creature, the most natural of all experiences, has to 
be a peaceful experience. I rely on nature. The long 
passages on all the strings at the end, as close as 
music can come to expressing silence itself, I used to 
hear as Mahler's idea of leave-taking at its best. But 
always, I have heard this music as a solitary, private 
listener, thinking about death. (164) 
Now, however, he 
cannot listen to the last movement of the Mahler Ninth 
without the door-smashing intrusion of a huge new 
thought: death everywhere, the dying of everything, the 
end of humanity. The easy sadness expressed with such 
gentleness and delicacy by that repeated phrase on 
faded strings, over and over again, no longer comes to 
me as old, familiar news of the cycle of living and 
dying. All through the last notes my mind swarms with 
images of a world in which the thermonuclear bombs have 
begun to explode, in New York and San Francisco, in 
Moscow and Leningrad, in Paris, in Paris, in Paris. 
(165) 
The rest of the essay is an account of Thomas's dark 
fancy of what it must be like for a "young person sixteen or 
seventeen years old" to face the possibility of destruction 
that the missile buildup threatens. Older people like 
174 
himself, Thomas explains, are "moving along anyway, like it 
or not" (165). Although he can no longer entertain benign 
fancies of "hanging around in some sort of midair" after his 
death, he can assimilate the thought of nuclear war, because 
he is close to death. 
Thomas alternates between sympathetic evocations of 
what it must be like to be young now compared to his own 
sheltered youth, and the jarring reminders of the nuclear 
age—a government pamphlet on MX missiles, a man on a news 
program who explains how many Americans might be "saved" in 
a nuclear war. The pattern is reminiscent, probably 
consciously so, of a musical theme and counter-theme. If 
this device had been more carefully and obviously carried 
out, it might have helped to counter the excessive senti­
mentality of the essay, providing a formal discipline. 
The problem with this essay is a lack of formal 
control, and also a peculiarity of voice. In "An Earnest 
Proposal," Thomas speaks from the vantage of a biologist: we 
trust his expertise and therefore accept his pronouncements 
on the one-celled creature which serves as his emblem? thus 
we are able to more readily accept his essayistic connection 
between the organism and the stupidity and wrong-headedness 
of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in "Late Night 
Thoughts," Thomas speaks from a different point of view—as 
an amateur musicologist rather than an expert biologist. 
It is not Thomas's moralizing to which one might object 
in "Late Night Thoughts." We are used to his opinions, even 
those as overtly expressed as some of the suasory pieces 
from Discover which are collected in Late Might Thoughts. 
In his interview with Dowdey, Thomas labels his most 
"persuasive" pieces as "propaganda" (518) and says that on 
"two issues — the importance of basic science and the 
importance of getting rid of thermonuclear bombs—I fully 
intend to argue" (521), Nevertheless, Thomas's most 
persuasive moral arguments are grounded in anecdotes from 
biology, his area of expertise. His ethical appeal in "Late 
Night Thoughts" is undercut by amateurishness and a sort of 
self-advertising sensitivity which at times smacks of 
arrogance. The steady undercurrent of irony in "An Earnest 
Proposal" keeps Thomas's suasory appeal from becoming too 
shrill. Interestingly enough, in "Late Night Nights" 
lyricism predominates over deliberation, but the lack of 
irony leaves this piece of "propaganda" unmuted and at times 
as emotional as the most passionate measures of Mahler's 
Ninth. 
The lyricism is undisciplined, and personality 
predominates over subjectivity. Thomas's private reaction 
to the symphony is too idiosyncratic for his readers to 
share. We are not prepared for the leap from strings to 
bombs. Furthermore his repetition of "in Paris? in Paris, 
in Paris," does not act as a cohesive refrain but, instead, 
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seems a highly self-conscious lament, especially when 
followed by Thomas's despairing passage on the possible 
destruction of his "favorite part of the world . . . the 
Engadin, from the Moloja Pass to Ftan"—a part of the world 
his readers likely care little about. 
The final paragraph of the essay reaches an even higher 
pitch of emotion as Thomas tries to imagine the reaction of 
young people to absurd governmental projections and debates 
on nuclear war. 
If I were sixteen or seventeen years old and had to 
listen to that, or read things like that, I would want 
to give up listening and reading. I would begin 
thinking up new kinds of sounds, different from any 
music heard before, and I would be twisting and turning 
to rid myself of human language. (168) 
Thomas's description of what he would do if he were sixteen 
or seventeen does not jibe with what most teenagers would do 
and are doing—that is, living their lives as unconscious of 
imminent death as was Thomas in his youth. The reader's 
credibility is stretched beyond repair. 
An interesting note on this essay—and a possible 
explanation for its fatal idiosyncracy—is the circumstances 
of its composition. Thomas told Dowdey that he wrote the 
essay for himself and did not intend to publish it until his 
daughter ("who has a degree in musicology") suggested that 
he send it to Discover (518). 
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For the purposes of this study, "Late Night Thoughts" 
is useful as an example of a Montaignesque essay flawed by 
relying on personality rather than subjectivity and a self-
conscious, humorless lyricism. We might accept the latter 
more readily if Thomas had established himself as a sensi­
tive dilettante in the Charles Lamb mold. But Lewis 
Thomas's audience identifies him with another sort of 
persona—that of a scientist with the instincts of an old-
time doctor. Readers will listen to almost anything that 
Thomas has to say in the confident "bardic" voice of a 
biologist and doctor, persuaded by and enjoying his poetic 
gift for description and analogy, but they may not sit still 
for his amateur, impressionistic pronouncements on music, 
especially those at once so private and propagandistic. 
Nevertheless, "Late Night Thoughts" is an uncharacter­
istically flawed piece, and it would be unfair to leave this 
discussion of Thomas without reiterating the special 
contributions he has made to the essay, especially the de 
facto genre of the science essay. Thomas has been able to 
portray the beauty of a world which many of us wrongly 
associate with scrubbed laboratories and cold hearts. In 
telling the stories of strange unicellular creatures, 
passionate researchers and other biological marvels, he is a 
remarkable apologist—a troubadour scientist who recites the 
poetry of the "other" culture. 
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II.Joan Didion and the Impersonal Confession 
"Usually I spend a great deal of time finding a tone 
that is not my own* and then adopting the tone and getting 
it righto . » . Normally I have difficulty ^expressing 
myself in any natural way. I'm not that open," (Friedman 
25) . This seems an odd statement from a writer who laces 
her essays with emblems taken from her own experience—her 
failing marriage, her mental collapse—stark examples from 
her life to stand for a splintered culture. Nevertheless, 
Didion's statement is true. Her essays—even the ones 
concerning her private life—are all delivered in the cool 
tones of journalistic prose, and it is this detached tone 
which makes these essays so powerful. 
Levis Thomas nearly always eludes sentimentality by 
presenting "only the facts" in the voice—often ironic—of 
the experienced observer. Many of Didion's essays, too, are 
constructed on this formula, although her voice is not that 
of a specialized expert—scientific or otherwise—but of an 
astute reporter of current events, events which assume the 
same symbolic value as Thomas's organelles., In other 
essays, Didion steps into the more dangerous waters of 
personal experience. Unlike Thomas, however, her control in 
either case is almost infallible. Didion seems to have 
captured the best of two rather incompatible essay tradi­
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tions--the romantic confessional and the "Baroque" or 
Montaignesque skeptical. 
John Romano echoes the judgment of many critics who 
find her essays superior to her fictions 
[Her writing] balances an objective-seeming precision 
of language and observed detail against the feeling 
that a particular person is speaking to us, an intelli­
gent, likable, and utterly subjective, even prejudiced 
person; and, as it happens, someone who lives in or 
near a condition of unhysterical despair. In this 
balance there is an explanation for something that is 
often said about Joan Didion—that her essays are 
excellent, whereas her fiction is only just good. In 
Rnn River and Play Tt as Tt Lays, personal idiosyn­
crasies overrun the writing, and drench it in despera­
tion; in the essays, with their necessary burden of 
fact and information, the balance is better kept. 
(Friedman 142) 
Romano does not credit enough, I think, the part that 
Didion's fanatical attention to structure and her perfect 
pitch play in the emotional control of the essays. Personal 
idiosyncracy has contributed to her success: because she is 
reticent she searches for a "tone that is not [her] own"; 
because she is obsessive about order in her own life, she is 
obsessive about it as well in her essays. As she has told 
Michiko Kakutani: 
Order and control are terribly important to me. I 
would love to just have control over my own body—to 
stop the pain, to stop my hand from shaking. If I were 
5 feet 10 and had a clear gaze and a good strong frame 
I would not have such a maniacal desire for control 
because I would have it. (Friedman 40) 
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Not only are the essays' structure an extension of 
Didion's character, but the themes of the essays as well— 
the disappearing world of traditional values, the generation 
of virtue and vice in individual people rather than systems, 
the fictional nature of the meanings that people ascribe to 
events. But, of course, Didion's character is also a product 
of a social context. The essays garnered from the Saturday 
Evening Post and Life columns and contained in the two 
collections Slouching towards Bethlehem (1968) and The White 
Album (197 9) , are the history of individualism confronted 
with mass dissolution in the sixties and seventies. 
As a fifth generation Californian and temperamental 
loner, Didion seems to embody the spirit of the Old West, 
whether or not that spirit is mythical. Because she is also 
part of "The Business" of moviemaking—she and her husband 
John Gregory Dunne have collaborated on screenplays for over 
a dozen movies and are friends with many people in the film 
industry—she has an insider's view of the essence of 
cultural story telling which has produced not only varia­
tions of the "New Adam" myth but "dreampolitik" as well. In 
the title essay of The White Album she begins with a account 
of this mythmaking and its importance: 
We tell ourselves stories in order to live. The 
princess is caged in the consulate. The man with the 
candy will lead the children into the sea. The naked 
woman on the ledge outside the window on the sixteenth 
floor is a victim of accidie, or the naked woman is an 
exhibitionist, and it would be 'interesting' to know 
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which. ... We look for the sermon in the suicide, for 
the social or moral lesson in the murder of five. We 
interpret what we see, select the most workable of the 
multiple choices. We live entirely, especially if we 
are writers, by the imposition of a narrative line upon 
disparate images, the "ideas™ with which we have 
learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is 
our actual experience. (11) 
The rest of the essay is an account of the personal 
devastation caused by Didion's inability to continue to 
believe in "the stories." Between 1966 and 1971 she found 
herself "improvising" instead of following a story line; 
This was an adequate enough performance, as improvisa­
tions go. The only problem was that my entire educa­
tion, everything I had ever been told or had told 
myself, insisted that the production was never meant to 
be improvised: I was supposed to have a script, and had 
mislaid it. I was supposed to hear cues, and no longer 
did. I was meant to know the plot, but all I knew was 
what I saw: flash pictures in variable sequence, images 
with no "meaning" beyond their temporary arrangement, 
not a movie but a cutting-room experience. In what 
would probably be the middle of my life I wanted still 
to believe in the narrative and in the narrative's 
intelligibility, but to know that one could change the 
sense with every cut was to begin to perceive the 
experience as rather more electrical than ethical. (12-
13) 
Eventually, as Didion relates in the most matter of 
fact way, she checks into a psychiatric hospital where her 
clinical report relates a condition which represents, she 
implies, the condition of many people—even a cultural 
condition. She is described as having "alienated herself 
almost entirely from the world of other human beings," of 
having a "fantasy life . . . virtually completely preempted 
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by primitive, regressive libidinal preoccupations many of 
which are distorted and bizarre," of feeling "that all human 
effort is foredoomed to failure, a conviction which seems to 
push her further into a dependent, passive withdrawal" (14). 
Didion succeeds in this tricky business of using her 
personal breakdown as an emblem of cultural breakdown by 
maintaining the neutral tone of the objective observer. 
Furthermore, the essay genre, because it is "true," lends 
itself to such a metaphorical use of private experience. 
Didion1 s account of her emblematic collapse is lent 
credibility by the anecdotes of the many strange conversa­
tions and encounters she. has during these years—of compar­
ing notes on publication advances and problems with Eldridge 
Cleaver while he sat in jail, of shopping for a dress for 
Linda Kasabian's appearance in the Manson trials, of 
witnessing the collaborative efforts of college administra­
tors and student radicals in obtaining television coverage 
for campus demonstrations. All are samples of "cuts" which 
do not fit into a traditional story line. Just as in 
"Shooting an Elephant," the fact that these events—in this 
essay and others equally self-revelatory--are true (or 
presented as true) makes them more potent emblems of 
corporate dissolution than like experiences transposed on to 
a fictional character. In fact, Didion's and Orwell's 
success in the essay form, and their relative lack of 
success in fiction, gives credence to the suggestion that 
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fiction cannot gracefully carry such an overtly rhetorical 
load. When it is attempted, as in Burmese Days or Play It 
as It Lavs, the result seems overwritten and even preten­
tious. Interestingly enough, Didion herself has criticized 
Doris Lessing for paying more attention to rhetoric than to 
poetic in her fiction. In an essay contained in The White 
Album she writes: 
That she is a writer of considerable native power, a 
"natural" writer in the Dreiserian mold, someone who 
can close her eyes and "give" a situation by the sheer 
force of her emotional energy, seems almost a stain on 
her conscience. She views her real gift for fiction 
much as she views her own biology, as another trick to 
entrap her. She does not want to "write well." Her 
leaden disregard for even the simplest rhythms of 
language, her arrogantly bad ear for dialogue—all of 
that is beside her own point. More and more, Mrs. 
Lessing writes exclusively in the service of immediate 
cosmic reform: she wants to write, as the writer Anna 
in The Golden Notebook wanted to write, only to "create 
a new way of looking at life." (119-20) 
Didion's harshest criticisms of Lessing's fiction are 
directed at Briefing for a Descent into Hell r a novel in 
which the insanity of the heroine is the only "sane" 
response to an insane world, the theme which forms the 
subtext of "The White Album." Didion's comparative success 
with the theme is an unspoken criticism of Lessing. 
Because Didion uses the essay genre for the recounting 
of potentially melodramatic examples, she has the potent 
tool of self-deprecation at her disposal. A fictional 
character can be self-deprecatory too, of course, but the 
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effect is not as forceful. A successful self-deprecating 
narrator such as Jack Burden in All the King's Men must make 
it clear that he is telling a story about an earlier, more 
foolish and self-deluding version of himself without giving 
away the ending of the story * Furthermore, in so doing he 
must make his irony seem genuine self-deprecation rather 
than self-pity, as for instance, the unsympathetic whining 
of Orwell's protagonist, Flory, in Burmese Days. The author 
of a fictional ironist must overcome not only the initial 
hurdle of his audience's suspension of disbelief inherent to 
all literature, but also a second hurdle of suspicion that 
an ironic narrator or protagonist is a stand-in for the 
author himself who wishes more to preach than to tell a 
story. An essayist, on the other hand, is a self-acknov-
ledged moralist, whose recital of humiliating experiences 
does not require a suspension of disbelief, since his story 
is "true." 
In the essay, "On Going Home," for example, Didion 
examines the difficulty of introducing her husband to the 
habits and secrets she shares with her parents and brother: 
We live in dusty houses ("D-U-S-T,n [her husband] once 
wrote with his finger on surfaces all over the house, 
but no one noticed it) filled with mementos quite 
without value to him (what could the Canton dessert 
plates mean to him? how could he have known about the 
assay scales, why should he care if he did know?), and 
we appear to talk exclusively about people we know who 
have been committed to mental hospitals, about people 
we know who have been booked on drunk-driving charges, 
and about property, particularly about property, land, 
185 
price per acre and C-2 zoning and assessments and 
freeway access. (164) 
With these humble examples, Didion suggests the comic side 
of the sad ritual of "meeting one's past at every turn, 
around every corner, inside every cupboard" (166) as well as 
the strong affection she has for her family,, Therefore, the 
force of the dramatic ending of the essay which states one 
of Didion's themes—the impossibility anymore of having such 
a family matrix, of establishing a net for one's own child— 
is all the more poignant. 
Joan Didion's deeply rooted family background seems to 
be the source of her despair in witnessing the breakdown of 
such a tradition. She was born into an old Sacramento 
family, although she had an early taste of the alienating 
rootlessness which later would affect the wandering adoles­
cents of the sixties. Her father was an Air Force Colonel, 
and during World War II, she and her family moved from base 
to base. This, of course, was also the experience of 
millions of other Americans during the early forties and 
perhaps explains that generation's dismay at the upheavals 
of the sixties. Having regained "order" and a sense of 
community they were sorry to see these disrupted by a 
cultural war. 
She writes of her years at Berkeley in her essay "On 
the Morning after the Sixties" and explains the orientation 
of her generation to moral questions: 
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We were that generation called "silent," but we were 
silent neither, as some thought, because we shared the 
period's official optimism not, as others thought, 
because We feared its official repression. We were 
silent because the exhilaration of social action seemed 
to many of us just one more way of escaping the 
personal, of masking for a while that dread of the 
meaningless which was man's fate. . . . That most of us 
found adulthood just as morally ambiguous as we 
expected it to be falls perhaps into the category of 
prophecies self-fulfilled: I am simply not sure. I am 
telling you only how it was. (206-207) 
Actually Didion's essays provide the evidence that she is a 
good deal surer about the ambiguity of existence as a 
continuing truth rather than a "self-fulfilling prophecy." 
This view may be common to her generation, but it is one 
which Didion continues to hold. 
In her essays Didion engages in a continuing quest to 
see things as they really are, not as she or others might 
fictionalize them. For example, in the title essay of 
Slouching towards Bethlehem,, she explores the self-delusions 
of the adolescent hippies of Haight-Asbury whose lack of 
education in the values of the culture makes them prey to 
the pseudo-philosophies surrounding drug use and political 
ideologies. The vignettes which she culled from an extended 
stay in the district in the late sixties are organized into 
a series of "cuts'1 reminiscent of "The White Album." In the 
manner of New Journalism she uses the narrative mode with 
particular attention to dialogue. But the "cuts" are more 
than random fragments; they are arranged in a definite order 
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which lead inexorably to Didion's conclusion that the 
children of Haight-Asbury represent the dissolution of a 
culture where "the center cannot hold" and the young are 
driven back on their own devices and eventually into the 
control of sinister forces. John Hollowell has commented 
that Didion "learned this technique [of "jump cuts™] from 
the movies" (Friedman 164). 
Didion's particular temperament is "theatrical," she 
has said in an interview with Michiko Kakutani (Friedman 
33). She also portrays herself as a disillusioned romantic. 
She told Susan Stamberg on National Public Radio's "All 
Things Considered," for example, that she is 
rather a slow study, and I came late to the 
apprehension that there was a void at the center of 
experience. A lot of people realize this when 
they're fifteen or sixteen, but I didn't realize until 
I was much older that it was possible that the dark 
night of the soul was . . „ aridity. I had thought 
that it was something much riper and more sinful. One 
of the books that made the strongest impression on me 
when I was in college was The Portrait of a Ladv. Henry 
James's heroine, Isabel Archer, was the prototypic 
romantic idealist. It trapped her, and she ended up a 
prisoner of her own ideal. I think a lot of us do. 
. . . The reality does intervene eventually. (Friedman 
27) 
It is characteristic of Didion that she portrays herself 
depreciatingly as "a slow study," when her incisive comments 
on contemporary life are evidence to the contrary. 
It is also characteristic that she describes disillu­
sionment in sensual terms. Didion's explanation of why she 
became a writer involves the same combination of self-
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deprecation and concrete induction. In "Why I Write," which 
was first published in The New York Times Book Review, 
Didion explains that her emergence as a writer was founded 
on her failure as a thinkers 
I am not in the least an intellectual, which is not to 
say that when I hear the word "intellectual" I reach 
for my gun, but only to say that I do not think in 
abstracts. During the years when I was an undergradu­
ate at Berkeley I tried, with a kind of hopeless late-
adolescent energy, to buy some temporary visa into the 
world of ideas, to forge for myself a mind that could 
deal with the abstract. 
In short I tried to think. I failed. My attention 
veered inexorably back to the specific, to the tangi­
ble, to what was generally considered, by everyone I 
knew then and for that matter have known since, the 
peripheral. (Friedman 5) 
Fortunately, she abandoned the quest to be an intellec­
tual and concentrated instead on apprehending the world 
through the concrete. After graduating from Berkeley in 
1956, she moved to New York to work for Vogue, having won a 
writing competition sponsored by that magazine. At Vogue 
she was first assigned to write captions. Kakutani inter­
viewed her former editor, Allene Talmey, whom he describes 
as "a perfectionist" and who explained that she asked Didion 
to "write three hundred to four hundred words and then cut 
it back to fifty. We wrote long and published short and by 
doing that Joan learned to write" (Friedman 35-36). Didion's 
captions were often descriptions of elaborately decorated 
rooms. Later she "went on to write stories on furniture, 
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homes and personalities; the exercises honed her unfailing 
eye for detail and fine-tuned her lean prose" (36). 
While she was in New York, the pull of the West never 
ceased for Didion. Her first novel Run RiverP which she 
wrote in New York, was set in the Sacramento Valley. After 
her 1964 marriage to Dunne, who wrote for Time, she and her 
new husband moved back to California. One of her essays 
records her sense of alienation in New York—"Goodbye to All 
That,"—and most are concerned in some way with California, 
even though she believes the "real" California, of farms and 
small town politics and Western self-reliance, is disap­
pearing. In "Notes from a Native Daughter" she says that 
it is hard to find California now, unsettling to wonder 
how much of it was merely imagined or improvised; 
melancholy to realize how much of anyone's memory is no 
true memory at all but only the traces of someone 
else's memory, stories handed down on the family 
network. (177) 
California itself is a concrete example and distilla­
tion for Didion of the larger sense of loss shared by 
everyone in the face of the social upheavals of the last 
several decades and a sign as well of how the old meanings 
were as sadly insubstantial as the new ones. Nevertheless, 
she continues to refer to these older traditions and locates 
her own set of values within them. Thus she can tell 
Kakutani that her dislike of the reasonable "middle road" 
and her concomitant affection for "extremes" is probably a 
190 
result of her background "as a daughter of the Golden West." 
(Friedman 33}. The stories of "extreme action" may not have 
been entirely true, but nevertheless inform her moral code. 
We can see that Didion is a sort of representative 
"fideistic" skeptic, who realizes that many of the "truths" 
that people hold dear are false, but who continues to search 
for the meaning behind events anyway. Along the way, she 
turns her clear eye not only on the new myths engendered by 
the movies and the press, but on the equally fallacious and 
probably more destructive "systems" which have taken the 
place of the old stories. 
For example, one of her finest essays, "Some Dreamers 
of the Golden Dream," is an attempt by Didion to explain a 
San Bernardino County wife's murder of her dentist husband 
by seeing it not as an isolated aberration, but as an 
exaggeration of a common phenomenon. Didion suggests that 
Lucille Maxwell, the "high spirited" wife, saw her life as a 
melodrama. Thus her affair with a local lawyer and her 
subsequent murder of her husband is portrayed by Didion 
(like so many other social breakdowns) the nightmarish 
result of people living lives according to the movies. The 
people of San Bernardino County have abandoned their 
traditional religious fundamentalism for an equally devout 
belief in Hollywood. Explains Didion: 
This is the county in which a belief in the literal 
interpretation of Genesis has slipped imperceptibly 
191 
into a belief in the literal interpretation of Double 
Indemnity .... Here is where the hot wind blows and 
the old ways do not seem relevant, where the divorce 
rate is double the national average and where one 
person in every thirty-eight lives in a trailer. Here 
is the last stop for all those who come from somewhere 
else, for all those who drifted away from the cold and 
the past and the old ways. Here is where they are 
trying to find a new life stylev trying to find it in 
the only places they know to look; the movies and the 
newspapers. (SB 4) 
As Didion describes events leading up to the murder, 
she increasingly uses the narrative mode—recreating 
conversations between Lucille and her lover, paraphrasing 
the trial transcript—although she firmly directs the piece 
with discursive evaluations used as rhetorical markers along 
the way. Thus she begins her discussion of the Maxwells' 
marriage with a variation of the beginning of Anna Karenina. 
a marker which reiterates her view of the murder as paradigm 
rather than aberration; 
Unhappy marriages so resemble one another that we do 
not need to know too much about the course of this one. 
There may or may not have been trouble on Guam, where 
Cork and Lucille Miller lived while he finished his 
Army duty. There may or may not have been problems in 
the small Oregon town where he first set up private 
practice. (8) 
Didion's seeming lack of interest in the details of the 
Maxwells' trouble is another strategy which subordinates the 
particulars of the narrative to its universal significance. 
This is usually the case in her essays; the details of a 
narrative are the concrete universals of a moral. Her 
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statement that she has trouble "opening up" is plausible: 
she uses the details of people's lives—including her own— 
to make larger points rather than to express idiosyncracies. 
Keeping her eye on the commonality of experience disciplines 
and directs her essays and also contributes to their 
"coolness" of tone. 
The rhetorical use of narrative in essays is not a 
technique invented by the new journalists such as Didion, 
although new journalists have successfully, even spectacu­
larly, exploited the resources of dialogue and realistic 
"plot." Other essay writers from Montaigne with his 
personal exempla to present-day political satirists such 
as Calvin Trillin, Russell Baker, and Art Buchwald consis­
tently have used stories to make arguments. Didion, 
however, is a particularly interesting example of a narra­
tive essayist, since she brings her gifts for the lyrical 
and the ironic to the challenge of addressing subjects of 
high moral, seriousness. As Joyce Carol Oates has written? 
Joan Didion is not, of course, alone in her passionate 
investigation of the atomization of contemporary 
society. But she is one of the few writers of our time 
who approaches her terrible subject with absolute 
seriousness, with fear and humility and awe. Her 
powerful irony is often sorrowful rather than clever. 
(Friedman 140) 
Oates, like so many of Didion's critics, notes the 
dispassionate quality of Didion's prose in which "very 
little emotion is expressed" (140). Her explanation, like 
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John Hollowell's, is that this coolness is meant as a kind 
of mirror of a world in which horrible events numb expres­
sion: "Emotion itself has become atrophied," writes Oates 
(140). Such explanations overlook one of the traditional 
rhetorical strengths of irony, that is, that an ironic 
narrator transfers the emotional "work" of a piece to his 
audience. A satirist like Swift or an ironic essayist like 
Didion purport to give us just the story, although the 
elements of the story are calculated to powerfully affect 
us. Coolness of tone is essential, since an enraged or 
distraught author/narrator frees and distances an audience 
from the burden of emotion. 
In the following analysis of two of Didion's essaysa we 
can see irony as a way not only of disciplining potentially 
melodramatic subjects but, paradoxically, as a way of 
emotionally engaging an audience. Didion®s use of irony is 
in counterpoint to her gift fcr lyrical narration* which 
emotionally captures her audience in as powerful a way as 
her irony. 
In "On Morality" (SB 157-163), Didion solves the 
immemorial problem of all essayists in making didacticism 
palatable. The problem in this essay is compounded because 
her subject is, after all, so obviously "moralistic." 
Through her use of evocative examples, manipulation of 
modes, and voice modulation, Didion preaches a sermon so 
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subtly that the mood of the essay accomplishes what strings 
of aphorisms could not in this anti-authoritarian age. 
"On Morality,n like so many of Didion®s titles ("Cali­
fornia Dreaming," "The White Album,™ "Slouching toward 
Bethlehem") resonates with allusion. In this case the title 
is forthright and ironic at the same time. The essay is an 
attempt to define morality, but it is not the measured 
definition of a Baconian essayist. Instead, Didion uses 
Montaigne's inductive method of recounting several examples 
as evidence for her general proposition that morality can 
only be ascribed to those actions which contribute to 
"survival, not the attainment of the ideal good" (159); 
Throughout this essay she repeats variations and specific 
terms of that proposition; morality concerns those "promises 
we make to one another"? "personal conscience" as a measure 
of morality is actually its antithesis? championing causes 
may be a diversion from thinking about the difficult 
problems closer to home. 
For Didion readers, this essay is another articulation 
of a consistent theme in the essays, that is, an attempt to 
regenerate "wagon train morality" (158), which is an indivi­
dualism circumscribed by a social context and disciplined by 
tradition. What Didion abjures is a romantic idea of 
personal, extemporaneous virtue, the way of "madmen" and 
murderers, she warns. 
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"I followed my own conscience." "I did what I thought 
was right." How many madmen have said it and meant it? 
How many murderers? Klaus Fuchs said it, and the men 
who committed the Mountain Meadows Massacre said it, 
and Alfred Rosenberg said it. And, as we are rotely 
and rather presumptuously reminded by those who would 
say it now, Jesus said it. Maybe we have all said it, 
and maybe we have been wrong. Except on that most 
primitive level—our loyalties to those we love—what 
could be more arrogant than to claim the primacy of 
personal conscience? (161) 
This discursive passage—rather rare in the essay—is 
followed immediately by a self-deprecating example in which 
Didion posits a moral world dependent on her own moods. 
Since most readers have a picture of Didion as a rather 
neurotic pessimist the example is particularly effective* 
We know she sees the world at times "as a painting by 
Hieronymous Bosch" (161), and we do not want the persona of 
the essays "The White Album" or "Slouching toward Bethlehem" 
deciding our fate. 
Didion's larger exempla in the essay are even more 
effective, since they evoke the somber mood which under­
scores the essay's theme. "Wagon Train Morality" is a 
simple code which pertains only to issues of survival, and, 
appropriately, Didion's examples are anecdotes from a summer 
night in Death Valley—the all night vigil of a talc miner 
with the body of a teenager killed in a car accident, the 
futile effort by sheriff's deputies to find missing divers. 
These are examples of "promises we make to one another" not 
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to abandon our dead to the coyotes or the dark, water of 
underground pools. 
Didion evokes the spirit of Death Valley through her 
lyric gift for the particular; it is the "lunar country" of 
119 degree heat, rattlesnakes, scavenging coyotes, dying 
Midwesterners at the Faith Community Church singing "Rock of 
Ages Cleft for Me" and the mysterious pools of hot water 
which may be linked to underground nuclear testing. 
The widow of one of the drowned boys is over there; she 
is eighteen, and pregnant, and is said not to leave the 
hole. The divers go down and come up, and she just 
stands there and stares into the water. They have been 
diving for ten days but have found no bottom to the 
caves, no bodies and no trace of them, only the black 
90 water going down and down and down, and a single 
translucent fish, not classified. The story tonight is 
that one of the divers has been hauled up incoherent, 
out of his head, shouting—until they got hire out of 
there so that the widow could not hear—about water 
that got hotter instead of cooler as he went down, 
about light flickering through the water, about magma, 
about underground nuclear testing. (160) 
The conscious rhythm of this passage—the repetition of 
"no," "down," "about"—as well as the dense texture of 
modifiers are balanced against a homely diction—"she just 
stands there," "until they got him out of there so that the 
widow could not hear." The method is the time-honored one 
of horror stories, in which the everyday is juxtaposed 
against the mysterious and awful. Didion's voice, charac­
teristically objective, heightens the horror by playing 
against it. Information about the pathetic wife is given in 
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the stolid prose of newspaper reporting, and "single 
translucent fish, not classified" in the diction of a 
scientific report. 
The tone is consistent throughout the essay, which 
begins in the dramatic mode; "As it happens, I am in Death 
Valley, in a room at the Enterprise Motel and Trailer Park," 
she informs her readers without noting the metaphorical 
significance of that statement. The offhand voice continues 
as she explains her motive for writing such a portentous 
essay: The American Scholar asked her to. (Didion's piece 
is very different from the other contributors to the 
magazines1 s forum on morality. She has chosen to present 
her thoughts dramatically and in concrete terms. This 
calculated approach is a counterbalance to—and, perhaps a 
kind of criticism of—the abstract definitions offered by 
the other participants.) 
Didion's off-hand explanation helps to undercut any 
unpleasant aura of lecturing which might hang over such an 
essay. Instead, Didion pictures herself as not only coming 
to the task under the gun of a deadline but uncomfortable 
and distracted as well: 
I cannot seem to make the air conditioner work, but 
there is a small refrigerator, and I can wrap ice cubes 
in a towel and hold them against the small of my back. 
With the help of the ice cubes I have been trying to 
think, because The American Scholar asked me to, in 
some abstract way about "morality," a word I distrust 
more every day, but my mind veers inflexibly toward the 
particular. (157) 
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Like the dark underground pools, a sense of the macabre 
and sinister underlies this essay. Didion twice mentions 
nuclear weapons; first in the context of the diving anec­
dote, and second in a quotation from The Deer Park in which 
a character looks toward Los Alamos and wishes for the 
"white dead dawn" to "clear the rot and the stench" (161). 
Didion, in her- Hieronymous Bosch mood, sometimes wishes the 
same thing, she admits. Is Didion's repeated use of nuclear 
explosion as metaphor an accident? It is unlikely, given 
the careful attention lavished on every other element of 
this essay. 
In fact, nuclear disaster is, perhaps, the most 
important "particular" in the essay, but of such magnitude 
that Didion wisely alludes to it rather than uses it, as 
does Lewis Thomas, as the theme of the essay. In defining 
morality as "survival," Didion prepares the way, with a 
subtle reminder here and there, for her readers to conclude 
that nuclear weapons may be the ultimate violation of the 
"promises we make to one another," This is the unspoken 
text of the essay, and one which is most powerful because it 
is unstated. With such subtlety and respect for her 
audience, Didion's essay achieves what a more overtly 
persuasive essay could not. Her conclusion, which is also 
highly patterned and rhythmic, is equivalent to a lyric 
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refrain, continuing in the mind's ear as a reminder and a 
source of formal assent: 
When we start deceiving ourselves into thinking not 
that we want something or need something, not that it 
is a pragmatic necessity for us to have it, but that it 
is a moral imperative that we have it, then is when we 
join the fashionable madmen, and then is when the thin 
whine of hysteria is heard in the land, and then is 
when we are in bad trouble. And I suspect we are 
already there. (163) 
The ironic tone of "Good Citizens" (WA 86-95) is much 
lighter than that of "On Morality." Didion uses a triptych 
of "jump shots" making no effort to bridge between each 
section. As in "The White Album" and "Slouching toward 
Bethlehem," the aim of "Good Citizens" is the portrayal of 
the bulwarks which people erect to make sense of things—the 
stories they tell themselves. The abrupt shifts from one 
story to another seem to formally duplicate the disorienting 
cultural shifts which wash around such fragile bulwarks. 
The first section is an acrid description of politics, 
Hollywood style. Didion depicts the shallowness and naivete 
of politically active movie makers through anecdote and 
quotation. Unlike "On Morality," "Good Citizens" contains 
many general statements—perhaps because the subject is more 
emotionally manageable. 
The public life of liberal Hollywood comprises a kind 
of dictatorship of good intentions, a social contract 
in which actual and irreconcilable disagreement is as 
taboo as failure or bad teeth, a climate devoid of 
irony. (86-87) 
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Because the "climate" is devoid of argument, according 
to Didion, Hollywood people use the "borrowed rhetoric" of 
mass rallies to articulate political ideas, chanting "Mo man 
is an island" at dinner parties and thinking they are 
quoting Hemingway (86). Didion's essay is laced with a 
delicate malice, the sort of attack favored by the new 
journalists who are such excellent mimics of unguarded 
conversation. And like Tom Wolfe, for example, Didion seems 
to have no trouble cornering invitations to the parties she 
parodies. The central anecdote of this section is a 
"debate" she witnessed at a Beverly Hills club organized to 
raise money for Eugene McCarthy's campaign. Didion, 
characteristically, relates the details of the event with 
deadpan delivery. The "debate" was an incongruous contest 
between William Styron and Ossie Davis, the actor. 
It was Mr. Davis® contention that in writing The 
Confessions of Hat Turner Mr. Styron had encouraged 
racism ("Nat Turner's love for a white maiden, I feel 
my country can become psychotic about this"), and it 
was Mr. Styron's contention that he had not. (David 
Wolper, who had bought the motion picture rights to Nat 
Turner, had already made his position clears "How can 
anyone protest a book," he had asked in the trade 
press, "that has withstood the critical test of time 
since last October?") (87-88) 
The subject of the debate, of course, is so much 
moonshine, an excuse for theatrics: "James Baldwin sat 
between them, his eyes closed and his head thrown back in 
understandable but rather theatrical agony" (88). In fact, 
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their vision of life as a script is Didion's explanation for 
the almost touching credulity of movie people when con­
fronting social problems, "What we are talking about here 
is faith in a dramatic convention" (88). Her series of 
examples to back up this assertion are sharp, funny, and 
devastating. 
If Budd Schulberg goes into Watts and forms a Writers' 
Workshop, then "Twenty Young Writers" must emerge from 
it, because the scenario in question is the familiar 
one about how the ghetto teems with raw talent and 
vitality. If the poor people march on Washington and 
camp out, there to receive bundles of clothes gathered 
on the Fox lot by Barbra Streisand, then some good must 
come of it (the script here has a great many dramatic 
staples, not the least of them a sentimental notion of 
Washington as an open forum, cf. Mr» Deeds r,np.q to 
Washington) , and doubts have no place in the story. 
(88-89) 
The next section of the essay is an account of a 
television crew's filming of Nancy Reagan doing something 
"ordinary" in the Governor's Mansion. The "ordinary" thing 
turns out to be Mrs. Reagan's picking flowers in the garden-
-a pretty scene suggested by the film crew. Most of the 
section is a transcription of the chatter between Nancy 
Reagan and the crew. This non-event is even less substan­
tial than the non-debate between Davis and Styron. Didion 
inserts enough discursive markers to guide the reader to see 
the inanity of the conversation. 
"Indeed it is," Nancy Reagan said with spirit. Nancy 
Reagan says almost everything with spirit, perhaps 
because she was once an actress and has the beginning 
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actress's habit of investing even the most casual lines 
with a good deal more dramatic emphasis than is 
ordinarily called for on a Tuesday morning on 45th 
Street in Sacramento. (90) 
The closing bit of dialogue in the section is a kind of 
comic emblem of Didion's views of the fictions of modern 
life. The newsman in charge encourages Mrs. Reagan to "nip" 
a rhododendron bud. 
"Let's have a dry run," the cameraman said. 
The newsman looked at him. "In other words, by a 
dry run, you mean you want her to fake nipping the 
bud." 
"Fake the nip, yeah," the cameraman said. "Fake the 
nip." (92) 
Didion tells us in "On Keeping a Notebook" (SB 131-141) that 
she collects such bits of dialogue to remember whole scenes, 
to recreate a mood. The mood of this section of the essay 
is mocking amusement, with little undertow of the charac­
teristic Didion pessimism. Sandwiched between the first and 
last sections, however, it seems a facet of a more serious 
subject--the delusions, benign and malignant, which we 
mistake for truths. The last section of "Good Citizens" 
opens in a darker mood. The rain streaming down the faded, 
vacant buildings of Santa Monica heightens "the most 
characteristic Santa Monica effect, that air of dispirited 
abandon which suggests that the place survives only as 
illustration of a boom gone bankrupt" (92). In this long 
opening paragraph, Didion describes the President's Luncheon 
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at the Jaycee Convention which is being held in Santa 
Monica. Onstage the New Generation are singing cheerful 
Disney songs while at the head table a pretty young wife is 
crying into her napkin and saying over and over "Let someone 
else eat this slop" (92), 
Such a scene is vintage Didion—the woman who is 
cracking up set against the dutifully "positive" Jaycees. 
Once again Didion provides an emblem fox a fractured society 
in which those people who live lives "devoid of irony"— 
Hollywood activists, Governors® wives, Jaycees—must avoid 
looking at things as they are so that they can keep their 
places in the script. The essay, which begins light-
heartedly, ends on a note of pathoss 
Late one afternoon I sat in the Miramar lobby, watching 
the rain fall and the steam rise off the heated pool 
outside and listening to a couple of Jaycees discussing 
student unrest and whether the "solution" might not lie 
in on-campus Jaycee groups. I thought about this 
astonishing notion for a long time. It occurred to me 
finally that I was listening to a true underground, to 
the voice of all those who have felt themselves not 
merely shocked but personally betrayed by recent 
history. it was supposed to have been their time. It 
was not. (95) 
One of Didion®s gifts is her ability to elicit sympathy 
for unsympathetic subjects. She manages this feat, for 
example, with the Haight-Asbury hippies in "Slouching toward 
Bethlehem," the murderess Lucille Maxwell, and, in this 
essay, with the Jaycees. Didion is good at drawing lines of 
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association between such exotica and ourselves, the "ordin­
ary" ones. 
In "Good Citizens," she reminds us that the "ideas" of 
the Jaycees are the ideas shared by most people in small 
towns and some in cities, "ideas shared in an unexamined way 
even by those who laughed at the Jaycees1 boosterism and 
pancake breakfasts and safe-driving Road-e-os" (93). The 
notion of "business success as a transcendent ideal," 
however, had fallen on hard times in the late sixties when 
she wrote this essay, and the rain-drenched peeling build­
ings of Santa Monica seems an appropriate spot for a 
convention honoring those ideas. 
Didion's ability to translate common experience into 
the particular is the lyricist's gift as is her ability to 
manage language so that the rhythm and sound of the words 
carry the mood. In the first paragraph of "Good Citizens," 
she moves effortlessly from the drenching rain outside the 
convention to the tense scene inside. With her use of 
anaphora—"It scaled still more paint from the faded hotels 
. . . .It streamed down the blank windows"—she portrays the 
relentless rain. With polysyndeton—"keynote banquets and 
award luncheons and prayer breakfasts and outstanding-young-
men-forums"— she represents the determined energy of the 
Jaycee delegates. And twice, as a kind of frame and 
refrain, she mentions the "pretty young wife" who is 
breaking down emotionally. It is an almost perfectly 
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rendered emblem—as is the stark, primal world of Death 
Valley—of Didion's notion of a world in which the old 
values do not work and are, indeed, under constant siege. 
When one reads "Good Citizens," "On Morality," and 
other Didion essays twenty years after their first publica­
tion, they seem surprisingly fresh and relevant. The 
reasons that this is so are external to Didion's vision, on 
the one hand, and inherent in it, on the other. Contemp­
orary culture is still in disorienting flux, and we have not 
recaptured the insulated calm of an earlier age. Didion's 
irony continues to be the best recourse in a world in which 
traditions and the promises we make each other have tenuous 
holds. The essays by Didion which emerged from the turbu­
lent sixties and early seventies are not only responses 
to a specific historical moment, however, but also a 
statement of an enduring theme: all our meanings are 
fictions, but some are truer than others. 
Conclusion 
In reading the lyrical essays of Thomas and Didion we 
enter the farthest reaches of the reflective-exploratory 
genre, the steppes of rhetoric and the foothills of poetry. 
Both writers have the poet's eye for analogy and metaphor 
and the poet's ear for rhythm and pattern; both depend on a 
subjective, often self-deprecating voice as an instrument of 
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their rhetoric; both rely on precisely drawn emblems, 
enigmas and other exempla to carry the meaning of their 
moral lessons; both understand the uses of irony in leaven­
ing melodrama and posturing. These common traits are an 
inheritance from the Montaignesque tradition, in which 
laboring to give the appearance of casual ruminating and 
offhand storytelling is the stock in trade of essayists as 
covertly serious about drawing moral conclusion as the more 
overtly didactic Baconian essayists. 
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A CONCLUDING ESSAY 
(IN THE CONTEMPORARY MANNER) 
"I think I'd like to like write about %Hands across 
America,'" my student tells me. We talk some more about 
organization and framing and she leaves happy. 
I'm not so happy. Teaching freshmen to write essays, 
writing a dissertation about essays, and writing essays from 
time to time myself have left me punch drunk. In short, I 
am wary of essays. Seeing how things work—the kitchen in 
the restaurant, the motor in the music box—turns ones 
thoughts from romance to technology. 
Essays are everywhere these days—neat little construc­
tions of wit and whimsy in magazines and advertising supple­
ments, on the backs of herbal tea boxes, even on the evening 
news in the form of "commentaries" by earnest "analysts." 
As I have said earlier in this dissertation, we are starving 
for interpretation and essays are attempts to provide a 
flood wall against the Mississippi of information which 
threatens to drown us. 
But I worry about this trend. My student thinks her 
essay will capture her experience in Raleigh when she and 
her roommate joined hands with other sincere people on the 
state capitol grounds and felt good inside. It might, but 
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my question is whether or not my sanctioning of such a 
project is a good idea, and in a larger sense, whether the 
public's sanctioning of thousands of such projects is a good 
idea. If essayists are natural born skeptics, then they'd 
better be skeptical about essays., 
Essayists often practice the form as an adjunct to 
something else—Paul Fussell* and Lewis Thomas are academic 
scholars? Paul Theroux, Joan Didion, and Calvin Trillin are 
journalists and fiction writers., They bring to their essays 
a store of knowledge and borrowed techniques. Often, too, 
essayists are people who have tried writing long and 
discovered they do better writing short. And they have a 
steady audience; many people these days read short. The 
greatest advantage of the contemporary essay as a genre is 
its brevity, a characteristic, by the way, which is not part 
of the legacy of Montaigne, whose essays sometimes run to 
thirty or more pages® 
My worry concerns this "advantage.". What is happening 
to the long thoughts that are being pushed aside by reading 
and writing short? Of course, a good deal of reflection 
lies behind such a provocative essay as "Slouching towards 
Bethlehem," and the ideas suggested should inspire a 
reader's lengthy contemplation, as well. But these thoughts 
are articulated in the shorthand of the lyrical 
essayist--not staked out and dissected. Such is the 
persuasive way of the essay, to suggest rather than to 
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insist. Even the essayists who follow the plain-speaking 
Bacon charm their audiences with witty allusions and 
narratives, rather than categories and reasons., 
Perhaps the essay has spoiled us, so that we insist on charm 
and ease in everything. In 1987 we find a polemicist like 
George Will using example and dialogue more often than 
cold-blooded deliberation to carry his point. We find Paul 
Fussell softening his acerbic literary analyses with 
personal anecdotes. And I find more and more students who 
are impatient with and confused by anything but the inviting 
prose of the reflective essayist. 
"Boring," they say of Conrad or Hawthorne. 
"You can't understand it," they complain of The 
Federalist Papers or even "The Declaration of Independence." 
Often, instead of burdening them with more "hard" 
thought, we give them the easily digested essays of 
E.B. White and tell them to emulate him. White, however— 
and Fussell, Theroux, Will, Trillin, Orwell—learned their 
craft not by studying each other, but by reading first the 
"hard" things. Sometimes I wonder if we are making people 
dumber by giving them the top of the heap instead of the 
bottom. And sometimes I visualize the whole of serious, 
difficult discourse flowing toward the warm sea of subjec­
tivity and simple plots. 
That is what I think when I worry about the essay—usu­
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ally when I've just read a particularly silly student essay 
or had one of my own rejected. 
On the other hand (the essayist's motto), even in these 
dark moments, I know not only that many essayists have 
written at length about difficult matters but also that the 
essay form itself is invaluable in this age of confusion. 
The essay, just as in the Renaissance, provides a well 
wrought urn for rhetorical discourse, the sort of discourse 
fostered by and necessary in unpredictable times. 
And I know another good thing about the essay. Not 
only has it influenced more stolid deliberation, it has also 
influenced literature. If one accepts Tom Wolfe's conten­
tion that many contemporary fiction writers have abandoned 
realism, to our sorrow, then the influence of the essay on 
literature is a happy development. 
I offer as evidence the strange and phenomenal success 
of Garrison Keillor whose hybrid essay/stories represent, I 
think, a new shift in fiction, and, perhaps, a reconnection 
with realism—and rhetoric. Calvin Trillin, who writes 
brilliantly funny essay/stories himself, told me once that 
he believes Keillor is a genius of a singular kind, one who 
dreams up plots as he goes along—plots with a point. His 
"News from Lake Wobegon" on his radio program, A Prairie 
Home Companionf is a free-fall act, the oral equivalent of 
composing an essay, but with the disadvantage of no revi­
sion. 
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In 1985, Keillor published Lake Wobegon Days, a 
collection of stories, many of which had first appeared in 
oral form on his radio program. The book was a wildly 
improbable success, remaining week after week on The New 
York Times Bestseller List. What was going on here? The 
stories are moralistic, grounded in an unmistakable, but 
tolerant, version of the Midwestern ethic, and contrary to 
Fussell's dry opinion that no one these days will sit still 
for an undisguised ethical essay, people were not only 
buying multiple copies of the book but listening to varia­
tions of the same moral stories on Saturday night. 
Keillor's comic gift as well as his ability to create 
recognizable characters are the staples of his sermonic 
stories. Just as Theroux's travelogues and Thomas's biology 
lessons are the trappings for their moral essays, so too are 
Keillor's familiar cast of middle-class, middle Americans in 
Lake Woebegon. 
The stories seem to tap deep underground streams of 
shared memories and values. As Didion notes in "Good 
Citizens," the small-town ethic lies in the near-background 
of almost every American; when Keillor tells stories of 
Dorothy at The Chatterbox Cafe, or Ralph at Ralph's Pretty 
Good Grocery, or Our Lady of Perpetual Responsibility 
Catholic Church, or the always losing Lake Wobegon Whippets, 
his audiences recognize themselves and the familiar, secure, 
and oppressive life of a small town. Nevertheless, small 
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town life is disappearing, and Keillor's stories evoke both 
recognition and nostalgia for the old traditions, the old 
"wagon train morality" we once shared. 
The stories are a source not only of moral lessons but 
of cohesion as well. The latter is a surprise, since a 
commonplace these days is that our culture is so diverse and 
fragmented that there are not many sources of community that 
we share or even remember,, In fact, that is the ideology of 
those who say that rhetoric in the classical sense is 
impossible. But Keillor proves every Saturday night that 
the "community" still exists. One portion of each week's 
show is his reading of messages written by listeners to each 
other. When you hear these funny, corny messages—"To 
Grandmother on her ninetieth birthday," "To Barbara: please 
return yourself or my typewriter"—you feel an unexpected 
sense of exhilaration. Maybe things are not so strange 
after all. 
Surprising too, and more related to this study, is the 
fact that the fictional dimension of the Lake Woebegon 
stories is transparent. Keillor has formed a cheerfully 
casual pact with his audience; we will pretend together 
that this place exists, and part of the fun is knowing all 
the time that it doesn't. Certainly, it is a different sort 
of pact than one makes with a writer like Faulkner; the 
texture of the fictional Yoknapatawpha County is so deep 
that we must wade right in without thinking of the shore. 
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Keillor, however, consistently gives us our bearings; "Just 
because these people are. fictional doesn't mean they don't 
have feelings," he says from time to time. If people are 
seduced by Keillor's story line into taking their moral 
medicine, then the seduction is much more forthright than 
that of the travel essayist or book reviewer. In Keillor's 
Lake Wobegon stories, rhetoric is as obvious as the story. 
Keillor's career is an interesting contrast to other 
essayists who began as something else. He began as an 
essayist, and still writes essays of the more recognizable 
form from time to time. But his amazing success with the 
Lake Woebegon stories suggests another direction for the 
essay. If the association of the essay and deliberation is 
sometimes contemptibly familiar, the association of the 
essay and literature is not. The spirit of the essay—its 
rhetorical point and clarity—-could entice some "untrained" 
readers back to serious fiction. 
This is what I think when I am feeling good about the 
essay, when I have listened to A Prairie Home Companion or 
read a thoughtful student paper or finished a dissertation. 
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